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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
EXCHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT
A Systems Approach to the Structuring of the International
Economic System

by
THOMAS BAUMGARTNER

The institutions and structures of the International
Economic System (IES) become increasingly questioned as the
countries of the Third World insistently demand a New Inter
national Economic and Political Order (NIEPO).

In this con

text, the analysis of international economic exchange requires
a more detailed and differentiated set of actors, and a multi
dimensional conceptualization of economic valuables and actors'
goals, including, besides the economic dimension, social, po
litical, cultural and military aspects of exchange.

Further

more, a dynamic analysis of international exchange has to in
corporate the constraints placed on actors by IES institutions
and structures, the actors' attempts to shape institutions and
structures favorable to their action opportunities, and the
feedback patterns which link the aggregate multi-dimensional
exchange outcomes to the maintenance or transformation of the
IES.

Such an analysis has to include as inputs into and out

puts from the operation of the IES inequalities in control by
actors over valuables and power resources and in actors' po
sitions in the structure of relationships.

The existence of

conflict between actors, and of patterns of dominance and de
pendency, is fundamental to this conceptualization of the IES.
This focus implies a political economy approach to inter
national economic exchange where economic behavior is analyzed
as an integral part of behavior in a social system encompassing
economic, social, cultural, political and military spheres.
The multi-dimensionality of economic exchange, the feed-back
patterns between the multiple levels of the IES, and the role
of power inequalities necessitate

the use of a systems method

of analysis.
A review of International trade theories and their em
pirical verifications shows that the strict assumptions of
the Heckscher-Ohlin model have undergone modifications and re
laxations and have been alternatively formulated to include,
mostly implicitly, elements of the systems model mentioned
above.

Accordingly, Chapter III presents a more formal de

scription of systems elements: the hierarchy of actors and
their goals and action opportunities; the multi-dimensionality
of valuables; the occurrence of systemic ramifications, i.e.,
the non-evaluated spin-off and spill-over effects of exchange
activities by lower-level actors.

The unequal accrual of power

resources to actors in the IES through systemic ramifications
is defined as unequal exchange.

Higher-level actors particu

larly attempt to structure and restructure the IES to generate
unequal exchange patterns where a country's lower-level actors
have action and exchange opportunities which produce positive
systemic and power ramifications.
Chapter IV elaborates on systems internal restructuring
in response to events in the IES.

The reactions of five Eu

ropean countries to the fall in the wheat price after 1870
illustrate the proposition that restructuring is in part de
termined by the interests of those groups which possess meta
power with which to institute adjustments favorable to their
group interests.
Chapter V elaborates on two aspects of the structuring
of the IES.

The first, the development of an unequal exchange

system between Portugal and England in the 17th century,

viii

demonstrates how the dominant groups in Portugal exchanged
economic concessions with long-term negative developmental
ramifications for short-run military and political support
measures by England.

These higher-level exchanges helped to

maintain the groups' continued dominance and favored their
economic interests,, all, however, to the detriment of the
political and economic long-run development of Portugal.

The

second case demonstrates the use of a position of world dom
inance by the U.S. during World War II to realize, through
the IMF, World Bank and GATT, the American conception of a
democratic economic world order with favorable consequences
for her own commercial interests.

However, the power relations

implied by the Bretton Woods institutions were different than
those actually existing at the end of World War II and those
later emerging with the economic development in Europe and
Japan, with the result, that these institutions played their
assigned role only for a few years after 1958.
Chapter VI deals with the problem of domination and de
velopment and the origins of systems transformations.

The case

of Comecon illustrates the dilemma faced by a dominant country,
here the Soviet Union, between a strategy of divide and rule
to ensure its continued dominance, and the development of in
stitutions and structures favoring cooperation, growth and de
velopment necessitated by competition with another developing
system.

The second case traces the origins of the present con

flict between OPEC and OECD.

On the one hand, the exploita

tion of the oil producing countries led to the formation of
OPEC.

On the other, the rapid economic growth in the OECD area

shifted patterns of oil production and consumption.

Both

factors increased the relative power of the countries united
in OPEC leading to increased oil revenues and control over oil
production.

OPEC is therefore in a position to engage, to

gether with other Third World countries, in further attempts
to restructure the IES in tune with their interests and vision
of a less unequal world.
The concluding chapter suggests that the case studies
have demonstrated the usefulness and fruitfulness of the sys
tems approach to the political economy of the IES.

Yet, this

is clearly only the beginning of a further elaboration, formal
ization and verification of the systems approach to problems
of international economic exchange, development and transforma
tion of the IES.

x

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Today’s international economic system (IES) is under
attack.

The countries of the Third World (UDC) demand with

increasing insistency,at

least since UNCTAD I in 1964 but

especially since the events of October 19733

a revision of

the rules and institutions governing international trade and
investment as well as international financial and monetary
matters.'*'

Academic and official views in the industrialized

countries (DC), confronted with the failure of the development
strategies of the 1950’s and 1960's to reduce inequality on the
world level and to bring about self-sustained growth except

in

a few highly favored countries, are increasingly willing to
consider and discuss such a course of action.

The speech of

the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the 7th Special
Session of the UN General Assembly in 1975 provided assurances
of an American willingness to participate in such discussions
(Kissinger, 1975b).
However, UDC demand the establishment of a New Inter
national Economic and Political Order (NIEPO) (Bergsten, 1975;

For the present purpose all countries not belonging
to the Comecon or the OECD (the developed countries -DC) are
included in the category of Third World or underdeveloped
countries (UDC). This is a short-hand way of talking about
the world situation and fundamental interests in the world
system.
1

2
Gardner et^. al., 1974)2 while the larger industrialized
countries belonging to the OECD seem to consider at most some
marginal adjustments.

On the other hand, some representatives

of OECD countries take the increasing interdependency of the
world’s countries as a fundamentally new fact which demands
basic adjustments in the world system (Cooper, 1968, 1972a;
Brown, 1972; Duchene at. al., 1974; Moynihan, 1975)*^

Some

believe on the one hand in the need for, and the coming of,
some form of world government.

Their research is consequently

directed towards the development of 'preferred world futures',
the institutions made necessary by them, and the desired
transition paths who could get us from the present to these
futures.^

Others have subsumed the fact of world wide inter

dependency in the metaphor of 'spaceship earth'.

They argue

that the global system is facing in the near future limits to

2The declaration and action program "The Establishment
of a New International Economic Order" passed at the Special
Session of the UN General Assembly on "Problems of Raw Materials
and Development" in May 1974 is reprinted in the UN Monthly
Chronicle, May 1974. The resolution passed at the Special
Session in September 1975 on "The Development of International
Economic Cooperation" is contained in the UN Chronicle of
October 1975*
^However Waltz (1970) maintains that at least the
larger DC still possess an absolute freedom of action.
^The World Order Models Project is centrally concerned
with the conceptualization of such alternative 'just world orders'
(Bhagwati, 1972a; Mendlovitz, 1975)* The concerns and goals of
this project are not necessarily the same as those underlying
the views and demands of the UDC with respect to a NIEPO.
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its growth in population and material well-being (Meadows et.
a l ., 1972; Mesarovic and Pestel, 197*0-

The implicit or ex

plicit conclusion is that only structural and institutional
changes both on national and world levels will keep the world
system safely within the limits of a finite environment.

The

only difference is that some believe that the world will
gradually and almost automatically evolve towards such a new
structural and institutional setting while others see the need
for rapid, planned and coordinated policy responses in the next
few decades.
But whatever view or approach is taken, the structure and
institutions of the International Economic System (IES) are
centrally involved in these considerations and deliberations.
Or, whatever the future changes in the global system, if
brought about through agreed upon and planned action or through
unplanned and chaotic struggle, the world economic order will
be qualitatively transformed (Jolly, 1975-" *0 •

This suggests

that the analysis and modelling of international economic
exchange as it relates to systems development and transformation
will have to deal explicity with at least four aspects of
economic action.

These four aspects -- dealt with in the
5
past in a very limited if not arbitrary way — are-.

Economic historians, institutionalists, neo-institu
tionalists and, to some extent, Marxists, studies in the fields
of industrial organization, development, and more recently also
urban and environmental economics, as well as numerous area,
industry and case studies have frequently touched upon these
aspects both descriptively and analytically. But the statement
is true in the same sense that Gardiner Means' comment is true
when he argued that theoretical economists have sofar refused
to reformulate "over-all theory in terms of the pervasive nonclassical competition" which has been shown to exist so much

4
(i)

Economic Actors.

Theory is still based on un

differentiated sets of households and firms, and in the case
of international trade theory, of countries.

While households

have hardly changed since the time Adam Smith developed classical
economics, firms form today a hierarchy of organizations of
vastly different size, scope, and organizational structure.
In the theory, the multinational corporation (MNC) with its
"global reach" (Barnet and Mueller, 1974) is conceptually the
same as the corner grocery store, a point central to the
criticism of neo-classical theory by Galbraith (1968).

Further

more, to this day, governmental units are only implicity included
in theoretical macro-analysis as undefined managers of aggregate
demand, exchange rates, tariffs, and as providers of foreign
aid, to mention a few of the more important activities that im
pinge on the IES.^

But not only are they unspecified, they re

main organizations without multiple goals and interests, and
contradictory internal and differentiated power structures
which characterize them in real life.

Even more complete

(Means, 1972:ix) .
Kolm (1975:136) argues that economists in the past
have already covered almost any subject and dealt with most
problems. References quoted here and in subsequent chapters
represent therefore an eclectic selection in support of the
arguments presented.
^The 'New Political Economy' recognizes the need to
analyze government in order to understand economic policy.
To this end, its representatives apply the propositions and
tools of neo-classical economic theory to the analysis of
political behavior. First contributions were made by Downs
(1957) and Buchanan (1968), more recent treatments are by
Bartlett (1973) and Breton (1974).

5
abstraction is made of the rapidly increasing number of sub
national governmental units, non-governmental national and
international organizations, governmental international
organizations, and even some supranational organizations with
almost independent powers.

Many of these organizations partici

pate and intervene in the international economy and are also
often heavily involved in the efforts at economic development
(Hawkins, 1970:98-110).
(ii)

Economic Values.

Theory limits itself to the ana

lysis of households, firms, countries and, to a limited degree
as just argued, governments.

These economic actors try to

maximize economic goal functions within constraints.

The

latter are often economic in nature, especially when formulated
explicitly, although the economic action space is implicitly
understood to be also constrained by non-economic institutional
factors.
life.

It is clear that social life is more than economic

It includes in addition to the latter political, social,

cultural and,military aspects (Chodak, 1973; Galtung, 1971)*
This multi-dimensionality characterizes interests and goals of
actors, the material and non-material valuables which are the
means and often the ends of social life, as well as the outcomes
of the many interactions between actors.7>8

^Organizational theorists like Maslow (195^:80-106)
and March and Simon (1958) were some of the first social
scientists to stress the importance of non-economic goals for
individuals in their roles as homo oeconomicus once they had
reached a certain material subsistence threshold. Galbraith
(1968) and Boulding (1969) for example argued that therefore
tastes and preferences could not be assumed to be autonomously
determined but were the result of social processes (including
advertising). Myrdal (1972), and also Boulding (1969)3 argue

6
(iii)

Institutions and Economic Activity.

stream economic theory takes institutions as given.

Main

Actors

belonging to an exchange system are assumed to have equal
access chances to every other actor in the

system.^

There

fore little attention is paid to the constraints social norms,
moral values, rules and laws place on economic action possibil
ities and outcomes.

Institutional factors are habitually

classified as remaining unchanged over the time period a.nalysed

that economic behavior can and, is often moral behavior, that
egalitarianism is an established fact which makes it im
possible to build a utility theory on the basis of an in
dividualistic rationality assumption.
O
Today, economic theoreticians use four methods to
circumvent the problem of multi-dimensionality.
(i) They
continue to postulate that households and firms are purely
economic constructs which are able to abstract from the
interests they or their individual members may have in other
spheres.
(ii) They take refuge in the assumption that the
economic actors are able to assign economic values to all
events, outcomes, and goals in the non-economic spheres
of social life.
(iii) They recognize explicitly the existence
of variables in other spheres but postulate that they can be
treated like any economic variable. This is the approach of
the New Political Economy. And (iv) they accept that case (ii)
does not hold because of institutional limitations. The con
cept of "externalities" is used to handle and explain ad hoc
economic and non-economic outcomes not reflected in the economic
calculus of those actors party to an economic activity which
gives rise to an externality.
^The importance of limited information, transportation
and transaction costs for the structuring of interaction
possibilities have been recognized since the important work
by Coase (1952, I960) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962). But
despite these contributions, Rothschild (1975) could complain
recently that the pure theory of international trade neglects
these costs almost completely and this Respite the fact that
such cost factors are probably more important in international
trade than national one.

7
or as not being significantly affected by the activities
modelled.1^

These views have two general consequences for

research specification.

Firstly, actors are assumed to maxi

mize action outcomes passively within the institutional limits
in which they find themselves.

Actors are not seen as being

actively concerned with overcoming unsatisfactory constraints
through direct action.^

However, corporate mergers, political

lobbying and bribing, and many research and development activities could be seen as purposeful activities of this kind.

12

Secondly, not much effort is undertaken to study Ihose outcome
dimensions of economic activity which strengthen or undermine
a given institutional set.

Economic theory is essentially

based on linear action-outcome patterns; inputs are transformed
into outputs and even such important economic variables like
income and wealth distributions are not part of the output
vector.

Feedback which could affect the initial conditions of

The short-run nature of the analysis is justification
for this procedure. However, the temporal limits of this shortrun are never specified, nor do models of economic growth deal
with such institutional considerations, although they are cer
tainly concerned with the long-run (Britto, 1973:1360).
^However, see Perroux (1964:2).
12

The largest MNC have to be seen as supra-national
organizations "whose internal decisions have as much impact
on patterns of trade and international relations as decisions
taken by governments" (Child 1969:1).

8
this type are rare except in the work of Myrdal (1958, 1968).
However, the absence from economic models of feedback mecha
nisms with respect to structural and institutional factors
as well as of active actors who try to overcome the con
straints facing them becomes more critical with the emergence
of global corporations, increased world interdependence and
the emergence of bottlenecks and limits facing all countries
of the world.
(iv) Structural Inequality and Conflict.

In general,
actors in a system are structurally differentiated. 18 For one,
actors differentially exercise control over and have access to
resources and valuables in the many spheres of social life.
This differentiation exists not only in terms of the quality
and quantity of resources controlled but also in the degree of
control exerted over them.

Secondly, actors find themselves

in different positions within a historically determined structure
of relationships between and among the actors of a social system.
All these inequalities constrain action opportunities and action
14
outcomes and in turn are affected by them.
Consequently,

13 Point (i) referred to the need to differentiate more
extensively between different categories of actors. The focus
here is on the differentiation of actors of a given category.
Both problems involve structural differentiation but at
different levels.
14

Price theory is including many of these elements im
plicitly in its analysis insofar as revenues for example deter
mine budget constraints or a firm is limited in its pricing
actions depending on the number of competitors in the market.
But the full significance of such differences becomes clear
only in a dynamic analysis which includes inequality itself as
a variable.
(See also footnote 16).

9
actors may engage in attempts at directly modifying these
structural constraints.
Structural inequalities of the kind described here are
pervasive and persistent elements in the different spheres
of social life including the economic sphere.

For Arthur

Lewis, for, example, economic growth leads inescapably to
inequalities of many kinds as growth, in-general, causes im
poverishments of some professions, sectors, geographical re
gions, and maybe even countries (Moynihan, 1 9 7 5 : ^ 2 ) . it seems
natural, in this context, to suspect in initial inequalities the
leading causes for continued uneven growth and development processes.

16

Inequalities provide actors with differentiated powers

See also I. Adelman and Morris (1973)- However,
Kuznets (1955, 1966) adduces some evidence from Germany, Britain
and the U.S. showing that economic growth and development in
creased personal income inequalities only in the initial phases
of industrialization.
(See also following footnote.)

Both Friedmann (1972) and Kaldor (1970) develop models
of regional development where initial imbalances lead to
further uneven development. In this context, Kaldor argues
that the existence of a central government with increasingly
more important central taxation and expenditure powers limits
regional intra-country inequality which, therefore, is not
allowed to or cannot develop to the extent that inequality
develops on the world level. Kuznets (1966:206-217) too seems
to assign to the central government an important non-market
role in reversing the development of income inequality in the
later stages of economic growth in industrialized countries.
I. Adelman (1975) makes the same point.
Myrdal (1958, 1968) developed his principle of circular
and cumulative causation in order to explain increasing in
equality. Initial inequalities of a general kind are the cause
for these vicious circles. The same holds for the marxian models
of uneven development (Amin, 1971).
Bowles (1972) uses initial inequalities to explain the

10
and enable some actors to use their power to structure the
system in their own favor (Wilber and Wisman, 1975:673).
But in the case where inequalities lead ultimately to the
institutionalization of inequality, conflict between actors
is much more likely to prevail than basic harmony.

This does

not mean that conflicting goals and relations are necessarily
dominant and replacing harmonious ones as the basic foundation
of social activity.

However, models of world trade cannot a

priori assume harmony of interests, and absence of conflict
and dominance patterns, when income inequalities at the world
level are two hundred times larger than at the time of Adam
Smith (Kaldor, 1970).17
The model developed and illustrated in this treatise in
corporates in a central way elements which reflect the critique

reproduction of inequality through the school system.
None of these approaches has been absorbed in the core
theory. Even the concept of immiserizing growth remains a
fringe concept in international economics despite the in
creasing income inequality on the world level (Bhagwati, 1969a:
325-338; Johnson, 1967b). This remains so despite the demon
stration that immiserizing growth is not only the result of
faulty policies but can occur with simultaneous growth in
several countries and the absence of monopoly power in inter
national trade (Bhagwati, 1969b; Melvin, 1969). Of course, the
important point to explain in this context is the particular
processes that produce the appropriate shifts in the offer
curves (Balogh, 1973:8).

Benjamin Ward (1972) makes many of the points mentioned
in the above discussion of the four aspects. If economists want
to be able to contribute to the solution of social problems they
will have to deal with three areas: (i) the growing importance
of externalities; (ii) the increasing interrelationship of
economic variables with non-economic factors; and (iii) the
problem of distribution.

11
made above of some aspects of economic theory and, specifically,
international trade theory.

The chosen title —

The Political

Economy of International Economic Exchange and Development.

A

Systems Approach to the Structuring of the International Economic
System —

suggests three different levels of analysis: (i) the

method used is systems analysis; (ii) the approach is one of
political economy; and (iii) and the subject is the structuring
of the international economic institutions and structures which
mediate the economic exchange activities of actors belonging to
different countries.

Initial interests in questions and problems

related to the changes in the terms of trade between UDC and DC
led to the realization that these questions demanded a more
general framework of analysis going beyond the pure treatment
of economic trade theory.
The adoption of a larger perspective suggested in turn
the use of a systems analysis.

As the research proceeded on

the bases of the individual cases reported in chapters 4, 5 and
6, it became necessary to develop new systems concepts and
elements in order to be able to describe the fundamentals of
each situation.

Of course, the availability of this language

made the chosen political economy approach much richer and
helped to bring about a general view of the problems analysed.

The particular research results reported here have
greatly benefited from and have also substantially influenced
simultaneous research on other economic problems (Baumgartner
and Burns, 1974; Baumgartner et. al_., 1975c), non-economic
problems (Baumgartner et. al., 1975a), and general theoretical
and methodological questions (Burns and Meeker, 1975; Baum
gartner et_. al., 1976b).

1ft

12
The scientific perspective governing the conceptuali
zation and model of the IES is inspired by the particular ap
proach to modern systems theory originally outlined by Buckley
(1967).^

This perspective focuses on actors as social beings

which act in a complex world.

Their action possibilities are

constrained by the distribution of resources of many kinds, by
institutions in different spheres, and their positions in the
structure of possible relationships to other actors and valuables.
In general, actors are significantly differentiated in all three
respects and, as a consequence, will experience systematically
different outcomes as they act and interact within the social
system.

Existing inequalities will therefore most probably be

maintained as basic inequalities become and are built into the
institutions themselves.

However, the system is complex.

Actors

are not only economic actors but to differing degrees also
social, political, cultural beings.

They therefore have often

to reconcile conflicting goals and possibilities which often
belong to different spheres.

In general, actors are unable to

model completely and accurately the world in which they act
and interact.

As a consequence, human action, including economic

action, has unintended consequences which may affect the distri
bution of valuables, the actors' positions in the structure of
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^Important further developments appear in Burns (1973),
Burns and Buckley (197*0 and Buckley et_. al_. , 1974).
A different contribution to the development of a systems
theory of development is by Tehranian (1974).
Parsons and Smelser (1956) present an early argument why
the economy should be analysed as a subsystem of the larger social
system.
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interactions, and institutional effectiveness in ways which
are undesirable from the viewpoint of dominant actors.

The

operation of the system may in this case lead to systems
transformation possibly even in the direction of greater
equality among the actors.
Actors will also often be unwilling to operate within
the given constraints of the system and they will attempt to
modify directly the constraining factors (like institutions)
which limit them in their action capabilities.

These activities,

directed toxtfards the higher-level characteristics of the system
(which are normally taken as given in economic analysis), the
unintended consequences of human activity^ and several natural
structuring factors as well as the differentiated outcomes from
the normal operation of the system provide feedback links within
the system (Baumgartner et. al_. , 1976a).

Such links are central

properties of the systems model of society (and therefore the
IES) and their modelling and analysis are crucial to the under
standing of societal development, and especially the links be
tween international economic activities and national development
and economic growth of DC and UDC.
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Unintended consequences are not synonymous with random
events or effects. The former can be quite deterministic events
which however were not foreseen by the actors when choosing the
course of action producing them. They are the result of decision
models which contain faulty or incomplete representations of
reality (Rosen, 197^; Burns and Meeker, 1975; Baumgartner et. al.,
1975c).
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Such a systems approach and the model and its con
stituent elements developed here have general applicability
in the analysis of social systems., both on the macro and micro
levels (Burns, 1974; Baumgartner et_. al. , 1975b).

However,

the focus in this instance is explicitly on the economic
sphere of social life.

But the analysis is and cannot be

purely economic in the sense that only economic values in
terms of utilities and profits determine the consumptive and
productive activities of the households and firms while all
the other values and goals, institutional constraints, and
non-economic effects of economic activities are either absorbed
in an all-embracing ceteris paribus clause or simply excluded
from the analysis. P 1

Here, institutions and non-economic values

and goals affect significantly and explicitly economic behavior.
Conversely, economic activity has non-economic results and its
effects on institutions are also explicitly included in the
analysis.

Institutional, structural and power factors are

integrated with economic factors.

It is in this sense that one

can speak of a political economy analysis. 22

P1

See footnote 8 of this chapter for an elaboration on
this statement.
?p

Only a few remarks about the use of the term 'political
economy' can be made here.■ The term becomes today again in
creasingly popular after its early use in the 18th and 19th
century to describe economic analysis in general (especially
in its classical form). Even Samuelson now claims this label
for his kind of economic theory and analysis (Samuelson and Scott,
1975:v). As already explained in footnote 6 of this chapter,
the term of the 'New Political Economy' is claimed for an analysis
which applies the theorems and propositions of neo-classical
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The case studies which served as background for the
development of the theoretical conceptualization of the systems
approach to political economy problems, and which will be used
in chapters 4, 5 and 6 to demonstrate and amplify this approach,
are all taken from the area of international economics and eco
nomic development.

This area has been chosen for a detailed

study not only because of its topicality.

Economic development

is a long run problem and furthermore can only succeed if it
is accompanied by developments either in a parallell or possibly
dialectic fashion in other spheres of social life.

Economic

development is only continuous if institutions develop con
currently with the growth of productive powers.

Development

therefore includes all the elements which make up the character
istic nature of the systems approach as outlined above.
Past economic developments of both DC and UDC can be
understood only in the context of the operation of the IES
23
(Wallerstein, 1974; Amin, 1971).
Most countries will continue

economic theory to the analysis of the behavior of governmental
actors (Uphoff and Ilchman, 1972:1). The political
economy of marxian analysis links the operation of the economic
system to the non-economic superstructure, using at least on
the more abstract levels of analysis a dialectic relationship
between the two. Institutional and neo-institutional economics,
or what Grucb / (1947:550) once called 'holistic economics', is
insofar political economics as its focus is on the structure
and functioning of human relations as determinants in the pro
duction of goods and services. Technological change is seen
as the driving force, moderated by individual and group goals,
including non-economic ones — determining the development path
of the economic system and its institutions (Gruchy, 1972:293-298;
336-337).
The dialectic links between continuous economic growth
and development, structural and institutional transformations,
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to be linked very intensively to the IES independent of its
future forms. It is therefore of continuing interest to in
quire about the links which may exist between the structure
of the IES, the types and nature of international economic
exchange activities, and their developmental consequences
for the national systems involved in these activities. As a
corollary, it is of importance to model, analyze and under
stand the relationship between exchange outcomes and the
stability or transformation of the institutions and structures
which make up the IES. These matters include the study of
the active attempts by social actors to structure the IES
in such a way that its operation generates outcomes which are
supportive of their objectives, both economic and non-economic.
It is this focus on the IES and the interaction of its struc
tural and institutional forms with economic exchange and its
outcome which characterizes this treatise as an economic one,
even though the analytical framework is concerned with the
social system and its operation as a whole.

oh

and the changing nature of trade structures is admirably de
monstrated in the model of development presented by Paauw and
Fei (1973) where they differentiate between phases of import
substitution, export promotion and export substitution. Okita
(1970) presents a somewhat similar description (although con
centrating on the last phase) of the Japanese 'virtuous circle
of accelerated growth'.
2^Breton (197^:11-21) uses some of the same arguments
to justify his type of New Political Economy analysis as valid
economic analysis. However, the argument is not only one over
the boundaries of economics and the economic process which
Boulding (1969) and Galbraith (1973) would like to see extended
in specific directions, and Georgescu-Roegen (1966:101-107) and
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Chapter II shows that much of the traditional theo
retical discussions and empirical investigations of inter
national trade problems use elements and concepts which are
at the basis of the approach outlined here and elaborated
and applied to specific historical cases in the later chapters.
However, these elements and concepts are mostly treated as re
finements or deviations from the structure of the classical
market model underlying economic theory since Adam Smith.

But

when all these refinements and deviations are brought into the
same theoretical framework, it becomes quite obvious that this
system is qualitatively different from the one postulated in
economic theory and underlying so much of our economic reason
ing.

Chapter III therefore will present in a relatively ab

stract way the major elements and concepts necessary for the
analysis of the economic aspects of such a system.

Chapters

IV, V and VI provide the application of this systems model to
past and actual events in the IES.

Chapter IV concentrates

on the ramifications internal to a country due to events in
the IES.

Chapter V concentrates on the IES itself.

Two in

stances in the past are investigated where a country used an
initial power advantage to try to structure parts or even the
whole of the IES in an attempt to maintain this power advantage

Kolm (1975) in a more general way, the latter calling for a
’science morale et politique'. One consequence of the accept
ance and modelling of a world full of "interdependencies and
complex causal sequences" is the need to abandon the positivist
methodology (Kapp, 1970; see also the reply by Beckerman (1972)
and the rebuttal by Kapp (1972) and indirectly by Showier (1974).)
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and possibly even to further it with the aim of assuring
complete dominance.
uring of the IES.

Chapter VI deals also with the struct
But the focus here is not so much on the

basis of such structuring attempts and the processes of using
power to structure the IES than on the problems and dilemmas
that can be inherent in such structuring efforts.

A first

part illustrates the dilemma that can arise between the desire
to structure a dominance system and the need to maintain a
minimal economic performance of the collective system.

A

second part concentrates on the possibility of turning points
in a system of dominance using the recent events of the oil
crisis as illustration of the processes related to such re
versals .
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND THE REAL SYSTEM
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The theoretical framework in economics underlying
much of the analysis related to international trade is in
large measure based on or linked to the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-0)
model.

This chapter therefore begins in Section 1 with a

brief description of the basic assumptions and propositions
which make up the H-0 model. P ^J

A review and discussion of the

effort by Leontief (195*0 to test the model by showing that
U.S. trade was in fact H-0 trade concludes the section point
ing out how Leontief’s effort started a process of, more im
plicitly than explicitly, relaxing the H-0 assumptions.
Section 2 continues the review of different trade models and
their tests but focusing more on alternative hypothesis and
explanations.

The purpose of this review is twofold.

For

one, it becomes clear that many tests which purported to verify
the H-0 model were in fact using assumptions fundamentally dif
ferent from those originally postulated in the model.

Secondly,

the modifications of the H-0 model as well as the alternative

25section 1 is not intended as a survey of trade theory.
Reviews of the development and present state of the pure theory
of international trade are'presented by Chipman (1965a, 1965b,
1966), Bhagwati (1969a:3-122) and Chacholiades (1973) among
others.
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hypothesis show clearly that they contain many of those
assumptions and elements which were deemed to be essential
elements of a systemic analysis of the IES.

Section 3 then

returns to the H-0 model, describing its policy implications
and comparing them with recent developments in this area.
Section 4 takes up the problem of trade intervention and
controls by pointing out that the structure of trade controls
in DC is quite specific.

The same holds for the structure of

exports and imports of DC and UDC which differ significantly
for the two groups.

These two findings combined suggest that

they are the result of a purposeful will set to impose a cer
tain structure on the IES.

A summary section then relates the

findings in Chapter 2 to the introductory remarks in Chapter 1
thus setting the stage for the theoretical developments of
systems elements in Chapter 31.

The Heckscher-Ohlin Model and the Leontief Test
The pure theory of international trade is centrally

concerned with (i) the demonstration of the causes of trade;
(ii) the determination of equilibrium prices and quantities
traded; and (iii) the welfare implications of trade and trade
controls.

In this sense international trade theory is micro-

economic price theory where countries replace households and
firms as the basic units of analysis without however elimina
ting the latter as the basic actors in the system.

In order

to be able to proceed with the analysis on this level of
aggregation and to arrive at the conclusions of the H-0 theorem
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that a country exports the goods which use intensively the
q s'

relatively abundant factor,
have to be constrained.
level has

production and welfare functions

The production function on the country

to be homogenous of the first degree.

This in turn

implies that the economy on the country level has to exhibit
the structure of an economy in perfect competition.

If in

addition the production functions exhibit diminishing marginal
returns along isoquants, factor and commodity price ratios will
be uniquely related to each other (Samuelson, 1948, 1949)Social welfare functions can be constructed and not
simply assumed only if individual households have identical
and homothetic tastes, or instead of the latter condition,
equal factor endowments (and therefore equal income and wealth
positions) (Chacholiades, 1973.122-128).^

Samuelson (1948,

19^9) has shown that if the production functions in the two

Factor abundance can be defined using either a quan
tity or a price definition with implications for the determin
ation of the exportables in case of factor intensity reversal
(Chacholiades, 1973:202-204).
27

The sufficient conditions for identical tastes on the
country-level are restrictive. Chacholiades (1973:123) main
tains that tastes are reasonably identical within a given
country especially if it has a uniform culture. This argument
however undermines the importance of consumer sovereignty as
any planning agency could take over its role in a market
economy and allocate the goods in the same pattern to consumers.
Samuelson (1956) has shown that an appropriate social
indifference map can be constructed if one assumes a re
distribution of income which maximizes social welfare. This
naturally begs the question.
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countries are identical and without factor intensity reversal
over the relevant range,

P fi

and if the consumption patterns in

the two countries are identical, trade will tend to equalize
relative factor prices and take on the structure predicted by
the H-0 theorem. x t

is in this sense that international

trade is a substitute for international factor mobility in
equalizing marginal rates of transformation and substitution
in the two countries.30
The significance of the H-0 theorem is contested.
This does not surprise in view of the restrictive assumptions
that are necessary to arrive at the strong version of the
theorem as stated by Samuelson (1948, 1949) and the large gap
between these assumptions and reality.

The formal correctness

of the theorem is not in doubt but the meaning of it, or the
value of the conclusions based on it with respect to the ex-

pO

The investigation by Minhas (1962) seemed to confirm
the existence of widespread factor intensity reversals. Sub
sequent research has produced contradictory evidence (Bhagwati,
1969a:100-107)•

^Samuelson (1971) revises his strong statement of 1948/
49 that relative factor prices will be equalized through trade.
He accepts now the original Ohlin version that the opening of
trade will only narrow the difference between relative factor
prices.
3^Additional conditions are incomplete production spe
cialization and absence of transportation costs. Factor
supplies have to be absolutely inelastic and while world
commodity markets are perfectly competitive, factors of pro
duction are absolutely immobile internationally.
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p l a n a t i o n of the

sources of trade,

o b s e r v e d trade pattern,

the d e t e r m i n a n t s

of the

and the f o r m u l a t i o n of t rade p o l i c i e s

are.
Chipman

( 1 9 6 5 a : 479)

"probably the most
ture that

complex and i m p r e s s i v e t h e o r e t i c a l

has yet b e e n d e v e l o p e d in economic

e t . a l . (1967:96)

struc

t h o ught."

Clement

see the t h e o r e m ' s v alue not only in its

logical c o n s i s t e n c y but
cost

lauds the t h e o r e m as r e p r e s e n t i n g

theory of trade.

also
But

in its

as Kornai

general c r i t i c i s m of the f o u n d a t i o n s
e q u i l i b r i u m theory,

superi o r i t y to the
(1971:9)

argues

labor-

in his

of n e o - c l a s s i c a l gene r a l

a t h e o r e m should not

simply be a c c e p t e d

beca u s e its a s s u m p t i o n s and axioms are i n t e r n a l l y consi s t e n t
and its d e r i v a t i o n is log i c a l l y u n a s s a i l a b l e .
tions and basic p r o p o s i t i o n s
world

Rather assump

should also d e s c r i b e the real

31 32

in s u f f i ciently a c c u r a t e terms.-1

'Sufficiently accurate' is the key expression. Un
fortunately we do not have a developed concept capable of
measuring the 'degree of proximity' between theoretical
postulates and the structure of the real world (Kolm, 1975:131)

^ Haberler (1961:20-21) and Harrod (1957:37), the latter
on the basis of the presence of factor intensity reversals,
question the scientific value of the theorem on similar grounds
Cooper (1970:436) expressed recently his doubts about
the relevancy of the pure theory of trade noting that Michaely
(1968) seemed to be able to explain the pattern of trade with
out making a passing reference to the H-0 theorem but stressing
accidental historical developments as determinants of special
ization in and export of manufactured products.
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Others see the value of the theorem in its setting
of a benchmark.

Chacholiades (1973:265) thinks that its

value lies in the fact that it allows the identification of
those variables which determine the impact of free trade on
factor prices.

Harry Johnson (1968a:88; 1970a:19) takes a

similar position.

The theorem is not a prediction about the

real world but states the necessary conditions for factor
price equalization and therefore for world welfare maxi
m i z a t i o n . ^

T h g

theorem permits the identification of those

real life conditions which prevent the factor price equaliza
tion from coming about.

One can then determine and design

the appropriate corrective policies.
In this situation one could naturally fall back on the
positive methodology of Friedman (1953:1-43) and accept the
H-0 theorem and its underlying assumptions as a valid base
for further analysis if the propositions derived from it co
incide with reality.

However, such tests are rather difficult

to design as the so-called Leontief paradox clearly demonstra
ted.

Leontief (1954, 1956) tried to establish the link be

tween factor availability, factor proportions and the trade
structure of the U.S. in one of the most important tests of
the H-0 model.

His findings, unfortunately, were rather con-

33That is, the theory becomes "the 'grand parable'
that is still defended against non-believers but is not taken
too seriously as a scientific explanation of 'what is'."
(Wilber and Wisman, 1975:672). See also Shubik (1970).
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trary to the expected

r e s u l t .

34

He found, using the input-

output table of 1947 for the U.S., that U.S. export industries
as a whole were relatively more labor intensive than import re
placing industries.

This result was in contradiction to the

predicted pattern based on the H-0 theorem and the widely ac
cepted assumption of the U.S. as a relatively capital rich
c o u n t r y .

35

Leontief's findings did not lead to the rejection

of the H-0 model.

For one, methodological and statistical ob

jections led to doubts about the validity o f 'Leontief's test.
Secondly, and more importantly, modifications in the basic H-0
assumptions seemed to be able to resolve the paradox without
somehow destroying the central idea of the

t h e o r e m .

35

Leontief

3^It is difficult to understand why Leontief ever
thought that his test could verify one of the H-0 predictions.
Samuelson (1949:181) himself seemed to be much more cautious
in this respect:
I cannot pretend to present a balanced appraisal
of the bearing of (the H-0) analysis upon interpreting
the actual world, ...: on the one hand, I think it would
be folly to come to any startling conclusions on the
basis of so simplified a model and such abstract reason
ing; ...
15Leontief did not show that the U.S. was capital abun
dant. He simply assumed it. Naturally it is not permissable
to conclude from the relative factor proportions of the exportables that the U.S. is relatively capital rich (Jones, 195657) .
Concise reviews of this debate are contained in
Bhagwati (1969a :28-34), Chipman (1966:44-57), Clement et_. al.
(1967:98-104) and Travis (1964). Bhagwati (1969a:33) pro
nounces himself an agnostic on the veracity of the H-0 theorem.
Clement at. al. (1967:104) call essentially for a better data
base to allow a fair test of the theorem. The data base is still
a problem as Finger (1975a) points out.
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(1956) himself introduced efficiency units of labor as the
modifying additional element.37

This can be taken to mean

either that different countries have different production
functions, that factors of production are not homogenous,
or that additional factors of production beyond capital and
labor are important in the production process.38

jn general

the model was expanded to encompass a multi-country, multi-

37
Bhagwati (1969a:31) points out that the use of
relative wages as efficiency weights already presupposes
the correctness of the H-0 theorem. It also means that the
wage rates are implicitly contained in the independent
variable used to explain the relative factor price and there
fore implicitly the (average) wage rate. This is obviously
an improper procedure.

3 Caves (1960:93-101) discusses these definitional
problems. The three explanations seem to be closely linked.
A non-homogenous factor implies that the units embody differ
entially one or more characteristics. But it is rather
arbitrary if one sees, for example, human capital as such a
differentiating characteristic making labor non-homogenous
or as an additional factor of production besides 'pure labor’.
Also, Haberler (1961:20), leaning on Samuelson (19^8:
181-182), has pointed out that production functions in differ
ent countries can always be made equal if enough variables are
explicitly recognized. But in the latter case the concept of
the production function becomes empty.
Posner (1961:326-328) rejects the multiplication of
the number of explicitly recognized factors of production
because analysis then becomes description.
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commodity and multi-factor world.39 j 40
The Leontief test raises, however, the much more
general question to what extent the different conclusions
of the H-0 theorem can be actually tested.

The model, its

theorems and all of the welfare theoretical conclusions
based on it are derived from long-run, comparative static
equilibrium analysis.

The IES however is rarely static or

in equilibrium and the observed trade patterns and price re
lations do therefore not reflect equilibrium positions.

The

most one can hope for is that trade under these circumstances

■^The H-0 theorem becomes quite ambiguous in some of
these cases and depends on the adoption of additional re
strictive conventions or reinterpretation of concepts. For
a discussion see Clement et_. al. (1967:56-60) and Baldwin
(1971b:132).
For example, multi-factor models lead to definitional
problems with respect to the concept of relative factor en
dowments and factor intensities (Samuelson, 1953-54; Bhagwati,
1969a:26). And Jones (1971),
has to assume in his
three-factor model that only two factors enter into any one
commodity. It also becomes impossible in the multi-factor
case to reason a priori that the production functions in
different countries are in fact the same (Chacholiades, 1973:
225). Lacking this proof the H-0 theorem becomes even more
a logical system with only tenuous links to the analysis of
trade. If the production functions are really different, then
the theory would have to include a theory of the production of
the production function before it could be applied to the
analysis of trade.
Ambiguities occur also in the multi-country case where
one can adopt bilateral or multilateral definitions of relative
factor abundance (Bhagwati, 1969a:26-27)• The simplest ex
pansion of the traditional H-0 model seems to be possible in
the multi-commodity case (Bhagwati, 1972b). But even this case
demands reinterpretations (Chacholiades, 1973:216-224; Vanek,
1968; Vanek and Bertrand, 1971).
^ T h e multi-country case does not seem to have affected
the Leontief test as the U.S. was clearly the leading country.
Tatemoto and Ichimura (1959) however show that Japanese exports
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produces a tendency towards the purported trade pattern and
factor price equalization (Chacholiades, 1973:264).

The

problem with a test of the H-0 model lies in the interpreta
tion and specification of these tendencies .^
The Leontief test of the factor content of U.S. trade
was based on the U.S. input-output table and trade structure
for 19^7-

This period lies about halfway in between the end

of the war and the beginning of European reconstruction.
The U.S. accumulated net exports of over $32 billions between
1946 and 1949-

1947 alone contributed almost one third to

this trade surplus.
allied control.

West Germany at that time was still under

Its economy was administered and controlled.

Its currency reform took place only in 1948.

The British de

valuation of 30% in 1949 was a reflection of the serious dis
equilibrium of the British economy in the immediate post-war
years.

Kindleberger (1962:78-80) mentions that the trade

structure of West Germany and other European countries during
these years did actually remain the same as in the prewar
years.

The trade structures did not adjust to the drastically

changed factor availabilities.

Instead reconstruction was

directed towards the reestablishment of the prewar factor

to more developed countries are relatively labor intensive,
those to less developed countries relatively capital intensive.
^1This is one of the fundamental points of criticism of
positivist (neo-classical) economic theory. See e.g. Hollis
and Nell (1975), Kaldor (1972), Kornai (1971), Mini (1974),
Solo (1975) and Wilber and Wisman (1975).
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proportions through massive capital formation financed with
Marshall aid.

And finally, as Travis (1964) has pointed out,

most countries had actually at that time a sophisticated
tariff system in place and had had so for many years.^

It is

therefore not very clear what the Leontief test could have
possibly proven.

This problem seems also to hold for alter

native trade theories which will be discussed in the next
section.

A testable model, it seems, would have to include

not only a positive theory about the trade determining effects
of the elaborate tariff systems (Travis, 1964) including the
even more complex systems of non-tariff barriers (Baldwin,
1970) which actually exist, but also some notion of reaction
or adjustment speeds of the IES to various

c h a n g e s .

^3

That

alternative trade models seem to be often superficial and
journalistic might only reflect this lack of a general theoret
ical model capable of handling the complexity of the IES
(Bardhan, 1970:5).

^Baldwin (1971b:130;139) points out that tariffs can
shift trade away from the postulated H-0 structure without,
however, generating the paradoxical structure found by Leontief.
^Time is essentially a logical element in the models
of growth and trade (Soedersten, 1964; Bardhan, 1970) as
Robinson (1962:22-29) points out. They lend themselves only
with difficulty to the analysis of these problems. Also, Stern
(1973:865) mentions that these models do not incorporate the
dynamic effects of tariffs and other trade control measures.
Ohlin (1970:331) himself seems to be little
perturbed by this variety of competing approaches:
In the last few years I have become more
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The next section will provide a review of such al
ternative formulations of the determinants of trade.

They

all relax in one way or another the stringent assumptions of
Samuelson's formulation of the H-0 model.
2. Multi-Factor Models of Trade
As mentioned in the preceding section, Leontief's
paradoxical findings stimulated a renewed and not yet term
inated search for additional factors of production which when
incorporated in the model could explain the observed structure
of trade and still preserve the idea that relative factor pro
portions determine trade structures.

These so-called neofactor

proportion accounts of the determination of trade patterns - as
opposed to the neotechnology accounts - have taken different
factors of production as the missing explanatory factor al
though, basically, they are all concerned with the complete
specification of capital and labor (Harry Johnson,

1 9 7 0 a ) .

^5

sceptical about the fruitfulness of the application
of so much scientific energy to a refined and de
tailed analysis of models based on violent abstrac
tions. It is perhaps more fruitful to use several
new models, and to admit that they all, taken together,
can do little more than.increase our understanding of
the problem.
^Baldwin (1971b:141-143) concludes at the end of his
extensive review and testing of alternative trade models that
a two-factor model will never be sufficient to explain trade
patterns. He agrees with Hufbauer (1970) and Kenen (1970) that
more elaborate models are necessary which include not only mul
tiple factors but also barriers to factor mobility and to trade.
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Land and natural resources, the latter possibly con
ceived as a differentiating factor of land, were introduced
early on as the missing explanatory factors.

The relative

abundance of land and resources would provide countries with
a comparative advantage in the production and export of re
source-intensive products, i.e. raw materials, agricultural
products and their processed derivatives (Vanek, 1963; Linder,
196l:8l).

On the other hand, many studies used human capital

as the missing third factor of production.^

The controversy

about Leontief's use of efficiency units of labor as an ex
planation for his paradoxical findings showed, as already
pointed out, that it is rather difficult to distinguish addi
tional factors of production from different production func
tions (Samuelson, 1948:182).

For example, managerial know-how

is often said to differentiate production functions rather
than make labor non-homogeneous (Clement et. al., 1967:102).
Of course, once the idea of non-homogeneity of labor was ac
cepted, it became clear that capital was similarly differenti
ated and was made up of the basic unit "pure waiting" and
specific technological characteristics embodied in physical
units of capital which thus gained a historical time dimension

-------ITZ----------Bharadwaj and Bhagwati (1967) for India, Roskamp and
McMeekin (1968) for East Germany, and Kenen (1970) in a theo
retical analysis have provided early investigations of this
type.
Keesing (1965) uses a measure of labor skills as the
only trade determining factor of production.

(Kenen, 1965a, 1965b).

It was also argued that these dif

ferent factors were complements rather than substitutes in
the production process (Vanek, 1963).

This means that the

production functions are restricted to certain factor pro
portions, thus breaking the link between relative factor
prices and factor proportions.

This line of thought leads to

the view of technological knowledge and its actual application
as a source of differentiated production functions.

In this

case the analysis expands quickly to the study of the pro
duction of technological change, its diffusion and thus to the
wider socio-political circumstances which affect these two
processes (Hufbauer, 1970).
Technology as a trade determinant factor can also be
conceptualized in different ways.

For Jones (1970) technology

makes for different production functions while Lowinger (1975)
for example uses technology as equivalent to human capital in
determining trade.

Kenen (1965a, 1965b) on the other hand,

treats technical characteristics of capital equipment as differ
entiating elements of pure capital understood as waiting.

And

Samuelson (19^8) implies that technology, human capital, and
organizational know-how are complementary elements in the pro
cess of production.
Technological factors, or their proxy, expenditures on
research and development (R&D), become the explanatory variable
in the neotechnology account of the determination of trade
patterns.

The core of this explanation centers around the
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product cycle theory of trade (Vernon, 1966).^?

This view

is actually based on the dynamic application of monopolistic
competition theory to international trade.

It is very em

pirical but suffers from a lack of formal elegance compared
to the Samuelson version of the H-0 theory (Harry Johnson,
1970a).

In this explanation, countries and their producers

achieve temporary monopolistic comparative advantage positions
which are the result of technological leadership, product
differentiation and the early exploitation of economies of
scale.

The maintenance of this comparative advantage depends

on the continuous creation of new products or product variations through R&D.

ii«

it q

5 7

Large firms in large and high-mcome

countries will be better able to create and maintain such
temporary monopoly positions because of three aspects of the
R&D process.

For one, large firms with large and high-income

home markets will be able to minimize the risks inherent in

Ip7

Vernon (1970) and Wells (1972) contain further theo
retical and empirical contributions and relevant bibliographies.
Finger (1975b) presents a new version of the product
cycle hypothesis where the rate of product turnover becomes an
additional explanatory variable besides technology and labor
skills. Finger also argues that the 'technology gap' trade
model of Posner (1961) is indistinct from the product cycle model.
^Bhagwati (1969a :35-36;108) interprets the 'availability'
trade theory of Kravis (1956) in this way.
^This explanation is product oriented. Keesing (1967)
and Grubel et. al. (1967) include technological process in
novation as an additional explanatory factor (see next note).
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R&D.

They are, therefore, able to continue to create new

products and new technologies and to exploit economies of
scale in the production of these new products.

Secondly,

these large firms are frequently part of oligopolistic
markets in their home country, have production facilities
in many countries, and are able to protect their technolog
ical findings through patents.

In short, they are already

in a position to exploit oligopoly positions even without the
dynamics of technological change (Hymer, 1972).

And thirdly,

the diffusion of technological innovations even if they are
legally unprotected, requires resources and time.

Temporary

protection is therefore assured simply because the Innova
tions will not spread instantaneously to other countries (Mans
field, 1975:373-375)-

The product cycle occurs because a new

product will be first produced in the country of its creation
and exports will start as other markets accept the new product
As these markets grow and as local competitors might start up
their own production, local production will begin either on a
licensed basis or in production facilities owned by the orig
inal producer.

This production Is initially restricted to the

assembly of imported parts, but in the end, production will
be independent of parts shipped by the original producer.

The

product might ultimately even be exported back to the country
of origin.

This shift takes place as competing products ap

pear and the initial monopoly position is eroded.

Cost calcu

lations begin to favor low-wage countries as the center of
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p r o d u c t i o n .50

in this sense, trade based on a technological

monopoly gives way to trade based on traditional factor pro
portions (Kindleberger, 1974:4l)•^ 5
Linder (1961:87-88) offers a related explanation for
trade in manufactures.

Demand conditions in the home market

determine the range of manufactures that are produced in a
country.

Only these goods will be exportable because only

under these circumstances are the risks and costs of export
marketing acceptable.

Trade in manufactures will therefore

take place primarily between countries with similar tastes

50stobaugh (1971) argues 'that a secondary product cycle
based on process innovations is superimposed on the first
cycle based on product innovation and thus prolongs the mo
nopolistic advantage of the originating country. See also
the analysis by Seev Hirsch (1967).
51Harry Johnson (1970a:l4) points out that R&D can be
included in the concept of capital. This suggests that in
fact both the neofactor and neotechnology accounts of trade
determination are basically based on the same set of factors.
In fact, the use of an index of value-added per employee as
the explanatory factor of trade (Lary, 1968) points to the
same conclusion. Harry Johnson (1970a:16-17) argues that this
index picks up the effects of labor-capital ratios, human cap
ital, as well as neotechnology factors like scale economies,
product age and differentiation.
However, in the end the fact remains that the neo
technology account is concerned with developments over time,
market structure, and, as will be discussed later on, inter
national mobility of the factors of production.
c p

J A country can occupy a bridging position where it
finds itself as recipient in product cycles originating
recently in DC and as a second generation originator of prod
uct cycles with even less developed countries (Hufbauer, 1966;
Seev Hirsch, 1971)Akamatsu (1961:205-209), Higgins (1968:623-624) and
Kojima (1975:84-85) explain such a trade pattern with the
"catching-up product cycle" where a country's industries
find themselves in different phases of product cycles.
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and income levels.53

T^g demand conditions in most UDC are

sufficiently different from those in DC, according to Linder,
that the former will be hard put to find exportable manu
factures to DC among their home market oriented products
(Linder, 1967)-'^

More recently Linder (1971:504) argued that

home market demand determines also the search for technologi
cal

c h a n g e .
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Declining home market demand will therefore in

general lead to increasing uncompetitiveness on world markets.

53 I.e., these countries come close to satisfying the
H-0 assumption of identical consumption patterns. On the
other hand, the Linder hypothesis clearly differs from the
H-0 model in assuming positive information, marketing and
transportation costs (Linder, 1961:87-90). It is therefore
not clear to what extent trade between UDC or between DC
could be close to H-0 trade.
Linneman (1966:180-196) and Kindleberger (1962:8-25)
provide some indication for the importance of transportation
costs as a determinant of trade structure. Kindleberger
especially uses such costs to explain trade overlap which is
one facet of reality which cannot be explained with a pure
H-0 model. But see on this point Finger (1975a).
54

The Linder model assumes producer initiated exports.
However, MNC and possibly large DC-based retail organizations may
well initiate UDC based production and exports according to
DC demand patterns.

^^Schmookler (1966) presents the model of the demand
determination of technological change. Linder suggests that
this means that UDC and DC will follow different paths of tech
nological development.
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Exports will decline together with production for the home
m a r k e t

.56

Exports are therefore demand determined, either

directly or indirectly, both in the short and long run.
Both the dynamic model of Linder (1971) and the prod
uct cycle theory introduce technological know-how and tech
nological change as explicit trade determining factors.

This

means that the H-0 assumption of identical production functions
has been dropped.

Or if one considers technological know-how

as a separate factor of production or as a capital differen
tiating characteristic, international factor mobility has been
introduced into the model thus relaxing another H-0 assumption.
Most technological know-how today is produced in the highly
industrialized countries and then either consciously trans
ferred or indirectly diffused to other countries.

If one

considers technology as one of the trade determining factors,
then one introduces an imperfectly mobile factor into trade
models . ^

Of course, it has been recognized for some time that

the absolute dichotomy between perfect intra-country factor
mobility and absolute intercountry immobility is far from

-^Temin (1966) and Kindleberger (1962:59) provide ex
amples with the experience of the British steel and textile
and the U.S. textile and car industries.
Hsu (1972) presents the formal Linder model.

5?If on the other hand the differences are accounted
for by different production functions, one would have to model
the process whereby the production functions become transformed
under foreign influences.
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realized (Kaldor, 1970).

Mundell (1957) showed that inter

national factor migration in response to factor price differ
entials can reestablish factor price equalization.

Harry

Johnson (1958:84-92) and Meade (1955), on the other hand,
analysed the effects of factor movements upon income dis
tribution and shifts in production and demand patterns and
the terms of trade.-'58
However, the total impact of factor movements are likely
to be much more complex, especially in terms of their dynamic
and long-term ramifications.

For one, it is selected sets of

a given factor which tend to move between countries.

Secondly,

factors are often moved by a special category of actors, the
MNC.

Not only are these factor transfers made on the basis of

firm internal decisions, but they frequently involve the si
multaneous transfer of complementary factors, labor with mana
gerial know-how and other specialized skills, technology, and
either finance capital or capital equipment with specific em
bodied technological characteristics (Yudin, 1968).

And

thirdly, the effects of such factor migrations depend very much
on the particular socio-political conditions in and possible
cultural differences between the sender and receiver countries.
The complexity of these conditions and of the ramifica
tions to which they can give rise, and the different weight

^ S u b s e q u e n t research has built on this line of investi
gation. See, e.g., the analysis of capital mobility by Chipman
(1971) and Wan (1971) and of labor mobility by Kenen (1971).

39
given to them in the evaluation of factor movements, underly
the conflicting evaluations accorded to labor migrations.
Harry Johnson (1968b), taking an internationalist position
using a comparative static model, is unreservedly for such
movements.

They maximize world income although rarely giving

rise to compensatory payments.

Patinkin (1968), taking the

nationalist position and being aware of this lack of redis
tribution of income gains, stresses the negative growth effects
in the emigration country due to the loss of highly skilled
labor, the 'brain drain1. Myint (1968:238-252) on the other
hand takes a middle position.

Labor migration, or in his case,

migration of highly skilled and educated labor out of UDC, is
the result of structural disequilibria which cannot be over
come within the near future.

Emigration is therefore a safety

valve which prevents the eruption of sociopolitical tensions
and conflicts which could easily affect the growth rate by more
than the uncompensated export of human capital.59
be said about capital and technology movements.

The same can
The contradic

tory evaluation, e.g., of the effects of foreign direct in
vestments of MNC is based on similar differences.*^

5^The immigration of large pools of relatively unskilled
labor into the industrialized countries of Northern and Western
Europe generates also social and political problems which in
turn can feed back to the economic sphere.
^ S e e the study by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1972)
which is unreservedly positive, the more reserved report by the
U.S. Tariff Commission (1973)5 and the papers in Kujawa (1973)
reflecting the negative viewpoint of organized labor.

•'10
The product cycle hypothesis and related trade models
discussed at the beginning of this section have implicitly
introduced into trade theory large producer organizations
with world wide interests which are far different from the
firm of neo-classical price theory.

It has already been men

tioned that these organizations have reduced the barriers to
international factor mobility, or have at least changed the
character of this mobility.

In this context it has been

suggested that the effects of their activities, both in the
home and host countries, are not very clear and certainly
complex, especially when the latter are UDC.^l

But of special

interest in the present context are those aspects of MNC which

C

*1

Kindleberger (1972) suggests that these effects
changed with time and growth of MNC.
General reviews of the issues raised by MNC are pre
sented by Barnet and Mueller (197*0 and Wilkins (1974)- The
preceding footnote listed studies evaluating the effects of
MNC in DC. With respect to UDC, May (1974) finds MNC to be
extremely beneficial. Pearson (1969:99-123) finds foreign
direct investment in such countries to be overall beneficial
for them. Hirschman (1969) concurs but counsels nonetheless
gradual desinvestment, mostly for political reasons. A re
cent study by the United Nations (1974) is overall critical
of the benefits that will accrue to UDC.
(See also Evans
(1972) and Barnet and Mueller (1974:148-184).) The net
benefits depend crucially on the conditions under which MNC
are allowed to invest. At one time, Seers (1963) suggested
a UN organization to strengthen the bargaining power of host
UDC. Mueller (1973) was once sceptical about the ability of
these countries to reassert their control over the MNC but now
thinks it is possible (Barnet and Mueller, 1974:185-210). Bergsten (1974b) concurs with the latter view but fears that the
home countries of the MNC could try to retaliate and thus start
an investment war unless a generally accepted code of conduct
is drawn up. D. Wallace (1973) deals exhaustively with the
problem of the international control of MNC investments.
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differenclate them from the classical price taking firm of
the H-0 model insofar as they relate to the four aspects of
the IES discussed in the first chapter.^2
For one, MNC are their own very best international
customers.

Trade, finance and investment activities are

therefore not arms' length transactions, i.e., do not neces
sarily reflect market conditions (Vernon, 1973:98-99) •^
One aspect of this situation is the use of manipulated intra
corporate transfer prices for goods and services in order to
minimize tax liabilities and to circumvent exchange controls
rT [I

and limits on profit repatriation.

Secondly, MNC frequently

engage in foreign direct investments only if they can exploit
or have to preserve some kind of oligopolistic or even

The emergence of the MNC duplicates in many ways the
development of the large integrated oligopolistic firm in the
U.S. at the turn of the century. The effects on the world
level could well be equivalent to those on the national level
(Hymer, 1972 ).

^Gray
(1972) provides many examples of the consequences
this can have in his analysis of the Canadian experience with
foreign MNC.

See Barnet and Mueller (1974:151-162). Zenoff and
Zwick (1969:428) argue that "intracompany sales are the single
most important method of effecting a movement of capital be
tween countries in which companies have operations." On the
other hand, Arpan (1971:71-72) found a rapidly declining use
of transfer-pricing for tax minimization by MNC.

42
monopolistic

a d v a n t a g e .

^5

Thirdly, MNC are often worldwide

multi-plant organizations with similar production facilities
in several countries.

This not only provides them with the

possibility of closing down one facility in the face of un
pleasant host government decisions without endangering the
operation of other dependent

o p e r a t i o n s .

66

It is also pos

sible that in these cases decisions with respect to local
operations are made on the basis of the global interests of
the MNC and not on the basis of the conditions existing in the
host country (Hymer, 1970).
But even more important is that many MNC are more than
economic actors limiting their actions to the market place.
They are in fact economic and political entities (Hymer, 1970),
and by using their resources, they are even able to keep
"sovereignty at bay" (Vernon (1971)-

Recent history clearly

shows that MNC are important political actors which intervene
in the politics of their host countries or are at least able
to induce the governments of their home countries to do so on
their behalf (Sampson, 1973)*

Often, these political activities

65This point is stressed by many authors, see e.g. Caves
(1971, 1974), Kindleberger (1969) and Weigel (1974).
Kindleberger (1969:201-207) proposes international har
monization of investment conditions to prevent MNC from ex
ploiting UDC competing against each other for their investments.
cc

Moran (1973) describes recent financing strategies by
MNC exploiting natural resources to limit the danger of na
tionalization through increasing artificially the costs of
nationalization (especially the political costs).
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preempt foreign policy decision^ of their home governments
(Model, 1967) or they become active agents in behalf of the
foreign policy of their home governments (Gray, 1972:253-290).
Or, as the events during the Arab oil boycott in 1973 and 1974
revealed, they fill the policy vacuum left by their governments
if these are unable to reach necessary foreign policy decisions
(Mikdashi, 1975:6).^7

It is no wonder that Kindleberger (1969)

and Ball (1970) predicted at one time the actual or at least
imminent demise of the nation-state in favor of the transna
tional enterprise as the basic organizational unit of the world
system.
While this political aspect of MNC may yet be kept
under control, the socio-cultural effects of the activities of
the MNC may prove to be more significant.

These effects arise

not only because the export or local manufacturing of products
which issue from the rich, consumer-oriented economies of the
industrialized world propagate and reproduce the lifestyles
predominant in these countries.

The effects of investment

activities of MNC on work attitudes and organization, and the
cultural and socio-political structure of host societies
through the introduction of modern western technologies are
probably even more important.^

Hymer (1972) warned that the

^Barnet and Mueller (1974:72-104) give a compendium of
these different political activities by MNC. Vernon (1972)
contains several papers discussing the political as well as
military implications of MNC activities. See also the case
studies on the activities of oil companies by Pinelo (1973)
and Penrose (1968).
^chapter 3, Section 2, will take up this point.
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MNC would reproduce its hierarchical organization (Chandler
and Redlich, 1961) at the world level.

The strata of the

least developed countries would contain the manufacturing
activities supervised by regional headquarters located in
the middle-income strata of countries.

The richest coun

tries would become the seats of the MNC where all the stra
tegic decisions would be taken and where much of the research
activities would be concentrated.^9
All in all it is clear that the MNC are unlike the
traditional economic actors of classical economic theory.
They have not only economic but also socio-cultural, military
and political effects and capabilities.
not just the economic ones —

These capabilities —

are actually used in attempts to

shape actively their environment for their own benefits.
The extensions of the original H-0 model as well as
those trade models which deny any overt link with the H-0
model have raised the question of the proper conceptualization
of the model elements and the proper theory formulation.
Practically, this meant the gradual relaxation of the strict
assumptions underlying the Samuelson formulation of the H-0
theorem.

In other words, the models have attempted to re

flect more fully the complexities of the real world.

The

proliferation of explanatory variables and models is a re
flection of the problematic of trying to construct simple

^^Brown (1970:260-265) describes a plan by ITT to tie
all its subsidiaries into one central, real-time computer,
located of course near its headquarters in the United States.

45
models for a complex world.

One aspect of this is the ac

ceptance of elements of oligopolistic competition in the
IES.

The product cycle hypothesis and related conceptu

alizations have gone furthest in this direction although any
model that includes technological change as a variable comes
close to accepting such a market structure.
Neo-classical price theory has always argued that
oligopolistic market structures were non-optimal from a wel
fare standpoint.

The opposite, however, may hold in a world

of factor mobility, technological change, growth and develop
ment.^1

Harry Johnson (1968d, 1969:60, 1970a) now thinks that

such competition —

especially in the form of MNC —

is not

"a socially undesirable imperfection of market structure" but
a dynamic and rational mechanism to create knowledge, generate
and spread new technologies, and to bring about modern patterns
of consumption appropriate for developing economies.

One con

sequence of this view is that government intervention to con
trol and correct oligopolistic behavior is once more considered

7°Hymer and Rowthorn (1970) argue that the emergence of
the U.S. MNC has lessened competition in world markets, in part
because they induced a concentration in European and Japanese
industries. Harry Johnson (1970c) on the other hand thinks
that competition has increased because the entrance of MNC into
hitherto isolated national markets has lessened monopolistic
control of these markets by national firms. Caves (1974), after
surveying many empirical studies, thinks that MNC are unlikely
to increase competition if they participate in markets for dif
ferentiated consumer products.
^1Any text in Industrial Organization contains evidence
for this. Galbraith (1968) presents this conviction most force
fully .

46
unwarranted (Harry Johnson, 1971).7^

Yet, despite all the

welfare arguments against government Intervention, or at
least certain forms of intervention, in the past and today,
we find that governments have always intervened into the
working of the IES. The combined effect of these interven
tions has had very specific results raising the question of
the proper model construction again although from a different
angle.
3.

The next section will deal with these issues.
Trade and Trade Controls in an Imperfect and
Dynamic Social System
Government intervention to control trade flows and the

impact of events in the IES upon the national system generally
are pervasive and of long standing.

The arguments in favor of

such interventions have changed over time (Harry Johnson, 1974).
Welfare analysis based on the H-0 model has consistently sug
gested that free trade or at most a limited range of control
measures is best.

If market imperfections exist, the best pol

icy is always to remove directly the imperfection or end the
condition which makes the real situation diverge from the H-0
assumption.73

When the imperfections are country internal and

72

' This shift in theoretical argumentation to rule out
government interference has its root in the change from mercantilistic to classical, and then from classical to neo
classical economics (Mini, 1974; Solo, 1975).
72

'-'That is, as long as only one imperfection exists or
all imperfections are removed at the same time. Otherwise the
ranking of policies has to occur with the help of the theory
of second-best. The results become much more ambiguous in this
case.
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their removal is not feasible or impossible, first-best
policy is to use a tax combined with either a production
or consumption subsidy to reestablish equality between rates
of transformation and consumption and the relative commodity
prices (Bhagwati, 1971) •?45^5

This ranking of policies ap

plies even in the only ’true’ infant industry case where the
public goods nature of knowledge acquisition may lead to an
otherwise sub-optimal production of such knowledge (Harry
Johnson, 1970b).^

Trade is in general preferable to no trade

^ Stern (1973) and especially Corden (1971, 1974) pro
vide a complete review of the issue and contain extensive
bibiographies.

^Domestic distortions can be endogenous, i.e. they
arise out of the laissez-fair operation of the perfect system.
Or they can be the result of unintended consequences of past
governmental action (autonomous policy-imposed distortions)
or of instrumental policies through which the government wants
to achieve objectives which demand such distortions (Bhagwati,
1971:73-74).

Harry Johnson (1970b) shows that all other arguments
normally used to justify the protection of infant industries
refer actually to forms of market imperfection::. In all of
these cases the optimal first-best policy is a tax and sub
sidy scheme.
(See also the analysis by Grubel (1966) and
Baldwin (1969)-)
Harry Johnson (1970a:19-20) himself seems, however, to
entertain at times more differentiated views so when he wonders
if the complex problems of modern industrial competition can
still be handled adequately with the existing theory of tariffs.
Another problem is that the infant industry argument
refers to a truly dynamic event which entails probably more
than the traditional externality argument (Bhagwati, 1969a:80).
Also, List's argument for infant industry protection was very
much concerned with what might be called today nation-building,
i.e. non-economic effects (List, 1971:151-158; Senghaas, 1975).
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except in the case of increasing returns to scale (Bhagwati,
1969a:83-85).

Tariffs are always less optimal than a scheme

of taxes and subsidies except in the following cases:

(i)

when domestic demand is smaller than the optimal scale of pro
duction.

A temporary tariff or quota may in this case be

sufficient to allow producers to attain lower production costs
and even become internationally competitive (Pomfret, 1975)(ii) A tariff is the first-best solution when the imperfection
lies in monopoly elements in world markets which cannot be
affected by domestic policies (Bhagwati, 1971:79) 7^

And

(iii) a tariff may be useful in increasing the welfare of an
individual country although such an optimal tariff itself will,
in this case, introduce a distortion into the world system
(Harry Johnson, 1951-52; Chacholiades, 1973:435-440).^®
This ranking of trade intervention policies can be
used to determine optimal intervention policies for the

^This welfare analysis is based on the case of complete
monopoly and perfect competition. It does therefore not nec
essarily arrive at conclusions which are valid for inter
national markets where MNC introduce intermediary structures
of oligopoly and monopolistic competition discussed in the
previous section (Balogh, 1973:89 (Note 1)).

^®These gains from an optimum tariff reduce the welfare
of the international system. Also, they do not only depend
on objective conditions but are predicated on certain retalia
tion patterns (Harry Johnson, 1953-54; 1968c).
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achievement of 'non-economic' objectives.79

a

tariff is

an optimal trade intervention policy if the goal is increased
Op
self-sufficiency, i.e. reduced dependency on imports.ou a
tax and subsidy scheme is first-best policy if domestic pro
duction has to be maintained at a high level in order, e.g.,
to maintain sufficient production capacity for military emer
gencies.

Tax and subsidy schemes are also best for the main

tenance of factor employment at a given level or for the
limitation of domestic consumption (Harry Johnson, 1964;
Bhagwati, 1971:78).

Real domestic product will be decreased

in all of these cases although real income - defined to in
clude the welfare gained from achieving the non-economic obOn

jectives - will be maximized (Harry Johnson, 1965a:259-

O Q

5

^^This is the 'instrumental policy case' referred to by
Bhagwati (1971) (See note 75)'Non-economic' means in this context that the goal
achievement necessitates a loss of real product, not that the
goal does not belong to or not affect directly the economic
sphere (Harry Johnson, 1964:7, 1965a).

A tariff which achieves a given objective with minimal
loss of real product is called a "scientific tariff" by Harry
Johnson (I960) and a "made-to-measure tariff" by Corden (1974:
203) •
^Kindleberger (1972:388) points out that the difference
between real product and real income is not a neat one. Many
nationalistic policy cases provide also some kind of consumer
or producer goods. They can spur people on to more savings,
greater productivity, or make them accept an unfavorable income
distribution.
^2Harry Johnson (1965a :268-269) explains within this
framework a country's changing preference for free trade and

m
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Tariffs can be preferable to tax and subsidy schemes
even in the absence of non-economic objectives or external
monopoly elements because of the lower direct economic costs
which are incurred in the administration of such trade control
schemes (Corden, 197^:59-67)-

Harry Johnson (1965a:259) gives

three reasons for the political preference for tariffs which
are related to the administrative cost argument: (i) It is
more difficult to collect the taxes necessary to finance sub
sidies than to levy an appropriate tariff: (ii) those who bene
fit from import protection for example do not wish its real
cost to be readily ascertained or to depend on annual budgetary
approvals as would be normally the case with tax and subsidy
schemes: and (iii) industries must make believe —
ally and internationally —

both nation

that they are internationally com

petitive without government support.

This is easier with im

port protection.
The acceptance of such arguments or of the validity of
non-economic objectives as in the case of the scientific tariff
is an important and fundamental step outside the boundaries of

protection. A country which is already a net-exporter will
have a relatively low marginal preference for additional home
production. In this case real product and real income (in
cluding the non-economic objective) is almost the same and
free trade will maximize both. The marginal preference for
home production will increase if a deteriorating international
competitive position reduces home employment. Real income
maximization will lead to protection at the price of a less
than optimal product.
(It seems that this model is based on
Keynesian and not classical assumptions.)
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the H-0

f r a m e w o r k .

Goals other than pure product max

imization are Included In the social welfare function and
this opens the possibility to include goals as legitimate
O h

variables for analysis which belong to non-economic spheres.04
Furthermore, Harry Johnson’s reflections reported above on the
preference for tariffs over tax and subsidy schemes point to
the fact that trade and trade controls take place in a dynamic
social system with conflicts and that trade analysis and poli
cy prescription cannot abstract from these fundamentals.
This means that any trade policy —
timal or not —

scientific and op

which is supposed to correct existing market

imperfections or to benefit some groups but not others, acti
vates conflicts.

Although these conflicts may remain political

conflicts, they can easily become social, military and economic
conflicts (or affect already existing conflicts of this type).
These conflicts imply not only direct economic costs (in the
for?. of a once and for all downward shift in the growth path)

It already led to a reevaluation of the whole cus
toms union argument (Cooper and Massell, 1965a, 1965b; Krauss,
1972).
84 Economists have always arbitrarily limited the number
and character of variables to be included in the preference
function of 'rational economic man' (Hollis and Nell, 1975)This made it rather difficult to explain irrational govern
mental policies (Penrose, 1971:232) without taking recourse
to the concept of political market failure (Goeran Ohlin, 1969:
174) .
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due to the related resource use.

They affect the character

and stability of social relationships which in turn are important determinants of capital and labor productivities. 85
This means that optimal situations and policies (if measured
in traditional economic terms with a strong ceteris paribus
clause) may become non-optimal measured on the same basis if
the dynamics of the social system and its economic reper
cussions are included in the analysis.

A non-optimal policy or

situation if traditionally evaluated may become economically
optimal because of benign or relatively weak negative reper
cussions.®^

This point will be illustrated in more detail in

chapter 4 when the adjustment paths of various European coun
tries in the case of the drastic fall in the wheat price after
1870 are discussed.
A second aspect of the fact that trade and trade controls
exist in a dynamic social system with conflicts relates to the
distributional problem.

A move from a non-optimal to a more

^The direct resource costs of conflict as well as the
costs of controlling worsened social relationship can in
crease conflicts because they divert resources from private
and social consumption (Baumgartner ejt. al., 1976a; DeVille
and Burns, 1976; see also O ’Connor, 1973TT
®®Balogh (1963, 1973) makes the same argument pointing
out that in real life the comparative static end situation of
the economic system will not be reached because of the social
processes. These theoretical positions can therefore not be
used to rank policies.
Kindleberger (1968a :503-504) makes the same point with
respect to devaluations.
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welfare optimal trade system Implies In general a different
income distribution with some individuals, groups or coun
tries being worse off than in the original situation.

The

usual argument is that in such situations the gaining actors
are able to compensate the loosing ones and still realize an
improvement in their own situation.

Such compensation strat

egies are however rather rare in real life and normally not
institutionalized.

However, distributional conflicts lie at

the heart of many social conflicts and it seems that relative
income positions are often more important than absolute ones.
In these situations individuals, groups and countries probably
prefer to rely on the existing situation or to use their power
in clear-cut situations to increase their income share rather
than rely on a questionable political p r o c e s s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,
such redistributional processes are not costless and the ex
isting non-optimal situation may well provide a larger real
product than attempts to bring about a more optimal allocative
system that necessitates difficult redistributional policies
(Cooper, 1975:21, 26-27).^9

finally Cooper (1968) pointed

'The U.S. has recently improved its system of adjust
ment assistance. See the three papers by Metzger, Fooks and
the Department of Commerce in the report by the Commission on
International Trade and Investment (1971).
OO
Baldwin (1970:7-8) notes that governmental decision
makers are rather reluctant to discuss and decide distribution
al questions.
^Both Chipman (1972:209) and
that such redistributional decisions
distributional consequences of trade
These, however, are rather difficult

Stern (1973:879) point out
have to be based on the
liberalization policies.
to determine.
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out that institutionalized redistribution mechanisms on the
international level are even less frequent than on the na
tional level.
policies —

Agreed upon international redistribution

although rare —

are also more easily broken

without any consequences (at least for certain countries)
than on the national level where periodic national elections
provide at least some automatic checks.
All in all, it is not surprising that in situations
where activities in the IES have complex repercussions in the
national and international systems and where the social pro
cesses related to economic adjustments in the wake of events
in the IES or to changes in the trade control measures may
have significant feedback effects on the economic sphere it
self, governments continue to intervene to control the links
between their economies and the IES.

It is furthermore not

surprising that, despite the welfare implications of the H-0
model to the contrary, tariffs and other non-optimal trade
control measures are used very liberally.^0

It is therefore

^Curiously enough, GATT allows tariffs but not tax and
subsidy schemes for manufactures.
Overall protection and trade intervention has hardly
diminished despite several rounds of tariff reductions since
1945- Non-tariff barriers (NTB) — see Stern (1973:867—873) >
Baldwin (1970, 1971a), Harry Johnson (1967a:104-106), Walter
(1969) and the papers in Chapter 5 of the report by the Com
mission on International Trade and Investment Policies (1971)
— and country internal industrial policy measures — see
Goeran Ohlin (1 9 6 9 , 1975) — have taken the place of reduced
tariffs in controlling trade. Goeran Ohlin (1969) suggests
that tariff reductions forced governments to use these other
trade control forms to maintain overall control. Harry John
son (1975:45) thinks that the realization by governments that
the latter were superior to tariffs made them asquiesce in the
tariff reductions in the first place. The superiority of many
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of interest in this context to inquire about the structure
of these trade control measures and the trade flows gener
ated in part by them.

This may give us some clue to possi

ble additional motivations behind the use of trade control
measures.

The next section will therefore present a summary

of the relevant findings.
4.

The Structure of Trade Controls and Trade Plows
In general, the structures of tariffs and NTB applied by

DC have very specific forms.

Nominal and the higher effective

tariff rates increase as products become more highly processed.
That is, DC tend to encourage the import of unprocessed primary
products or of manufactures in early stages of processing.

Sim

ilarly, both nominal and effective tariff rates are lower for
technologically sophisticated manufactures predominantly traded
among industrialized countries than for manufactures like shoes
and textiles for which UDC possess a comparative

a d v a n t a g e . 91

Consequently, it is not surprising to find that manufactures

industrial policy measures — especially many subsidy programs derives from the possibility to protect and expand export mar
kets. This, instead of domestic market protection through
tariffs, becomes important due to the need to minimize unit
costs despite large scale production'and high R&D expenditures
(Harry Johnson, 1974:13-15)•

^ Zandano (1969) shows that nominal and effective tariff
rates in industrial countries are positively related with labor
intensity. However, Zandano sees in this result a positive
verification of the H-0 model which suggests that import barri
ers will increase the relative income share of the relatively
scarce factor. This implies that the relatively unskilled
workers must be a politically powerful group in the industrial
ized countries (Harry Johnson, 1965b).
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imported by DC from UDC face tariff rates above the average
rate on all the manufactures imported by DC.92
There exist strong indications that NTB are also biased
against the exports of UDC.

This is as much the result of

conditions specific to UDC as due to the specific forms of the
NTB of the DC.

Walter (1971:197) argues that producers in UDC

are in general less able to surmount a given barrier than those
in DC.

This is so because most of these producers have a low

capability to deal with the complicated issues raised by most
NTB because of their lack of commercial

e x p e r i e n c e .
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They are

also less able to switch production to products which face low
er or no NTB due to general structural limitations present in
the economies of UDC (which are in part of the Linder-type).
And they are frequently without appropriate informations about
the NTB and therefore incur unanticipated selling costs.

But

maybe even more important is that the exports of UDC are often
subject to especially tough health and quality standards which
introduce a direct cost .bias against them.

Walter (1971:202)

also shows that the incidence of NTB in DC against imports from

9 These propositions are based on detailed calculations
by Balassa (1965, 1967a, 1967b, 1968). Additional evidence
can be found in Basevi (1966), Harry Johnson (1967a:90-91;
96-104) and Streeten and Elson (1971:62-63)- Little et_.aU.
(1970:273) show that the tariff reductions in the Kennedy
Round did not reduce this bias.

^However, subsidiaries of MNC should not be affected
by this. One would also expect sales organizations in DC to
provide the necessary expertise if the products are really low
priced ones.
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UDC is higher than against imports in general.9^ j95
The structure of trade

f l o w s

96 exhibits a pattern

which leaves the same impression as the structure of trade
controls, namely of being intentionally structured.

Partner

concentration of exports and imports are in general higher
for UDC than DC.97

Galtung (1971:102) correlated per capita

GNP and the percentage of employment in the non-primary sec
tors —

both measures of degree of development —

with an index

^ Harry Johnson (1967a:85) points out that those primary
products exported by UDC to DC in competition with the latter’s
own products "are subject to the most complex and generally
severe restrictions involving quantitative control over imports
... as well as tariffs or equivalent price-raising charges."
Although other primary products face lesser import barriers,
they are nonetheless often subject to heavy excise taxes (as
in the case of oil and tropical agricultural products).
95This structure of NTB and the
NTB (see note 9 0) raise some questions
tariff preferences recently granted by
et. al., 1970:27^; International Labor
Cooper, 1972b) .

shift from tariffs to
about the value of
most DC to UDC (Little
Organization, 1970:337;

^ Three indices to measure trade structures are used:
(i) Geographic or partner concentration, i.e. the extent to
which a country's exports go to or its imports come from one
or a small number of countries; (ii) commodity concentration,
i.e. the extent to which a country’s exports or imports con
sist of different commodities (irrespective of destination or
origin): and (ill) trade composition which is an index for
the degree of processing which differentiates a country's ex
ports from its imports.
For the exact specification of these indices and a
discussion of their advantages and disadvantages see Michaely
(1962), Coppock (1962), Galtung (1971), and also Hirschman
(19*15), Kojima (1971) and Theil (1967).

9 ^ I m p o r t s
a r e
g e n e r a l l y
( M i c h a e l y ,
1962:19-20).

l e s s

c o n c e n t r a t e d

t h a n

e x p o r t s
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of partner concentration for a large number of countries.
The coefficients were -.52 and -.72 respectively.98

The

study of Hirschman (19^5) of the trade structures during the
1930's especially for Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom
suggests that such a pattern of trade concentration is a
consciously designed result used by large and developed and
therefore dominant countries to make small and less developed
countries economically and politically dependent on them.99
The commodity concentration measures indicate a simi
lar structure for the composition of trade as for the direction
of trade.

Galtung (1971:102) again finds relatively high cor

relations of -.89 and -.87 respectively for per capita GNP
and the percentage of employment in non-primary sectors when
regressed against commodity concentration of

e

x
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r
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.

-*-90

The

data of Michaely (1962:16) suggests that, among DC, smaller
countries have a higher export commodity composition ratio
than larger ones while the concentration ratios among UDC is

^ Coppock (1962) and Michaely (1962) support Galtung's
findings for the trade structure of the late 1950's.

99;Linneman (1969:121-123) shows that both in the late
1950's and early 1960's the neighborhood effect — i.e. the
effect of having contiguous borders with other countries on
trade between them — was not larger than the cousin effect.
The latter measures the influence of past commercial, economic,
political and social ties on trade flows. It is therefore
essentially an indication of the strength of colonial and post
colonial ties. This influence becomes even more pronounced
when controlling for distance and not just neighborhood (Linneman, 1966). See also J. A. Pincus (1968).

■^Ogee a^-so Lloyd (1968:27) and Coppock (1962).
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slightly higher for the larger ones.

This suggests that

underdevelopment and position in a structure of dependency
relationships are the determining variables and not smallness
of the country and factors singled out in the Linder hypothe
sis per se.

This view is reenforced by the particular re

lationship between the commodity concentration ratios for ex
ports and imports.

DC have generally low export and also low

and relatively equal import concentration ratios.

Countries

with high export concentration ratios have generally lower im
port commodity concentration ratios (Michaely, 1962:14).

This

structure is obviously the result of a lack of industrializa
tion as it is generally UDC which have high ratios for their
exports.
Both Michaely (1962:22) and Galtung (1971:102) find a
positive correlation between partner and commodity concentra
tion although Hirschman (1945:140-151) had originally hypothe
sized a negative one.

According to Hirschman a country with

only a few commodities to export had to sell them necessarily
to a relatively large number of countries.

However the ab

sorptive capacities of DC compared to concentrated production
capacities of UDC are so large that it is quite possible for
commodity and partner concentrations to go hand in hand.11^
This does not mean that major DC do not use their arsenal of
trade control measures to reenforce this pattern with the

Both situations minimize marketing costs which does
not mean that the UDC benefit in the form of higher net prices.
The oligopolistic character of international trade implied by
these trade structures suggest that the DC are the major bene
ficiaries .
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intent to make sure that the UDC are as much dependent on
them as possible.
The point, that lack of industrialization is in part
the determinant (as well as the result) of such a trade con
centration, is reenforced by Galtung’s data on the trade com
position and its correlation with the variables of underdevel
opment and concentration (Galtung, 1971:102).

In general,

trade of UDC is made up predominantly of the export of raw
materials and food and the import of manufactured goods while
the opposite is true for DC.-*-^^

The implications and conse

quences of such a trade structure of high partner and commodity
concentration and of an extractor status for UDC is clear for
Galtung (1971) and Hirschman (1945).103

This structure implies

-*-^2Galtung labels them extractor and processor states.
His sample contains one UDC — Jamaica -- with processor status.
The 12 DC in the sample which are weak extractors — their
average trade composition index is half as high as the average
index for 37 UDC — include such industrialized countries like
Australia and New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, Sweden,
Denmark and Finland. Obviously the consequences of being an
extractor country is different if one possesses an indigenous
industrial base.
1(-*3gorrie attempts have been made to verify the link be
tween trade structure, export stability and development.
Coppock (1962) and MacBean (1966) show that UDC do not have a
higher export earning instability than DC. Maddison (1970:
103-106), Erb and Schiavo-Campo (1969)3 and Massell (1970)
disagree using different methodologies and time periods.
Askari and Weil (197*0 have recently suggested that manufactures’
exports experience a greater instability than exports of non
manufactures (see also Naya (1973))* Michaely (1962:66-101)
and Massell (1964) found, however, a correlation between
commodity concentration and export volume and earnings fluc
tuations. This, however, is in part due to the fact that
small countries or countries with small export sectors ex
perience greater fluctuations in their exports and that these
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the presence of an imperialistically structured IES and
provides the conditions where trade between UDC and DC will
maintain if not reenforce this structure.

The processes of

such a structuring of the IES or parts of it will be des
cribed in more detail in Chapter 5 while Chapter 6 will focus
on the problems and dilemmas associated with such structuring
efforts.
The analyses of Galtung (1971) and Hirschman (19^5)
differ in many aspects from the analysis based on the H-0 model
although they frequently use the same elements.

For one the

models now are totally non-normative but try to explain what
exists in all its complexities in the IES.

The basic premise

is, of course, the existence of international conflict among
countries and the desire of these countries to assure their
domination and to structure the IES to their own benefit, eco
nomically and otherwis^^J§^B|fctt^so it becomes important to
see what the l
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countries have higher than average concentration ratios.
Khalaf (197*0 has argued that there is no correlation
between export concentration and economic development, but
Glezakos (1973) finds that export instability affects growth
negatively but only for UDC.

involves all the spheres of a social
transformations of the institutions
regulate social life.

One consecuen

and services have now to be evaluate
influences on such developmental tra
ditions under which their production
generates specific repercussions in
points which have already been touch
3.

It was especially in Section 3 -

economic policies which are ncn-opti
model can become quite optimal once
accounted for.

I also suggested the

the persistence of non-optimal trade
section now has reviewed some evider.
trade flows which suggests that it i
actual resource distribution and cos
relations.

The suspicion is high th

behind these trade structures inscfa
identified with the different levels
the countries of the world.
5.

Summary

The first chapter suggested a
ysis to deal with the complexities c
general and the IES specifically by
and developing more fully four aspec
The complex hierarchy of actors with

61

the presence of an imperialistically structured IES and
provides the conditions where trade between UDC and DC will
maintain if not reenforce this structure.

The processes of

such a structuring of the IES or parts of it will be des
cribed in more detail in Chapter 5 while Chapter 6 will focus
on the problems and dilemmas associated with such structuring
efforts.
The analyses of Galtung (1971) and Hirschman (1945)
differ in many aspects from the analysis based on the H-0 model
although they frequently use the same elements.

For one the

models now are totally non-normative but try to explain what
exists in all its complexities in the IES.

The basic premise

iSj of course, the existence of international conflict among
countries and the desire of these countries to assure their
domination and to structure the IES to their own benefit, eco
nomically and otherwise.

In doing so it becomes important to

see what the long-term implications of specific trade patterns
are and how they affect the long-term growth and development
paths of the competing countries.

The question now is no

longer what the static welfare implications are of a given com
modity produced and traded.

The problem is rather to find out

if it facilitates growth and development in the longer run.
Growth can be seen as a purely economic although dynamic pro
cess.

Development however is dynamic and systemic, i.e., it

countries have higher than average concentration ratios.
Khalaf (1974) has argued that there is no correlation
between export concentration and economic development, but
Glezakos (1973) finds that export instability affects growth
negatively but only for UDC.
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involves all the spheres of a social system and implies the
transformations of the institutions and structures which
regulate social life.

One consequence is that traded goods

and services have now to be evaluated with respect to their
influences on such developmental transformations and the con
ditions under which their production, exchange and consumption
generates specific repercussions in the system. These are
points which have already been touched upon in Sections 2 and
3.

It was especially in Section 3 that I pointed out that

economic policies which are non-optimal according to the H-0
model can become quite optimal once their systemic effects are
accounted for.

I also suggested there that this might explain

the persistence of non-optimal trade control measures.

This

section now has reviewed some evidence on the structure of
trade flows which suggests that it is more than the result of
actual resource distribution and cost-minimizing commercial
relations.

The suspicion is high that there is a purpose

behind these trade structures insofar as they are clearly
identified with the different levels of development reached by
the countries of the world.
5.

Summary

The first chapter suggested a need for a broader anal
ysis to deal with the complexities of the economic system in
general and the IES specifically by paying closer attention to
and developing more fully four aspects of economic systems:
The complex hierarchy of actors with their goals and action

capabilities; the multidimensional character of economic
valuables; the relationship and feedback mechanisms between
institutional and structural constraints and economic ac
tivity; and the nature of structural, including economic,
inequalities, and their effect on the operation of an econ
omic system in the presence of conflict and competition.
Underlying both of the latter two points was the concept that
actors in an economic system will actively try to structure
the system in their favor by trying to build institutions and
structures which facilitate and beneficially influence their
own economic activities.
The present chapter started out with a review of the
assumptions underlying the strict formulation of the H-0 model
and then discussed the modifications, alternative definitions
of variables and concepts which were introduced in the course
of its testing subsequent to Leontief's paradoxical findings.
The combined effect of all this effort is raising questions
with regard to the preservation of the fundamental traits of
the H-0 model.

The third section discussed some alternative

trade determination models and hypothesis.

Although they rep

resent themselves as alternatives, the differences between
them and the more complex H-0 based propositions are rather
minimal.

It seems that the alternatives eliminate the use of

certain concepts, like for example the production function,
which had become a fuzzy concept anyway in the course of the
testing of the H-0 model.
The section on trade controls indicated a parallel to
the expansion of the H-0 model.

The original normative
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concern with the development of precise rankings of differ
ent policies with respect to their welfare optimality broad
ened to include the concept of a scientific tariff and the
acceptance of non-economic objectives as valid data for deter
mination of positive optimal policies.

The discussion of the

structures of trade controls and trade flows indicated, how
ever, that, in this area, the acceptance of what is has not
yet been fully completed.
Yet, it is quite clear that trade related theoretical
work has in fact recognized the importance of many of the
elements and aspects singled out as important in the first
chapter.

The recognition of non-economic objectives in the

determination of welfare optimal trade policies suggests the
importance of governments and the national power structures
supporting them.

The focus on technology as a trade determin

ing factor, especially in the product cycle theory, has led
to special consideration of the role and possibilities of MNC,
a category of economic actors certainly different from the
classical firm of economic theory.

Technology and its impact

on the social system in the course of its diffusion to other
countries implies the multi-dimensionality of capital goods.
Technology diffusion and the related phenomenon of limited
international mobility of factors of production, the issue of
appropriate controls over the worldwide activities of MNC, and
the very specific structure of trade controls all raise the
issue of the role of institutions in the determination of trade
and especially the consequences of trade.

The pervasiveness
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of trade controls suggests that conflicts over the distri
bution of the economic product both on the national and
international level are a basic feature of the IES.

The

present discussions in several international forums over the
future shape of the institutions of the IES bear this out.
The economists who use the H-0 model as the basis for their
analysis have recognized this situation, e.g., in their de
velopment of the concepts of scientific and optimal tariffs.
This, as well as the structure of trade controls and trade
flows, contains implicitly the idea that countries and their
governments structure external and internal relationships.
The following chapter will now develop the central elements
which have been mentioned here as part of a systems approach
to the IES.
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CHAPTER III
ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
AND STRUCTURING
This chapter will take up the many implicit suggestions
made in the course of the presentation of the H-0 model, its
testing, and alternative explanations of trade and interna
tional economic exchange.

The purpose here is to develop in

a relatively abstract and explicit manner the elements which
appear to be embedded in so much of international trade theory,
analysis and description, and which I judge to be central to
the formulation of a systems model of the IES.

These elements

have been selected and are developed for the purpose of explain
ing and modelling the structuring and restructuring of the IES,
a topic that will be taken up in more detail in the chapters
following this one.
Section 1 develops the concept of a complex hierarchy
of actors where the actors on different levels of the hier
archy possess different sets of goals and different capabili
ties to structure the system.

Section 2 deals with the multi

dimensional nature of valuables and the consequences this has
for the decision-making by actors.

Section 3 develops the

concept of systemic ramifications of exchanged economic valu
ables, that is, the processes through which the multi-dimen
sional nature of exchanged valuables is realized in a social
system.

Special attention will thereby be given to those
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ramifications which have implications for the power positions
of the actors involved and therefore will have consequences
for their ability to structure and restructure the system of
which they are part and the interaction conditions linking
their system to others.

Section 4 develops the concept of

unequal exchange, that is, the unequal distribution of power
resources through the systemic ramifications of economic ex
change and the implications this has for the maintenance or
transformation of a structured unequal exchange system.

Sec

tion 5 deals with the concept of structuring, i.e., the de
termination of the institutions and structures of the IES by
powerful actors so that the system operates in their favor.
1.

Actors and their Goals

Actors in a system are individuals, organized collec
tivities of individuals, and collectivities of such collec
tivities.

The latter two classes of actors can be called

organizations.

Actors are able to make decisions with re

spect to the use or disposition of valuables over which they
exert control.-^4

In doing so, actors interact with each

other or at a minimum impinge on other actors' future action
possibilities.

The nature and amount of valuables that actors

control, the degree of control over these valuables, the his
tory of their decisions and interactions, and the general

It is always individuals that make decisions and ex
ecute actions even in the case of organizations. Economic
theory assigned this role to the enterpreneur but the modern
business organization is certainly more complex than that.
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framework of rules, regulations and laws, which are an im
plicit and explicit part of any system to which such actors
belong, constrain differentially the actors’ ability to make
decisions and to engage in actions.

Actors are also con

strained by their position in the structure of relationships
among the actors in the system.

1 nc:

The desires, needs, goals and interests of actors are
generally complex.

One and the same actor may simultaneously

possess goals and interests of an economic as well as of a
social, cultural, political, and military nature (Galtung,
1971).

it is of course possible that a given actor, for

example a firm, may emphasize primarily economic goals and in
terests in deciding about a future course of action.

In this

case the decision-making members of the firm suspend or dis
regard goals and interests they might have in different roles
or as members of other organizations.

Similarly a member of

a military unit may choose an action based solely on the mili
tary objective of destroying a given objective.

And politicians

•'-^structure refers to the form of the totality of links
among the elements which make up a system (Kornai, 1971:52; see
also Machlup, 1967:81). The concept 'structure' is restricted
here to the description of the set of links and relations among
actors and between actors and valuables. Actors, valuables and
structure are three characteristics of a system in difference,
for example, to the use of 'structure' by van Nieuwenhuijze
(1969:146) where actors, valuables, relations and values are
all part of the structure of the system.
lO^Economic theory uses the heuristic device of the firm
and the household in order to circumvent the problem that the
same individuals are both producers and consumers at the same
time. How far the absolute separation of identities as postu
lated by economic theory is really maintained is an empirical
question.
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may in fact attempt to choose a course of action which maxi
mizes their votes in a future election as some political econ
omy models of political behavior postulate (Goodhart and
Bhansali, 1970).
Organizations are always made up of individuals and
these are members of a society and as such have goals and in
terests belonging to many if not all of the spheres of social
life.

They will generally remain conscious of them even if

they have to act within a single sphere or have to act as a
representative of a collective actor with well defined inter
ests limited to one sphere.

Furthermore, the actions of

large-scale organizations —

large with respect to the system

in which they operate —

often do have sizable impacts on

values and interests belonging to spheres other than the one
in which the action was primarily taken.

Feedback mechanisms

can then affect directly the organizations’ primary interests.1^
Or, other actors, especially governmental units (belonging to
the political sphere), may react to these effects in control
ling future operations of the organizations in their primary
spheres of interest.-*-0^

in both cases, the organizations can

do better in the long-run by considering all possible effects
even if they occur outside their spheres of prime interest.

107por example, compliance of U.S. enterprises with dis
criminatory policies of Arab governments could reduce sales in
their home market because of boycotts by offended customers.
108iphe sale of weapons to countries in conflict with
other countries might induce the government of the exporter's
country to introduce a licensing system for future exports.
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In addition, large organizations have the necessary means
to intervene directly with actors belonging to other spheres
in order to influence their decisions and actions when they
could hinder or facilitate the organizations' activities in
their spheres of prime interest. 1(-|9

in this case, as in the

others, actors will try to satisfy multiple goals belonging
to two or more of the spheres of social life.-^^
In some cases, it may be possible to determine a pre
dominant sphere of interests for a given category of actors;
in other instances, actors will have a wider spectrum.

The

range of interests for a given type of actor may vary with
the nature of the system in which it operates.

Interests may

change as an actor grows or transforms itself.

The firm is an

illustration of the latter occurrence.

Some of them became

oligopolists in national markets and thereby were forced to
include political goals in their decision matrix.

MNC are

frequently aware, e.g., of the military and cultural implica
tions of their investment decisions.
Achievement of the goals in one sphere may contribute
towards the realization of goals in other spheres.

Economic

^^poiitical lobbying by companies affected by or po
tentially affected by laws and regulations is often cheaper
than compliance with existing or proposed laws and regulations.
H^Eels (1972:108), using the framework developed by
Parsons and Smelser (1956), arrives at a similar view: "The
Multinational Corporation, as a concrete collectivity, is not
a sub-subsystem of the economy. Like all concrete collec
tivities, it is multi-functional, and its goals are accord
ingly assignable to each of the four functional subsystems
of the society."
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production capacities provide military capabilities (Knorr,
1973).

Schools produce not only human capital but they also

socialize students (Bowles, 1972).

Government financed hos

pitals provide health services as well as votes for the re
sponsible politician.

On the other hand, goals may conflict

and trade-offs have to be sought or accepted.

Price in

creases raise profitability but may also produce a political
backlash with negative effects on future government contracts.
The assembly line can increase productivity but creates
workers' alienation which depresses productivity (Terkel,
197^) and ultimately may lead to a different political system.
Or on the level of the world system, free trade may maximize
economic output and related welfare.

But if this system cre

ates increased inequality, resultant conflict and warfare may
well lead to drastic reductions of world welfare in the long
run.
There is a multi-level hierarchical structure associ
ated with the total population of actors in a system.

At the

base are individuals followed by smaller collectivities (fam
ilies, local firms).

There are increasingly larger collec

tivities (corporations that operate in national markets,
parties) and the state government (and its agencies) making
up a national system.

Some of these actors together with in

ternational intergovernmental and non-governmental organi
zations have interests in more than one national system (Feld,
1972:11-13).

They have therefore a direct interest in events

related to the international system and in the rules under
lying its organization.

Each actor with such an international

72
orientation is in principle strongly oriented towards a
particular national system, or in the case of intergovern
mental international organizations, towards the national
systems which are represented in the higher-level organiza
tion.

However, international organizations which do not have

such a dominant orientation are already beginning to emerge
parallel to the increasing integration of the world system.-1-1-1Exchange between actors belonging to the same system
is intra-system exchange; exchange across a system boundary
is inter-system exchange.

International exchange is there

fore exchange between actors belonging to different national
systems.

However, it is possible that the exchanging actors

are part of the same higher-level actor as in the case of
intra-MNC transactions.

In general, actors engaged in inter

national (external) exchange are also participating in nation
al (internal) exchange.

Both internal and external inter

actions can take place between actors which belong to the same
level or to different levels in the multi-level hierarchy of
actors.

^ H m n c of this type are called "international corpora
tions" by Kindleberger (1969:182), "transnational corporations
or enterprises" by Kirchner (1964) and Hochmuth (1974:3)3"polyand geocentric MNC" by Perlmutter (1969)s and "cosmocorp" by
Ball (1970). Essential in all these cases is that these firms
have worldwide production and marketing interests without how
ever being centered organizationally or in spirit in a national
system.
^^Higher-level actors operate in more extended systems
(Tinbergen, 1965). It has already been pointed out that Harry
Johnson (1965a), for example, enlarged the governmental pref
erence function by ’non-economic' objectives (see Chapter 2,
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Although corporations acting In the International
system may concentrate on the satisfaction of their economic
interests and goals, state governments will generally try to
realize interests which belong to several spheres.

These

goals and interests are complex because governments represent
many different actors with widely different demands.

The

pattern of goals and interests represented by a government in
turn depends very much on the socio-political structures ex
isting within the national system.

These structures and the

struggles for political domination within a society affect a
state's action and outcome preferences.^-*-3

Therefore a gov

ernment will normally not simply try to maximize the national
economic product through its interventions in the national
and international system, but will intervene in and try to
structure the IES so that economic and non-economic goals of
its actors are realized.

Section 3). Another important consequence is that higher-level
actors set the rules and laws which regulate the behavior and
activities of the lower-level actors. In this sense MNC are
subordinate to national governments (Wilkins, 1974:439) • How
ever, as the geographic extent of the reach of MNC is larger
than the one of national governments, true transnational cor
porations may well be able to reverse their clear hierarchical
subordination (Coleman, 1974).

^chapter 4 on internal restructuring of systems will
take up this point with respect to the different European
reactions to the agricultural crisis after 1873-
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2.

Multi-Dimensional Valuables

It was suggested at the beginning of the previous
section that actors possess, control or desire valuables
which are used by them to engage in actions and interactions.
Valuables are any symbols, attributes, conditions, resources
and commodities which allow actors to satisfy their interests
and reach their goals.

Any entity of this kind that is useful

to an actor in his attempts at goal fulfillment is a valuable
within the system to which the actor belongs.

Valuables are

in general characterized by a vector of attributes which be
long to the different spheres of social life, i.e. the eco
nomic, cultural, social, political and military spheres.
This multi-dimensionality of valuables is an objective feature
of valuables.
Economic commodities, for example, may entail much more
than the creation of new productive capacities, or the possi
bility of producing valued outputs through their use as inputs
into a firm's production process, or the provision of satis
faction through consumption.

Trucks do not only provide trans

portation services but project also military capabilities and
preparedness.

Truck factories can be converted into assembly

lines for armored vehicles (Knorr, 1973).

Electronic compo

nents and their use in cheap, mass-produced means of communica
tion provide the basis for cultural, social and political trans
formations .414

Consumer goods, if they are imported or produced

MacLuhan (1964) provides a provocative formulation
of this idea. There exists a large political science literature
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locally under license or as a competitive copy of importable
goods, together with their advertised virtues and qualities,
transmit the values of the particular society in which they
originate.

This is also true for investment goods.

These

embody technologies which reflect the cultural, social and
political aspects of societal organization in the origina
ting society in the most general sense. ^-*-5

On a more con

crete level, technologies imply specific patterns of work
organization, work rules, worker-management relations, and
-J1 /T

also management techniques.

It is exactly the diffusion

of these patterns, rules and relationships which some authors
see as the most (if not only) positive aspect of foreign di
rect investments under the control of MNC (Steuer and Gennard,
1971; Streeten, 1 9 7 2 : 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 ) . These enterprise or factory

which links communication with modernization (Lerner, 1958;
Pye, 1963; McCrone and Cnudde, 1967; Rogers, 1969; Frey, 1973)*
Pool (1973) discusses military and political implications of
communication systems.
^^^Technology itself is value-ladden and assumes and
subsumes cultural values (Ill.ich, 1971)- Navarro (197^:10)
argues that it is therefore impossible to strictly separate
technological and cultural diffusion processes.
11

C

Dubin (1958) discusses the links between technology
and worker-management interaction patterns. Woodward (1965)
outlines a model in which technology determines the organiza
tional structure of enterprises. Aldrich (1972) confirms the
existence of such links.
^^The argument here is not about the positive or nega
tive nature of these effects but simply about their existence
and therefore the need to arrive at a multi-dimensional con
ceptualization of valuables.
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internal patterns in turn have an impact in the larger so
ciety (Udy, 1970) and ultimately affect even the social and
political basis of the host society .-^8 ,119

On the other

hand, even the transfer of finance capital can have differ
ent psychological implications depending on their form as
aid payments, portfolio investments, or direct foreign in
vestments (Bergsten, 1973:103-104; Gergen and Gergen, 1974).
Their political implications are different not only because
different categories of finance accrue to different actors
in the social hierarchy.

Direct foreign investments lead to

the acquisition of property rights.

In most countries, these

give the right, or at least the moral right, to influence
political processes in the host countries.-*-26

llfiorow (1975) for example shows that those industrial
sectors in China which had been built up with Soviet tech
nology where also those which had adopted most completely
Soviet organizational methods. Desai (1972) shows that both
the Soviet Union and the U.S. were quite aware of these link
ages when they were considering the financing of the Bokaro
Steel Plant in India.
The existence of this mutual interaction between tech
nology, enterprise organization, and social and political
societal structures was at the heart of the Chinese break
with the Soviet Union, the Cultural Revolution and the current
discussions in China (Wheelwright and McFarlane, 1970; Dean,
1972).
1:L9lt is effects like those described here which lie at
the heart of the controversy over the beneficiality of MNC and
their direct foreign investments. For additional references
see Chapter 2, Section 2.
12 6The fears about Arab investments in the U.S. after
the massive oil price increases were in part based on such con
siderations (see Chapter 6, Section 2).
However, multi-dimensionality is not the same as the
simultaneity of economic and power effects as in the model of
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The multi-dimensional vector of characteristics is
an objective attribute of a valuable in the sense that its
use by actors in actions and interactions in a social system
has effects in several (but not necessarily all) spheres of
social life.

Actors, however, will consider in general only

a subset of these characteristics when evaluating valuables
which they control, desire or need.

For one, the goals and

interests of actors are limited as pointed out in the first
section of this chapter.

(But they do not have to be limited

to one sphere alone.) 1 P 1

In addition, actors in general are

not able to include all possible systemic effects of their
activities in their evaluation and decision making, nor do
they necessarily follow the 'rational' maximizing decision
strategies of economic theory.

The actors' situation and the

consequences of their actions are too
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Insofar as

actors make decisions and take actions on a limited basis,
evaluated effects will reflect only a limited spectrum of the

Hirschman (19^5:14, 78-79)- Power derives from control over
valuables and is not simply another dimension of a valuable.
See the next section on this point.
^lqoals and interests of actors are in part a social
product themselves. They reflect knowledge, socialization,
and legal constraints present in the systems to which actors
belong (Buckley et. al., 197^; Baumgartner et. al., 1975c).
IP?

Actors may also be unable to collapse the evaluations
of several dimensions into a suitable uni-dimensional index
like price, utility or votes. This can introduce inconsist
encies, intransitivities and indecision into decision making
(Burns and Meeker, 1975)*
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totality of systemic effects.

This means that in the case

of economic transactions, even if economic actors decide and
act in a perfect economic world without imperfections and
market failures, prices reflect only a limited range of all
systemic effects occurring in the process of production, ex
change and use of commodities.

The corollary to this propo

sition is that actors with different bases of evaluation and
decision making, and who are in a position to regulate the
behavior of lower level actors, may want to intervene and
structure the system so that the actions and interactions
taken by these lower level actors on the basis of their evalu
ations and decisions will reflect the interests of the higher
level

a c t o r s .

g>he next two sections will develop more ful

ly the concept of these systemic effects while Section 5 will
take up the structuring of systems by higher-level actors.
3.

Systemic Ramifications of Economic Exchange
Price in economic exchange and therefore international

trade theory reflects the economic aspects of production and
consumption processes
benefits —

-- measured in terms of costs and

as evaluated by the marginal sellers and buyers

participating in a market.

Social and private evaluations co

incide as long as markets are perfect and property rights are

122

-’Optimal and scientific tariffs or the inclusion of
non-economic objectives into the economic governmental pref
erence function are examples of such behavior. See Section 3
of the preceding chapter.
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completely specif led.-'-^4

Externalities, a divergence of

private and social costs and benefits, result when these
optimal market conditions are not fulfilled.

The preceding

section has defined the concept of multi-dimensionality of
valuables, including economic commodities.

It has been

suggested that, as a consequence, of multi-dimensionality
production, exchange, and consumption of economic valuables
entail a wide array of effects and processes in the differ
ent spheres of a social system.-^5

It has been argued that,

for various reasons, actors will include in their evaluation
and decision making with respect to their economic actions
only a lr-.nited number of these effects and processes.

It

follows that a multiple of these effects, actions, and proc
esses prior to, simultaneous with, and subsequent to the
action considered will not be reflected in the valuation of
the economic valuable exchanged.

The totality of these effects,

12^Market failures (Bator, 1958) result when property
rights are impossible or non-feasible to specify, or are not
completely specified and enforced for political reasons. In
terdependence of preference functions (Arrow, 1971) and differ
ential lengths of time horizons can also produce divergences
between social and private evaluations.
The existence of such divergences has led — especially
in the context of development planning — to the development
of cost-benefit analysis and the use of shadow pricing and in
vestment criteria.
(On the latter point see Kahn (1951),
Chenery (1953), Galenson and Leibenstein (1955), Eckstein
(1957) and the review of this debate by Chenery (1961).)
125The same can be said for any action in any other
sphere of a system. That is, a political scientist may ana
lyze political activities as involving multi-dimensional
valuables.
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actions, and processes excluded from the private decision
calculus of the actors are summarized under the concept of
systemic ramifications.

The systemic ramifications in the

case of economic exchange can be separated analytically into
the categories of spin-off and spill-over effects (Galtung,
1971:98).

Spin-off effects are those systemic ramifications

which occur within the sphere to which the exchange action
and exchanged valuable belongs.

Spill-over effects in con

trast are all those ramifications which have a bearing on one
or more of the spheres other than the one in which the action
responsible for the ramifications takes place.-*-^6
It is through the systemic ramifications, the spin-off
and spill-over effects of exchanged economic valuables, that

■- -

—

The idea of ramifications of economic exchange and
international trade is not new. Singer (1950:476) for example
argued that the most important element in the economic life of
a country is "the mechanism by which 'one thing leads to an
other', and the most important contribution of an industry is
not its immediate product ... but ... its effects on the gen
eral level of education, skill, way of life, inventiveness,
habits, store of technology, creation of new demand, etc."
(See also Bauer, 1968:49).
Hirschman (1958:98-119) seemed to take up this theme
with his concept of forward and backward linkages. Originally
Hirschman and, today for example Panchamukhi (1975)3 give a
very narrow economic meaning to these linkages. Hirschman
(1967), however, goes clearly beyond the narrow demand/supply
imbalance conceptualization in his analysis of the successes
and failures of development projects. Using terms like in
direct benefits, side effects, spillovers, linkages, reper
cussions, he describes spin-off effects like the acquisition
of new skills through learning-by-doing, the learning of co
operation and discipline by entrepreneurs, etc. Spill-over
effects are the acceptance of the idea of family planning,
heightened social and economic tensions, the spreading of cor
ruption, and shifts in political power towards particular pro
fessions (Hirschman, 1967:160; see also Streeten and Elson,
1971:54-59)* Raj (1975) has recently given such an expanded
interpretation of the concept of linkages. Ng (1975) uses the
concept of 'indirect externalities' in a way similar to the
concept of systemic ramifications.
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their multi-dimensionality is realized in the different
spheres of the social system.

Their nature and extent de

pend on the nature of the valuable exchanged, the specific
terms of exchange, the exchanging actor and his internal
structure (for example in the case of MNC), the position of
the actor in the structure of relationships with other actors,
and the institutional and structural properties of the system
to which the actor

belongs.

^7

of course, these ramifications

can be positive or negative with respect to a given standard
which is in general some measure of economic growth and social

^Important structural categories are: (i) The action
and interaction possibilities of the actor in the system. The
denser and the more extended interaction networks are, the
easier it is for the actors to react to a given exchange. This
is true for cities with their agglomeration effects (Werner
Hirsch, 1973:22; Hoselitz, 1953; Mills, 1972:16-17), national
market systems (Bauer, 1968) and especially international mar
ket systems as the development of the capitalist world economy
since the 15th century demonstrates (Cipolla, 1966, 1970; Rod
ney, 1972; Wallerstein, 197*0. The structure of production
has similar importance. For example, Kindleberger (1956:229)
argues that countries at higher stages of economic development
benefit more from free trade than those at lower stages be
cause the former are more differentiated and therefore factors
of production have it easier to exit from and enter a given
industrial sector. Baldwin (1963) thinks that agriculture in
tegrates people more than mining. Rosenberg (1964) argues that .
industrial sectors experience different feedbacks than agri
culture.
(ii) The relative interaction pay-offs. Burns and
Meeker (1975), for example, discuss the influence of pay-off
structures on the behavior of game participants.
(i3\) The
orientation of actors towards society. Included here are such
factors as n-achievement (McClelland, 1961), behavior according
to tradition and norms (Ohmae, 1975), class and ethnic con
flicts which can produce isolation and distrust (Meade 1961), etc.
It is therefore not a question of exports of raw materi
als and agricultural products versus manufactures but of the
conditions under which they are produced (Myint, 1954:153). It
is structural differences of the kind suggested here which make
Australia experience possibly more positive ramifications than,
e.g., the Philippines or Thailand although their trade compo
sitions are about the same (Galtung, 1971:102).
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development.^ 8
The exchanged valuables and the systemic ramifications
of exchange may entail commodities and services as in economic
theory, but also rights and action opportunities, structural
adjustments, behavioral modifications, processes, symbols and
attributes.

Of special importance for the analysis of the

structure of the IES and its evolvement over time are those
valuables and systemic ramifications which are power resources
and which affect the power positions of the actors in the sys
tem.

A power resource is any valuable which allows an actor

controlling the resource to exercise control over his environ
ment (Burns, 1975) .-*-29

Three types of power can be defined:

(i) The power of actors within a system to take advantage of
action opportunities in a system in order to realize positive
gains and to control, minimize or prevent negative effects.
(ii) The meta-power to structure the system to which the actor
belongs so that the actions of and interaction between actors
of the system generate productive gains and positive systemic
ramifications while losses and negative ramifications are pre
vented, or at least minimized and possibly overcome.

And (iii)

Myrdal (1958:27-33) calls the negative effects "back
wash effects", the positive ones "spread effects".

^Power, or the capability of getting things done, is
clearly a potentiality. The existence of power and the exer
cise of power, e.g., in an attempt at control of other actors,
are not the same thing. The actual exercise of power may not
entail the full use of power (Burns, 1975). In this sense power
is "a partly unobservable counter-factual property of a complex
system" (Alker, 1973:371).
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the meta-power to structure the external social environment
of the system to which the actor belongs by regulating and
influencing the relationships between the actors of the sys
tem and actors belonging to other systems.

The purpose of

this use of meta-power is again to increase the gains and
advantages accruing to the system (and minimize those of the
other systems) in the process of exchanging and interacting
with the other systems. •'•30
Spin-off and spill-over effects of exchange activity
defined in terms of these three types of powers contribute to
a process of social differentiation and social structuring
whereby some actors (e.g., states or corporations) develop or
maintain comparatively greater capabilities or powers relevant
to the particular environment in which they find themselves.
That is, actors acquire or develop through exchange trans
actions differential capabilities or powers to act in their
environment, to take advantage of productive or exchange op
portunities, to prevent or control negative spin-off and spill
over effects, or to restructure themselves or their environment

130power is exercised by actors to control directly the
outcomes of their actions and interactions. Meta-power is the
power of higher-level actors (see Section 1 of this chapter)
to control the structure and institutions of a system and thus
influence and regulate indirectly the relationships and inter
actions between actors, either higher-level or lower-level ones.
To structure a system means also to restructure it as
social systems have always a history. The use of the term ’re
structuring' emphasis the structural dynamics of a system and
the conflicts between present and desired structures.
The use of meta-power to restructure the IES will be
taken up in Section 5 of this chapter and illustrated on hand
of historical examples in Chapters 4,5 and 6.
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to their advantage.

Of special interest are the cumulative

or self-reinforcing feedback patterns, Myrdal's "benign" and
"vicious circles", whereby differences in systemic capabil
ities are amplified and developed over time.
4.

Unequal Exchange

Unequal exchange is exchange whose systemic ramifi
cations, i.e., the spin-off and spill-over effects, result in
a differential allocation or unequal distribution of power re
sources among the actors and subsystems involved in the exchange. 131
J 3132

The unequal allocation of power resources is

the output of an unequal exchange system.

The differential

allocation of power resources through such exchange may either
maintain or modify the distribution of control over power re
sources and the action capabilities and positions of actors in
the structure of social relations.

This provides the conditions

necessary for the occurrence of unequal exchange in the future.
That is, such conditions make up the institutional-structural
input into the unequal exchange system.

Unequal exchanges may

^ Emmanuel (1972) defines unequal exchange as a purely
economic phenomenon using a marxian scheme of accumulation.
Non-economic factors define the structure of the IES which pro
duces unequal economic exchange and reproduces the system of
uneven development (Amin, 1971* 1973)* The necessary con
dition for unequal exchange to occur is the ability of the DC
to set and maintain low wages in the UDC. Wolff (1974) and
Barnett (1975) provide historical evidence for such struc
turing of low wage labor.
132Q0untr;i_es are subsystems of the IES. Actors here are
mainly corporations and governmental organizations which par
ticipate in international exchange activities.
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have at least three types of soclo-structural outcomes, de
pending on the beneficiaries of the differential allocation
of power resources:

(i) The outcomes of exchange maintain

the original distribution of power resources.
structure is maintained and reproduced.

The social

However, the ex

change could be equal, in that an initial structure of equal
ity in terms of the distribution of relative power is main
tained.

(ii) Exchange outcomes may be unequal and modify the

original distribution of power resources (including position
in the structure of relations), developing or solidifying such
a structure, i.e., leading to increased inequality.

In this

case, the inequality of exchange favors those actors (or sys
tems) already occupying positions of power advantage.

(iii)

Although inequality is typically reproduced and possibly de
veloped further through exchange, important changes in re
source distributions and transformations of the structure of
relationships may take place under certain conditions, in some
instances in the direction of increased power equality.

In

this case, unequal exchange favors the relatively powerless.
Social structures based on a particular distribution of control
over certain strategic resources and action capabilities may
undergo such a significant transformation due to a shift in the
relative importance of power resources, thereby altering the
1 oo
basis of social structure.
Its transformation may also come

^ T h e importance of one power resource
resources will vary from social environment to
on their critical or strategic significance in
context. This context is naturally subject to
natural and social forces.

or set of power
another depending
the particular
alteration by
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about because actors previously in a more or less disadvan
tageous position unexpectedly gain resources or develop capa
bilities which enhance their position of relative power com
pared to those actors who have been in the dominant position.
Such changes occur typically when an actor exogenous to the
system provides the relatively powerless actors in the system
with additional power resources or opportunities for new re
lationships with power advantages (Baumgartner et. a l ., 1975b,
1976a).

Also, new valuables or sources of such valuables may

emerge, be discovered or created within the system or new so
cial relationships may emerge, particularly in connection with
such changes, and transform power relations in favor of dis
advantaged actors.1^
Unequal exchange is investigated through the compara
tive study of actors in an exchange system.
a class of buyers (or sellers).

One may examine

The members of the class will

gain or accumulate action opportunities and power resources at
differential rates even in the case where they are producing,
exchanging or consuming the same valuable.

Or one may look at

the parties engaged in an exchange relationship.

Unequal ex

change in this case can occur on three different levels:

(i)

the participants directly involved are affected differentially
in their relationship; (ii) the exchange between two traders
affects in unequal ways the capabilities and powers of the
respective systems to which they belong; (iii) meta-level

Chapter 6, Section 2, deals more extensively with
power reversals.
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exchanges between two systems, negotiated between the systems'
representatives or leaders, have spin-off and spill-over ef
fects which change the relationships of the two systems and
of their actors with each other.
In the case of
tion may focuson two

international exchange, the investiga
different aspects of unequal exchange

and its effects on the system capabilities of societies with
different internal socio-economic structures and positions in
the international structure of relationships.

First, the sys

temic outcomes of the same productive and exchange activities
may differ between two or more classes of countries in that
those countries engaged in the same trade activity, paying
the same price for the same valuable in world markets, may
experience markedly unequal ramifications from this activity;
in this sense, they would be engaged in unequal exchange.
Second, one may investigate the processes whereby ex
change between two or more countries is structured in such a
way that the powers of the relatively powerful country or
countries are enhanced further, or in the limit maintained,
while the development of such powers in the other country or
countries are affected either positively but to a lesser de
gree, or negatively.

This meta-process of the structuring and

institutionalization of an unequal exchange system is the topic
of the next section.
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5.

The Structuring of the International Economic
System
Systemic ramifications of international economic ex

change and the related power implications provide two reasons
why state governments orient a considerable degree of their
activities towards the structuring of the IES.

First, coun

tries will try to facilitate and develop those exchange ac
tivities of their lower-level actors which produce positive
ramifications within the system in addition to the private
benefits directly accruing to the exchanging actors.

This

means that they try to prevent or at least limit those ex
change activities which would have negative or possibly only
weak positive ramifications .-*-35

Secondly, governments will

attempt to favor those exchange activities which increase the
power position of the country and weaken the powers of the
other countries, at least relatively speaking.-*-36

That is,

governments will try to shape the institutional and structur
al context within which international economic exchange at the
world market level takes place so that the resultant systemic

-’-'Positive and negative ramifications or positive ram
ifications with negative power implications for dominant groups
may occur simultaneously creating dilemmas for the structuring
activities of the government. This point will be illustrated
in Chapter 6 with the case of the Comecon.

and their supporting groups might be more
interested in protecting their own power position within their
own country than the power position of their country in the
IES. The analysis of the European adaption to the fall in the
price of wheat in the late 19th century in Chapter 5 illus
trates this point.
■ ^ ^ G o v e r n m e n t s
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ramifications and power implications are biased in favor of
their own country.^37

The structuring of such an unequal

exchange system on the international level includes inter
ventions into country internal structures and institutions in
order to maximize beneficial systemic ramifications of a given
international economic exchange activity.
The ability to structure the IES so as to create, main
tain, and institutionalize an unequal exchange system to one's
own benefit and the benefit of the lower-level actors belonging
to the system is a meta-power, a higher order power.

States

exercising meta-power exercise relational and structural con
trol, i.e., they influence the structures and relationships
among the actors of the system and of the supra-system. -*-38
The exercise by governments of asymmetrical control over val
uables in the different spheres —
tary, social and cultural —

economic, political, mili

and therefore their ability to

^Keohane and Nye (1973:117) call this meta-level proc
ess "structure-level exchange", determining "the long-term
political and economic incentives and constraints within which
actors operate." Exchanges where the institutions are taken as
given, the ceteris paribus case of international trade theory,
are "process-level exchanges".

138por this purpose, higher-level actors engage in
multiplex exchange relationships where valuables in one sphere
are exchanged against valuables in other spheres. For example
a country might grant another one most-favored-nation treat
ment in exchange for a liberal emigration policy for persecuted
groups which has significant cultural, social and political
repercussions in the first country.
Whereas multi-dimensionality is a property of valuables,
multiplexity is a property of the relationships among actors.
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use meta-power to structure the IES, is in part the result
of differential natural resource endowments, climatological
conditions, geographic location, etc.

But it is also in part

the result of historical developments, of earlier uses of
meta-power and structuring attempts.

Today's inequalities

are in particular the result of a long history of colonial
and imperialistic domination of a few countries over others.
This domination has left behind a legacy of uneven accumula
tion of productive capacities and brought forth healthy and
well-educated, cohesive, disciplined and well-motivated labor
forces in a few countries while preventing their development
in others.

It has permitted the development of cultural traits,

socio-political structures, and behavior patterns flexible enough to let some societies adapt positively to changing cir
cumstances while others fail to do

s o .

^9

A n ( j

j_-j-

brought cer

tain countries into possession of recognized ideological, spir
itual, cultural and political leadership while others are sup
posed to follow the f o r m e r . p p

certainly has allowed the

dominant nations to gain favorable access opportunities to im
portant and profitable markets for their exports; their imports

pqg

However, Kindleberger (1974) raises some questions
about the ability of the U.S. to continue to do so. It should
be pointed out that Kindleberger makes the comparison not be
tween the U.S. or Great Britain and UDC, but between them and
Germany and Japan.
■^^The present challenge by UDC turns exactly around
this point. Decolonialization, and now the quest for a NIEPO,
are attempts to break this dependency relationship and insti
tute self-determination and equality. In this sense, today's
world struggle has some similarities with the early history of
labor movements.
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are procured from relatively secure and cheap sources; and
their financial and direct investments are profitable and
protected from losses.
Today we have a structured IES where economic exchange
between the industrialized, high-income countries of the
’North’ and the less developed, low-income countries of the
'South' generates differential systemic ramifications which
maintains uneven development on the world level.

A move to

wards free trade, i.e., a dismanteling of the extensive sys
tems of trade controls, will not necessarily change this bias
of the IES, although over time it may be weakened.

It shiml1

not be forgotten that historical attempts at free trade origi
nated always in the most highly developed countries, Great
Britain in the 19th century (List, 1971) and the U.S. in the
20th (Gardner, 1969).

As Wiles (1968:555) put it, free trade

"is the mercantilism of the strongest power and it leads to
imperialism almost as surely as thought-out commercial policy."
The IES will always possess certain structures and in
stitutions.

Until recently at least, these were the result of

relational and structural control activities by dominant DC
which used their power to structure an unequal exchange sys
tem in their favor.
turning point.

It seems like the world has arrived at a

Recent shifts in relative power have created

the possibility for UDC to demand a new definition of the laws
and rules which determine the distribution of the world product.
We will therefore experience a period where the main efforts of
international politics and actions by the countries of the
world are directed towards the determination of what constitutes
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a fair distribution of the world product, equitable prices
and fair values for the worlds' resources (Schmidt, 1974:442).
The next three chapters will expand on this topic of
the structuring of an unequal IES to illustrate in more detail
the processes of such structuring attempts as well as the in
teraction between the elements described in the earler sec
tions of this chapter.

The next chapter concentrates on the

capacity of countries to structure and restructure internally
in response to an external event in the IES, in this case the
fall in the wheat price on European markets after 1870 in the
wake of the opening up of new lands in North America and Russia.
Chapter 5, on the other hand, takes up the process of the struc
turing of the IES itself.

The first example traces the develop

ment of the relationship between England and Portugal in the
17th century, while the second one looks at the emergence and
breakdown of the Bretton Woods institutions.

The first example

concentrates more on the bilateral structuring of a trade re
lationship.

Special consideration is given to the role of the

power structure internal to Portugal in this structuring proc
ess.

The second example of the Bretton Woods institutions fo

cuses more on the attempt by one dominant world power, in this
case the U.S., to structure a so-called free world market sys
tem.

A subsidiary topic in this example is the relationships

between the power distribution implied in a given structural
and institutional framework and the power implications of the
operation of the system.

Chapter 6 in turn amplifies this topic

by looking, on one hand, at the dilemma that a dominant power
may face between structuring activities which assure its
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continued dominance but which may have only limited systemic
ramifications in terms of economic growth.

Section 2 of this

chapter illustrates how an unequal exchange system, in fact
the present IES, may be experiencing a turning point related
to a historical shift of power towards the countries control
ling oil and other raw materials.

Recent events involving

the countries grouped in OPEC and OECD are analysed in the
terms of the framework presented here, and a possible scenario
of the restructuring of todays’ IES is developed.

The examples chosen might imply a change in the char
acter of these structuring attempts as the world economy be
comes more integrated and interdependent. This implication is
in part the result of methodological limitations of the present
analysis insofar as the analysis concentrates on the activities
of a selected number of countries. England did not only struc
ture its relationship with Portugal but this development was
part of a larger process not analysed here. The difference
between the single-handed structuring attempt of the U.S. at
the end of World War II and the multilateral free for all of
the present situation is not necessarily the consequence of in
creased world interdependence but of a change in the power dis
tribution on the world level. Power is today more diffused
than at the time the Bretton Woods institutions were formed.
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CHAPTER IV
INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING
The welfare analysis of International trade is based on
a strictly economic analysis as outlined in Section 3 of Chap
ter 2.

Changes in comparative advantage due to economic events

in the IES or changes in trade policies induce only a reallo
cation of resources in response to changing relative prices.
Non-economic considerations or processes are absent from these
reallocation processes.
affected by them.

Institutions remain constant and un

On this basis, free trade, or as second-

best, certain trade control policies, are suggested as welfare
optimal policies for any country to follow.

In Chapter 3, in

contrast, I developed elements of a systems analysis of events
and processes in the IES based on the inclusion of non-economic
dimensions and spheres of social life, and a multi-level model
structure.
In this view, events in the IES have systemic ramifica
tions and effects on the relative power positions of interest
groups.

Therefore, the economic adjustment path will be af

fected by non-economic processes and power considerations.
This leads to three propositions.

Firstly, the economic end

situation will most probably not be what is suggested by a com
parative static, and even dynamic, economic analysis.

Secondly,

the classical free market adjustment and the optimal trade con
trol policies may not produce the best economic outcome.

And
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thirdly, government intervention into the adjustment proc
ess is likely but dependent in its occurrence and form on
the interests of the dominant groups in society and, es
pecially, their and the government's interest in the pres
ervation of their positions of relative power.
This means that the capacity of a social system to
structure and restructure its economic system in response to
a basic shift in the structure of the IES is limited by its
internal organization.

Below I explore the proposition that

the distribution of meta-power among the social groups of a
society and the interests and objectives of those with a dis
proportionate share of such power significantly affect the
capacity of a country to respond to external events and to
reorganize its internal structure, in particular, to change
the system of economic activity, and therefore, its develop
ment tendencies and potentialities.

Section 1 describes the

institutional and structural changes in five European coun
tries following the fall in the wheat price in European mar
kets after 1873.

Section 2 develops the proposition mentioned

above about the distribution of meta-power and interests among
social groups as important determinants of these different ad
justment paths.
1.

The Fall in the Wheat Price, 1873-1896,
and European Adjustments

Wheat and other grain prices fell on all European mar
kets by about 50 to 60% beginning in 1873 until about 1896 in
response to the arrival of large quantities of cheap grains
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from the newly opened up plains of Russia and North America. -^2
The agricultural sectors and economic systems of Great Britain,
Denmark, Germany, Prance and Italy underwent quite different
adjustments.

France and Germany chose an essentially nation

alistic approach protecting existing structures, while England
and Denmark restructured their agricultural sectors along lines
suggested by the changed comparative advantages.

Italy fol

lowed first the latter policy and switched only later to a
nationalistic response with, however, altogether different con
sequences .
In Great Britain, the agricultural sector shrank dra
matically, releasing large quantities of labor to the rapidly
expanding industrial centers of the country.

The farmers re

acted to the falling grain prices and incomes in an individual
istic manner with at most some local and regional attempts to
collectively adjust land prices and rental payments.

This

apolitical and individualistic response of the British farmers
was in part due to the fact that the real source of their trou
ble was masked by the general depression.

Drought conditions

lowered yields and thus incomes all over Europe.

Recurrent

^^See Kindleberger (1951:31-32) whose study "Group Be
havior and International Trade" provided the initial impetus
and basis for the present analysis.
This compares with a fall of the wholesale price index
(in the case of Denmark) of only 36$. The general fall in
prices was the result of the severe depression in Europe from
1873 to 1896, the downswing of the long-term cycle (Kondratieff,
1935; Hansen, 1964:53-76). Bad weather conditions in Europe
reduced yields and prevented even larger price falls. This
tended to mask the real source of the fall in farm incomes
(Kindleberger, 1951:31-32).

97
waves of animal disease in Britain were also seen as responsible for the falling incomes (Kindleberger, 1964:243)The preceding twenty years, on the other hand, had been ex
tremely prosperous years for the farmers and the accumulation
of reserves during that time now delayed the full impact of the
financial losses after 1873 (Kindleberger, 1951:32; Murphy,
1 9 7 3 : 6 0 0 ) . The restructuring of the agricultural sector
remained rather narrow and failed to take advantage of the
rapidly increasing demand for dairy products and meat (which
was instead satisfied by Denmark) as well as fruits and vege
tables (Kindleberger, 1964:240-242). ^ 5

However, some of the

remaining farmers converted to livestock and dairy farming, a

^The real crisis was however largely a crisis of
wheat farming (Kindleberger, 1964:241) and this probably
contributed to the lack of an organized response of British
agriculture.
-L^These internal events together with the fact that
the repeal of the corn laws in 1846 had not led to a fall in
the grain prices slowed down the perception of the problem as
a foreign one and thus may have contributed to the lack of a
political response.

-^5gome natural barriers like rainfall patterns and soil
conditions would have made such a restructuring difficult. But
the existing laissez-fair individualism prevented the emergence
of cooperatives and led to the neglect of agricultural education
(in the face of a general unwillingness to learn new things)
which could have overcome these barriers. The land tenure sys
tem with its specification of crops to be planted and its dis
couragement of capital investments increased the structural
rigidity. British farms were generally land-intensive and based
on wage labor. The alternatives demanded labor- and capitalintensive family-sized farms which would have demanded exten
sive changes in ownership patterns and heavy investments of
capital. But a laissez-fair system made these institutional,
higher-level changes difficult.

conversion which had already started in the 1850's in re
sponse to

low priced foreign feed grains (Schlote, 1952:

139-141)•

Others turned to horticulture and market garden

ing (Kindleberger, 1951:32).

At no time did British farmers

consider demanding the reimposition of tariffs; the repeal
of the Corn Laws in 1846 had convincingly demonstrated that
the commercial and manufacturing interests were dominant
(Perry, 1974).

The release of labor from the agricultural

sector helped in keeping wage costs low in the industrial
sector which obviously helped in its rapid expansion.

The

falling food prices, on the other hand, made low wages possi
ble without creating labor unrest and thus social and politi
cal difficulties.
Denmark and its agricultural sector reacted to the same
economic stimulus of falling grain prices by doing what Britain
could have done if the political and social situation had been
different.

Instead of reallocating the resources away from

agriculture to industry, Denmark restructured its agriculture
in order to be able to remain internationally competitive.

It

switched almost totally from grain farming to animal husbandry
and the production of eggs, bacon, milk, butter, and cheese
for the growing export markets in the industrial areas of Ger
many and Britain.

The cheap foreign grains were used as feed

stuff for the large animal herds.

However, the conversion was

not left to individual farmers but took place on the basis of
a large cooperative movement that provided the necessary scale
economies for technical information, technological Innovations,
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and the necessary infrastructural investments.

Excellent

rural schools and specialized facilities for continuing ed
ucation of the farm population helped to rapidly spread the
necessary new knowledge.

An extensive network of credit in

stitutions helped to finance the conversion effort. A cohe
sive population and a suitable farm structure of family-owned,
medium-sized farms helped in bringing about this market re
sponse resembling so closely the classical comparative advan
tage paradigm (Kindleberger, 1951:35)
Both Germany and France took what Kindleberger (1951:
37) calls a nationalistic response compared to the internationalistic responses of Britain and Denmark.

They instituted

protective tariffs on wheat and other grain imports in order
to preserve the size and prosperity of their agricultural sec
tors, or at least their most important and powerful parts.
Germany enacted a nominal tariff only in 1879 after 14 years

Of course, Denmark as a small country, compared to
its grain production capacity, had to restructure its agri
culture one way or another. Denmark was subject to export
market competition and not home market competition as was the
case for Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Only an export
subsidization program could have saved Danish exports but then
the pressure for structural adaptation would have come in
directly from the financial burden unless the costs could have
been shifted to other countries through an OPEC like cartel or
an arrangement similar to the EEC agricultural policy.
This means that a small country — small compared to its
major economic sector and its exports -- is almost forced to
be structurally flexible if it wants to protect its standard
of living in a changing world (Wright, 1939:3-27, 2H3-2HH).
Kindleberger (197*0 provides additional evidence on this point.
The task then becomes to explain why some countries are
structurally flexible and others not, and secondly, why Denmark
chose its particular adjustment path and not the British one,
or why Britain permitted the elimination of its agricultural
sector but France and Germany did not.
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of free trade.
and I887.

Sharply higher rates were introduced in 1885

This agricultural protection, which included a

tariff on rye, a dominant product of the agriculture of east
ern Germany, was coupled with protective tariffs for indus
trial raw materials, manufactures, as well as live animal s. ^ 7
This provided a protected inland market for all the major sec
tors of the German economy (Kindleberger, 1951:33).
The French government imposed markedly higher tariffs
on grain and live animal imports in 1885 and 1887 after an
initial small tariff had been levied since 1881.

The politi

cal pressure for such action came from the agricultural syn
dicates.

They in turn had earlier evolved into producer co

operatives from simple associations to further the technical
advancement of agriculture after the law against associations
based on economic interests had been fully repealed in 1884.
Grain farming was important all over France.

Grain crops oc

cupied more than half the tilled land in 77 out of the 88 de
partments in 1882.li|8

Wheat and other grain interests com

bined with other agricultural interest groups for wine and
cattle to agitiate for a generally high price level for their
products.

The tariffs on grain and live animals were the

■^^The protection afforded to the different products
was quite unequal. The tariffs on wheat, rye and oats, the
products of eastern Germany, were twice as high as on corn
and barley, the products of the western parts (Clapham, 1921:
24) .
148

Even Corsica with the smallest acreage devoted to
grain used still 40% of the tilled land for it. Also, wheat
was grown on almost every farm in the country (Kindleberger,
1964:27).
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result of a compromise between the conflicting interests of
industry and agriculture.

Industry wanted low food and raw

material prices but gave up on the former in order to pre
serve the free import of some agricultural raw materials
(Kindleberger, 1951:33).
The Italian government vacillated between a policy of
free trade and protection.

An early laissez-faire attitude

with strong exploitative tendencies towards the peasantry,
especially that of southern Italy, was followed by a policy
of protective tariffs on wheat but only after France and Ger
many had already taken similar steps.

Italy had levied a small

tariff on wheat since the l860's mainly for revenue purposes.
But wheat was the only agricultural product enjoying this mod
est level of protection and the rate was below those on manu
factured goods.

In 1869 an excise tax on milling of wheat was

reintroduced to increase state revenues.

This tax fell heavily

upon the poor urban and rural classes and was kept in force un
til its final demise in 1884 despite vigorous opposition and
protests (Clough, 1964:46-47).

This political resistance may

have contributed to the government's reluctance to impose high
er tariffs once massive imports started.

The relatively low

tariff rate of 1878 was finally increased in 1887 and 1888 to
a level comparable with that in France and Germany.

This step

was combined with a move towards increased protection for man
ufactures and thus did not improve the terms of trade of the
agricultural sector and especially the southern peasantry.
These measures did therefore not succeed in stopping the
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emigration of the peasants which had begun earlier in re
sponse to the low wheat prices and farm

i n c o m e s .

1^9

Con

tinued emigration overseas was about the only solution left
to the southern peasant.

Internal migration to emergent

centers of industrial production was impossible.

The uni

fication of the Italian territory had destroyed the small in
dustrial sector around Naples which could have provided the
core for an accelerated industrialization.

A restructuring

of the agricultural sector along the lines of the Danish mod
el was impossible.

The apathy of the central government and

the local ruling elites would have necessitated the capability
of the peasantry to self-financing a strategy of conversion.
But the socio-political make-up of the South and the economic
policies of previous decades had prevented the accumulation
of capital by the peasants or other groups connected with the
agricultural sector.
In summary, the five European countries reacted quite
differently to the challenge of falling wheat prices.

Britain

permitted the wholesale liquidation of its wheat sector and
absorbed the released agricultural labor in its expanding in
dustrial labor force.

Denmark maintained the size and pros

perity of its agriculture but converted to products which were
to have rapidly growing markets and in which Denmark could
maintain its International competitiveness.

France and Ger

many opted basically for the status quo in their economic and

in9See Kindleberger (1951:34-35), Clough (1964:107, 115)
and Smith (1969:157-162). The income squeeze was increased due
to the loss of the important French wine market.
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social

structures

(Kindleberger,

1964:195).

The r e s ultant

d i s t r i b u t i o n of the gains of p r o t e c t i o n was h o w e v e r m a r k e d l y
mor e u n e q u a l in G e r m a n y t h a n in Prance.

Italy m o v e d too late

to protect

its a g r i c u l t u r e and t h e r e f o r e did not r e a l i z e any

benefits.

W hile

in B r i t a i n the r e l e a s e d labor fed the ex

pa n d i n g i n d u s t r i a l sector,

I t a l i a n m i g r a t i o n was i n t e r n a t i o n a l

migration with completely different long-term consequences for
economic growth and soci-political structural transformation. 150
2.

Power and Group Interests as Determinants of Economic
Systems Adaptation
Kindleberger (1951:45-46) explains the different pat

terns of national adjustment described in the preceding section
with variations in the social cohesion of the five countries.'
Social cohesion is an expression of the societal flexibility
in restructuring institutions in order to maintain productive
capacities under changing circumstances.

Determining factors

of social cohesion are the internal mobility of the factors of
production, the quality of the system of communication, and
the strength with which a set of common national values is
held.

High social cohesion will make it easier for a society

to find a set of adjustment policies in the event of external

15
0
J The same structural deficiencies seem to exist today.
Southern labor moves north, but Italy as a whole is still ex
porting capital and labor. Factor emigration is therefore not
the result of factor supply imbalances but of structural bot
tlenecks. The government is still not able to overcome them
with a set of coherent reforms based on a social compact and
effort. In the meantime, Italy has to import ever increasing
amounts of foodstuffs (Hofmann, 1974).
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change which is acceptable to the various groups and which
can be realized with minimal social conflict.
In this conceptualization, social cohesion can obvious
ly only explain the speed with which the adjustment policies
are chosen and implemented and the degree to which conflicts
and disruptions will hamper this implementation.

It cannot,

however, explain why a country chooses one adjustment path
and not another.

Such an explanation has to build on socie

tal groups and their interests and the distribution of meta
power among them.-^51

The former factor determines a group's

interest in an adjustment and in the form of such an adjust
ment.

The latter factor determines the differential abilities

of these diverse groups to actually participate in the deter
mination and implementation of the adjustment policies and to
make sure that the restructured societal structure and institu
tions remain supportive of their interests and especially of
their positions of meta-power.

The comparative analysis of the

reaction patterns of the five countries points to two basic
patterns.
Germany and France were characterized by the existence
of several groups of cohesion and relatively equal positions
of meta-power with which to defend their interest.

The

French and German solutions therefore consisted, not surpris
ingly, in a compromise in which each group realized its

1 51j.J. Pincus (1975) shows that the ideal indus t r i a l
p r e s s u r e group for tariffs in the U.S. had m e m b e r s all over
the country and that the factors w h i c h det e r m i n e o r g a n i z e d
c oll e c t i v e a c t i o n a c cording to the analysis by O l s o n (1965)
were less important.
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strongest objectives by giving In on less Important ones.-*-52
The other pattern, represented by the cases of Great Britain,
Denmark and Italy, consists of the presence of groups which
have different degrees of cohesiveness and which have clearly
unequal positions of meta-power in the relationships among
themselves and to the governmental bureaucracy.
In Britain, the industrial-urban revolution had already
progressed far at the onset of the agricultural crisis.

The

dominance of the industrial and urban interests had been clear
ly demonstrated decades earlier with the repeal of the Corn
Laws in 1846.

Both the capitalist and the working classes had

essentially the same interest in low food prices, although the
former desired to keep wage costs low and the labor supply high
and the latter wished to ensure their survival at the prevail
ing wage rates.

This interest situation explains the mainte

nance of free trade in agricultural products.

The farmers and

landowners faced their crisis essentially as individuals and
had therefore only limited means available to express their de
mands.

The ideology of laissez-faire, the belief in the sanc

tity of private property rights, the poor quality of the rural
education system, and the general unwillingness of the farmers
to learn new ways and methods led to the particular adjustment
pattern described in the first section of this chapter. ^53

152This solution obviously requires that the preference
orderings of the different groups have at least some concord
ance embedded in them and are not totally opposite to each
other (Burns and Buckley, 1974; Buckley et. al., 1974; Burns
and Meeker, 1975).
153The government was reluctant to intervene in the

106
Denmark, on the other hand, comes closest to Kindleberger's case of a country with high social cohesion.

The

agricultural sector was an important part of the economy and
yet was closely integrated with the industrial and urban sec
tor.

Agriculture and industry were based on small-scale,

owner-operated units.

Cities and towns were small and evenly

dispersed over the country, thus assuring a close interaction
between the populations of the two sectors and their close
mutual identification with the other's interests (The Econo
mist, 1969)

.

The defeat in the war against Prussia in

1866 and the loss of part of the territory had increased the
feeling of national unity.

As already pointed out in the first

section, Danish agriculture had to convert as the two options
of export market protection and shrinkage and, consequently,
large-scale release of labor were impossible.

The importance

of agriculture for the national well-being and the close in
tegration of agriculture with the industrial and urban milieu
agricultural sector and violate the property rights of the
landowners which were seen by them as the basis of individual
ism and personal freedoms (Kindleberger, 1964:197-198). On
the other hand, the government interfered continuously with
the operation of the economic system despite the official ide
ology of laissez-faire. But the interventions were never in
favor of the agricultural workers and peasant proprietors
(Kindleberger, 1964:191-192, 244). The explanation is there
fore more likely to be found in the positions of meta-power.
154gqUaq inheritance rights on the farm were the rule
but the efficient rural credit system enabled farmers to pay
off their siblings. This facilitated the emergence of a large
middle class both in the rural and urban areas and assured a
relatively equal distribution of wealth. Close family ties
linked the two areas and the excellent rural education system
helped prevent the emergence of differences on this dimension
(Kindleberger, 1951:45).
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provided the former with a position of meta-power.

The

smoothness and efficiency of the radical reorientation was
the result of the identity between the different sectoral as
well as national interests and the absence of any seriously
differentiated interests within the agricultural sector it
self (in contrast to Britain, for example). -*-55
Italy seemed to possess the worst characteristics of
the Danish and British case.

Agriculture was economically im

portant all over Italy and predominantly so in the southern
part.^56

National unification had been achieved just prior

to the beginning of the crisis.
ly divided.

Yet the country remained deep

The North was rapidly industrializing on the basis

of reasonably modern institutions and a fair network of com
munication.

The South still possessed a semi-feudal structure.

The peasants were legally emancipated but were laboring under
high taxes which had replaced their former feudal duties.
This forced the peasant cultivators into cash-crop production.
But they could ill withstand the market price fluctuations
during the 1870’s and 1880's because they lacked capital.

This

capital shortage was in part the result of the policies of the

^ K i n d l e b e r g e r
(1951:45) argues that the large degree
of equality and absence of other differences enabled the farmers
to build and successfully utilize the cooperative institutions
which were so important for the conversion of agriculture.

156Agricuiture in the North was dominated by large-scale
wheat growers producing for the market. Southern peasants were
producing high-cost wheat and did not profit even from the high
tariff rates of 1888. As growers of olives and grapes, they
were net-buyers of grain and thus stood to loose from a pro
tected inland market while the northern producers gained (Smith,
1969:158-l60).
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government which turned the internal terms of trade against
the South and also led to a net-outflow of government funds
(Lopreato, 1967:23-24).

The Southern peasant suffered from

the worst of both the feudal and capitalist system (D. M.
Smith, 1969:40).
The Italian central government was dominated by a north
ern bureaucracy and interests. The electoral franchise favored
the urban population and excluded the peasants from political
representation.^57

The local governments in the South were

dominated by local elites who used their power to enrich them
selves (Smith, 1969:36-39).

The land-owning elites regarded

with contempt any practical pursuits and left the operation of
their estates to managers who in turn tried to delegate this
task still further (D. M. Smith, 1969:38).

The peasantry it

self was deeply split as the result of a long process of ac
culturation .158
Thus the society of southern Italy had characteristics
exactly opposite to those that allowed Denmark to stage such
an efficient and successful conversion of its agricultural

^57only 2% of the population had the franchise in i860
and this increased to only S% in 1872. Only .7% of the popu
lation voted in the parliamentary elections of 1870 (D. M.
Smith, 1969:35, 39, 134).
158The peasants had copied the socio-cultural views and
habits of a strictly structured hierarchical elite. See
Lopreato (1967:15) for examples.
The organization of agricultural workers and peasants
started in the l880Ts on a local basis and led too late, only
in 1901, to the formation of a national organization (Clough,
1964:395).
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base.

The South possessed an extremely fragmented social

structure, was politically powerless at the national level,
lacked capital with which a restructuring could have been fi
nanced on a private basis (as in the case of Britain), had a
seriously deficient infrastructure, an illiterate and under
nourished population, and a century-old habit of traditional
and inefficient farming techniques.-^59

These factors all com

bined to leave emigration as the only option to the peasant
when the agricultural crisis hit.

The lack of political power

on the national level led to tariff policies clearly damaging
to the South and favorable to the politically powerful north
ern agricultural and industrial interests.

The social struc

ture of the South explains why the agricultural sector could
not count on a unified regional support or the development of
cooperative efforts.

But even if the central government had

intervened and pushed for an agricultural conversion, the out
come would have been hardly different.

The preceding centuries

of despotic and exploitative rules had nutured in the peasants
a distrust of and hatred toward state officials.

Any state

intervention would have been perceived not as helpful but as
a new attempt at even more effective exploitation (Lopreato,
1967:26; Moss, 1974:153).
In contrast to Britain and Denmark, France and Germany
were made up of a number of cohesive groups with well-defined

159'rhe Church had been a major landholder in the South
for a long time and had discouraged all but the most traditional
and inefficient farming methods. The resistance to fresh ap
proaches and new methods naturally became a deeply ingrained
behavioral trait of the peasantry (Lopreato, 1967:12).
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but different economic and socio-political Interests and
which were In positions of relatively equal meta-power.

No

single group was capable of imposing its preferred solution
if it violated the major interests of other groups.

A com

promise had to be sought on the basis of the partially con
cordant interests embedded in the general preference order
ings over the different strategies and outcomes envisaged by
the various groups (Buckley et. al., 197*0.

The compromise

itself was in each case strongly supported and furthered by a
powerful bureaucracy and central government.

These two actors

had some goals of their own, especially a desire for national
strength and unity.

They enforced therefore a compromise

which realized the major interests of the dominant groups at
relatively low costs to them and which at the same time pre
served social and political stability, and therefore economic
productivity, within the two countries.1^0
This mediation by the state apparatus between almost
equally strong groups with very specific and conflictive inter
ests was especially important in the case of Germany where the
coinciding group boundaries of economic, cultural, socio-polit
ical, and regional interests provided for a strong secessionist

This assumes that the state bureaucracy and central
government can have goals and interests which are not in com
plete accordance with those of the dominant socio-political
groups. In this case, these two actors become interest groups
themselves. They can often pursue their objectives especially
effectively because they control the means of communication
and the forces of coercion. Elias (1969) stresses the posi
tions of meta-power and the action capabilities of these two
actors in his analysis of the emergence of the absolutist mon
archy .
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potential.

Both the agricultural and industrial sectors were

divided into subgroups with some differences of interest.

The

agricultural sector consisted, on the one hand, of the largescale, owner-operated Junker estates in the East producing
wheat (and rye) with wage labor.

These estates were export

oriented with markets in western Germany as well as other coun
tries.

On the other hand, there existed a large sector of

smaller, family-operated farms, mainly in the western parts of
Germany, which concentrated on animal husbandry, and which, as
net-buyers of feed-grain, were mainly interested in low grain
prices.

The industrial sector was similarly split between

large- and small- scale industry.

Industry as a whole was dom

inated by the regionally concentrated heavy industry which was
interested in exports in order to achieve cost reductions
through economies-of-scale in their capital-intensive plants.
The fabricating sector on the other hand was dispersed all over
western Germany and was made up of plants and firms of various
sizes which used mostly labor-intensive production methods.
They were very much concerned with wage costs and therefore
favored low food prices, while the capital-intensive steel and
coal industries did not care about this problem to the same
extent.

The labor movement itself was split in its views, re

flecting the different positions of relative power it possessed
in its relationships to the two groups of employers.
This configuration of interests and power relationships
could have easily produced a power stalemate between the domi
nant groups in which case the Junkers would have faced disas
trous consequences.

A secession in order to protect their
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Interests was not really viable for two reasons.

Their well

being depended on access to export-markets, which a secession
could not produce.

A Danish solution with a complete reorien

tation of the production structure was very unlikely because
the switch out of grain production into animal husbandry
would have threatened the social and political foundation of
Junker power.

However, at that time the German state reflected

very much the alliance between the Junkers and the industrial
barons as a consequence of their combined contributions to the
military successes in the wars against Denmark, Austria, and
France.

The two groups arrived at an understanding because

the solution imposed the costs of protection on the weaker sub
groups on each side as well as on the working class as a whole.
The solution reflected the interests of the Junkers and heavy
industry because their groups were the most powerful due to
their cohesion based on very narrow and uniform interests.
Furthermore there was never any threat of a collective rebel
lion of the loosers.

The farmers of western Germany received

some protection for their products.

This made them reluctant

to reject the compromise and possibly prevented them from per
ceiving the overall deterioration in their situation. -^1

But

probably more important was the acceptance by the other groups
of the leadership of the Junkers and industrial barons whose
’able' performance had been clearly demonstrated by the German
military triumphs.

A third and often neglected factor also

1°1Kindleberger (1951:33) following the argument of
Gerschenkron.
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helped to prevent the emergence of a rebellious coalition of
loosers.

The ideological differences between the land-owning

and independent farmers of the West, the small-scale capital
ists with their urban orientation, and the propertyless and
socialistic minded workers was too great to be transcended
over the relatively minor question of grain prices.
In Prance the cohesion within the industrial and agri
cultural groups was greater than in the German case and this
in turn made their differing economic interests much more pro
nounced.

However, this opposition became muted as a conse

quence of the military defeat and national humiliation in the
war against Germany in 1871*

The need to discharge the sub

stantial obligation of the war reparations helped to create a
sense of patriotism and national unity (Kindleberger, 1968b:
326-328).

Under these conditions the state could play once

more its traditional role as an equitable arbiter of competing
economic claims (Kindleberger, 1964:195)-

The state-sponsored

compromise satisfied again the major interests of the strongest
groups and preserved the socio-economic and political institu
tions and

s t r u c t u r e s .

T h e

French policy of tariff protection

Kindleberger (1964:28) points out that the protective
solution was facilitated by the absence of significant export
interests which would have pleaded for free trade in order to
avoid foreign trade retaliation. The loss of the Alsace had
eliminated the textile export interest, pylloxera those of the
wine producers. French society abhorred change of any kind
and one task of the state was the preservation of social sta
bility by freezing the economic and socio-political structures.
This necessarily led to the protection of agriculture when its
viability became threatened, and this in turn led to the pro
tection of the mining and industrial sectors (Kindleberger,
1964:286).

114
preserved the backward structure of the agricultural sector.
Industrial growth slowed down due to higher Input cost and
almost stagnant home markets.

The German solution, although

very much like the French one, did not have the same result
because the German social and economic structures were differ
ent from the French ones.

As in the case of Britain and Italy,

the same policy response to the same external event led to
different long-run outcomes.
The preceding analysis has shown that the economic pol
icy choice in response to an external event can be explained —
within the limits given by general economic constraints —

by

the economic and socio-political interests of the different
groups and their relative positions of meta-power.^63

The

different groups try to activitate their positions of meta
power in order to assure that the necessary restructuring in
the face of external influences will not affect them negatively
in terms of economic well-being and will not reduce their po
sitions of meta-power.

It is this concern with the position

in the distribution of income and wealth and with respect to
other sources of power and meta-power that individuals and
groups will not accept passively the Pareto optimal solution
to the new economic situation suggested by trade theory based

^^Lindbeck (1973) explains the reactions of the five
European countries using the concept of "endogenous politicians".
The politicians in the different countries had differing prefer
ences with respect to the exogenously induced shifts in national
resource allocations and the various protectionist counter-moves
possible. This, of course, does not explain why the politicians
had the preferences revealed by the chosen adjustment policies.
Group interests and meta-power seem to explain this choice.
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on the H-0 model.

This concern with power and meta-power,

and therefore the ability to control future restructuring to
their benefit, prevents also the compensation of those groups
which would loose in terms of income and wealth under the
Pareto optimal outcome by those who would gain if the loosers
are weaker in terms of meta-power.

The examples of the five

countries indicated that compensatory institutional benefits
were accorded to potential loosers only in those circumstances
where they themselves were in positions of substantial meta
power.

The analysis finally suggested that essentially the

same economic adjustment policies had different long-run eco
nomic consequences in terms of growth and development because
of differences in the social, cultural and political make-up
of the countries.

This is why the optimal internal economic

policy choice and recommendation cannot be made, by economists
for example, without taking into account what the most likely
effect of such an economic adjustment path will be on the oth
er spheres of the social system.

Nor can one neglect to ask

what the most likely economic ramifications of these non-economic developments might be.

These may turn out to be much more

costly in terms of newly generated economic inefficiencies and
squandered economic resources as the Economist (1969:67) put it
so aptly in discussing agricultural modernization today in UDC:
There are thus decisions to be taken over and
above the decision to modernize the farms (or to pro
tect their present state). Even if, on strict economic
analysis, East Prussia’s agricultural growth rate may
have had the edge over Denmark’s — which is doubtful —
the social costs in terms of Junker domination, lack of
social diversification, big-city migration, and the ex
ploitation of Slav newcomers added up to a burden of
which two world wars may have been part of the price.
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What has been said in this chapter with respect to
the internal restructuring has also general applicability to
the structuring and restructuring of external relationships
among countries.

The next chapter will deal with this subject.
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CHAPTER V
THE STRUCTURING.OP EXTERNAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGE RELATIONS
Chapter 3 presented the argument that the development
of countries participating in the IES is dependent on their
ability to structure and restructure in an appropriate way
both their internal social system and their external rela
tionships with the larger IES.
rated on the first point.

The preceding chapter elabo

It was suggested that the distri

bution of meta-power within a social system is a crucial vari
able —

in conjunction with the interests of those having

relative meta-power —

in the choice of internal economic

adjustment policies in the case of events originating in the
larger IES.

The present chapter takes up the second point.

Two historical examples illustrate how meta-power is used to
structure the IES itself through the structuring and re
structuring of the institutions which determine in large part
the scope for economic exchange between countries.
In the first example, the establishment of a special
international economic and political relationship between
Portugal and England in the 17th century, the focus is on the
effect the internal structure of Portugal had on this struc
turing process.

t"g

it will become clear that as in the case

h

Methodological complexities, space limitations, and
data availability are responsible for this concentration on the
internal factors in Portugal and the bilateral relationship
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of Internal restructuring analysed in the preceding chapter,
the internal distribution of meta-power and the interests of
those possessing dominant meta-power determined in large part
the process by which Portugal became economically and politi
cally dependent on England.

This structured relationship of

inequality and dependence had negative long-run developmental
consequences for Portugal because it reproduced itself through
the institutionalized unequal exchange pattern.

It also pre

served the internal position of power of the dominant groups
in Portugal and assured them at the same time of a substan
tial part of the economic product of Portugal and its colonies.
On the other hand, England's industrial development was favor
ably affected by the positive economic ramifications of this
unequal exchange system at the same time that England was en
abled to maintain this system of dominance and exploitation.
The second case study, the negotiations leading to the
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and the grad
ual change of the character of these institutions in response
to changed power relationships, abstracts from country internal
power processes.

The focus here is on the effect of power

differentials on the higher level of the IES.

Of interest is

the way countries use their positions of meta-power to institu
tionalize and structure the IES, not only to help in the reali
zation of their economic and political goals but also to assure

between Portugal and England. A complete investigation would
have to deal with the internal structure of England at that
time and the interaction of England and Portugal with other
countries.
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them of the continued preservation of their position of inter
national meta-power.

The difference between this case and the

Anglo-Portuguese one is

that the power relationships implied

in the structure of the Bretton Woods system as conceptualized
at the end of the second World War did not coincide with the
actual power relationships.

The system functioned therefore

in ways which were different

from those envisaged by the domi

nant power, the U.S.

The Bretton Woods

pecially the IMF operated as

institutions and es

originally planned only for a

short interval after 1958 when the actual power relationships
had become more like those originally built into these insti
tutions.

However, the unequal exchange system formed by them

continued to equalize power on the world level and ultimately
made it necessary to abandon parts of the international mone
tary system in favor of a system which reflected a more bal
anced power situation.

The Bretton Woods case is therefore

presenting a counter point to the relationship between England
and Portugal discussed in Section 1.
1. Internal Structure as a Factor in External Structuring:
The Establishment of an Unequal Exchange Relation
ship between England and Portugal
Adam Smith (1910:643-648) set forth his view of correct
international trade behavior by critizing the mercantilistic
Methuen Treaty of 1703 between England and Portugal.

Ricardo,

on the other hand, used a hypothetical construct of the trade
relationship between these two countries to expound his trade
theory which ultimately became the basis for the modern theory
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of comparative advantage (Ricardo, 1962:133-13^):
Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country
naturally devotes its capital and labor to such employ
ment as are most beneficial to each. The pursuit of
individual advantage is admirably connected with the
universal good of the whole. By stimulating industry,
by rewarding ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously
the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes
labor most effectively and most economically: while by
increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses
general benefit, and binds together by one common tie
of interest and intercourse, the universal society of
nations throughout the civilized world. It Is this
principle which determines that wine shall be made in
Prance and Portugal, that corn shall be grown in America
and Poland, and that hardware and other goods shall be
manufactured in England.
Since Ricardo, the exchange between the manufactures of
an abstract country England and the wine of an equally abstract
country Portugal has served as the textbook example illustra
ting the virtues of free trade. ^ 5

it is therefore appropri

ate to use the actual relationship between England and Portugal
to demonstrate how the actual trade pattern and country special
ization came about which has influenced the imagination of so
many students of international trade.

The exchange of manu

factures against wine had a history of structuring.

Portugal

was not originally a producer and exporter of wine just because
it was blessed with a sunny and warm climate.

Nor did it be

come automatically an underdeveloped country which was unable

^Portugal and England are replaced by the hypothetical
countries I and II in more sophisticated textbooks. However,
economists take the inspiration for their models and proposi
tions from observing the real world. In this sense, the Eng
land/Portugal example of international trade theory cannot com
pletely deny its parentage, nor, does it seem, are neo-classi
cal economists above obfuscating the differences between their
models drawn from reality and the real situation (Solo, 1975)-
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to satisfy even its own basic food requirements despite fa
vorable conditions for the production of agricultural goods.
In fact, Portugal was pushed and shoved in the direction of
becoming an important wine producer and exporter at the ex
pense of its own manufacturing development.

Free trade con

ditions took over only after this pattern had been firmly es
tablished, but then reenforced and maintained it.
The Anglo-Portuguese relationship dates back to the
14th century.

At that time, Portugal, based on her control

over the oceans, was clearly the superior power.

However, due

to various internal conditions as well as the emergence of ex
ternal rivals, Portugal had already begun to fall behind when
she was annexed by Spain in 1580.

(This period saw the as

cendancy of the Dutch and their dominance over Southeast Asia
(Sideri, 1970:19).)
dencies.

Spanish domination reinforced these ten

When Portugal regained her independence in 1640, the

politically precarious relation with Spain was compounded by
her weak economic position in her own overseas
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The new king of Portugal tried to gain recognition of
his throne and to stablize Portugal's international position
by signing treaties with opponents as well as traditional
friends of Portugal.

Portugal, meaning predominantly her roy

al house and its domestic allies, in serious need of political
and military support, turned to England, her most obvious hope.

l66This is clearly not the two-country world of the
simplest H-0 model. The present example, however, intimates
also how limited the expansion of the two-country model to
the three- or n- country model In trade theory really is.
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England —

then quite friendly with Spain, Portugal’s princi

pal enemy —

was under no threat from the Portuguese.

She

had in general a number of options in her foreign policy, en
abling her to maintain and even advance her position in Euro
pean power politics through astute policies of alliance.

Eng

land was therefore in a position to use Portugal as a pawn in
her own power politics. Since Portuguese cooperation was not
necessary for a successful defense of English interest, England
could drive a hard bargain in economic matters, in return for
lending her political and military support and protection to
Portugal.

The latter achieved her overriding (short-term) goal

of protecting the rule of her dynasty at home and in the colo
nies at the price of granting England substantial economic con
cessions .

The first treaty of 1642, shortly after Portugal

seceded from Spain and the Braganzas claimed the Portuguese
throne, established the pattern for future Anglo-Portuguese re
lations: Portugal conceded significant economic advantages to
England in exchange for political and military support.1^®
Portuguese economic concessions did not generally dam
age the immediate economic interests of the ruling dynasty and
its supporting class.

The costs of the concessions fell heavily

upon the non-land-owning classes, thus stifling the emergence

(1966 ) describes how Switzerland avoided a simi
lar fate when relying on the protection of Britain. Portugal's
situation might have been better if she had tried to develop
simultaneous relationships with other countries.

1fi R

Helleiner (1973) describes a similar exchange between
Britain and the Austrian Empire in 1865-
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of a strong merchant and capitalist c l a s s . j t

also in

directly affected wage-earning workers in agriculture, manu
facturing, and services.

Consequently, the growth of these

sectors and classes was retarded if not altogether prevented.
This, in turn, inhibited the development of new political,
social, and cultural interests that could have vigorously
pressured for a structural change of the socio-political fab
ric.

Portugal's economic base stagnated or even atrophied

while competing countries were developing rapidly.

Portugal

lost her opportunities for establishing an independent eco
nomic base which would have provided the underpinning for her
political and military power and for the control and develop
ment of the empire.

The circle was thus complete:

future

threats from hostile internal or external forces would drive
Portugal to seek renewal and reinforcement of the special re
lationship to E n g l a n d . T h e basically weak position of Por
tugal and her rulers, which had been the reason for the initial
request for outside support, would lead again and again to the
exchange of additional economic concessions for the renewal of
political and military support.

I69stein and Stein (1970:26), however, argue that the
merchants profited too insofar as they were able to preserve
intact within the status of dependence the life-style to which
they had become accustomed.
^f^In fact, England had an interest in the continuation
of political problems in Portugal. This would assure the con
tinued dependence of her ruling class on English support. The
political instability, however, was itself in part the result
of the peculiar Anglo-Portuguese relationship where England ex
ercised control without political responsibility (Maxwell, 1973
4-5) •
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The treaty of 1642 set in motion such a vicious circle.
In exchange for British recognition of the newly won independ
ence, Portugal opened her ports as well as those in its African
and Indian possessions to English ships, granted English mer
chants special privileges in Portugal (essentially allowing
them their own police and judicial system), and promised to
purchase all the ships needed for the Portuguese fleets in Eng
land (Sideri, 1970:20).

The first concession made the Portu

guese merchants vulnerable to foreign competition.

The second

introduced a foreign administrative body into Portuguese terri
tory at a time when the ruling dynasty was inexperienced and
weak.

This provided opportunities for collecting accurate in

formation about the health of Portugal, and created the poten
tial for conflicts between the foreign group and the Portuguese
which then in turn could be taken by the superior power as
grounds to intervene in Portuguese internal political affairs.
The elevation of England to supplier of ships to Portugal
illustrates well the vicious circle of political weakness and
economic stagnation.

At a time when European powers controlled

the oceans and maintained their tenuous footholds on other con
tinents only because of their possession of superior ships,
sailing techniques, and naval guns, Portugal permitted her own
shipbuilding capacity to atrophy and even to die. 171

Portugal

-'-'^English ships were conspicuous in the trade even be
tween the Portuguese mainland and its islands and possessions
in the Atlantic, Mediterrenean and North Africa (Fisher, 1971".
130-131). Cipolla (1966) gives a vivid description of the im
portance of ships for the European ability to maintain and ex
pand its dominance on other continents.
Although at that time both Portugal and Spain had already
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became locked Into an exclusive supply contract for a stra
tegic resource with a country that competed worldwide with
Portugal for superiority In trade and colonization on the
basis of possession of that resource.
Soon a second treaty had to be concluded between Portu
gal and England.

In 165^, Portugal was at war with Spain, and

therefore in urgent need of external support.
however were so onerous —

The treaty terms

reaffirming and strengthening the

English position in Portugal -- that Portugal ratified the
treaty only after English warships appeared in Lisbon.

England

received permission to trade directly with Brazil. 17 2

Although

Portugal retained some trading monopolies, she lost those over
the most lucrative products of her colonies, i.e., slaves and
sugar.

The treaty also limited the import duties Portugal

lost their technological leadership in ocean-going ship con
struction to the Dutch and English shipyards, the value of a
shipbuilding capacity and of some kind of know-how should not
be underrated (Cipolla, 1966). The importance of a productive
capability (even for inferior products and with inferior tech
nology) can be seen in the Spanish attempts at producing mod
ern large guns. Spain attempted several times to reduce its
dependence on gun supplies from rival countries by hiring for
eign experts in gun casting. The efforts at establishing pro
duction facilities and training skilled manpower proved timeconsuming and costly. Such undertakings were therefore aban
doned as soon as the immediate military threat had subsided.
The next military crisis, however, would see Spain again un
prepared, dependent on its rivals (and potential enemies) and
engaged in a fruitless crash program which did not produce re
sults when needed (Cipolla, 1966). The optimal short-run eco
nomic policy thus produced a military and political disaster
which forced Spain to pay economic concessions in return for
political and military considerations.
^^Portuguese settlers had already expelled the Dutch
from the occupied Brazilian sugar zone. The English merchants
gained therefore for awhile the possibility of supplying the
lucrative Dutch market with Brazilian sugar.
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could levy on English Imports.

On most types of cloth, the

import duty was set in absolute value terms, thus reducing
the effective tariff rate in times of inflationary price in
creases.

Further more, English merchants residing in Portugal

received partial tax exemptions, thus giving them a competi
tive advantage over Portuguese merchants .-*-73
The treaty of 1661 had stipulations along the same
lines: Portugal received guarantees of English friendship and
protection while England received preferential access to Por
tuguese colonies and colonial trade. -*-74

Bombay became English

and a certain number of English families were allowed to set
tle in each one of the Brazilian capitaincies. English mer
chants received extraterritorial rights in Portugal whereas
the Portuguese never succeeded in gaining reciprocal commercial
advantages in England or her

p o s s e s s i o n s . 1 ^

Portuguese ship

ping interests suffered from the same discriminatory treatment

^^See Maxwell (1973’
-4) quoting contemporary evaluations
of this and an earlier treaty.
-'-'^Political an^ military guarantees by England seemed
to be very important from the viewpoint of the Portuguese
rulers. Spain had not yet recognized Portuguese independence
and the peace negotiations with the Dutch were in progress
while the Dutch maintained their occupation in Brazil and har
assed Portuguese shipping. The secret English guarantee to
protect all Portuguese colonies from attacks was obviously all
important (Furtado, 1963=33-35).
■^^Maxwell (1973:7) writes that the treaty privileges
provided "a favorable environment for the creation of a state
of semi-colonial dependency."
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In English ports as the ships of other foreigners.

The re

sult was that the small Portuguese merchant marine was almost
completely shut out from the England-Portugal trade (Sideri,
1970:22-23) •
Indeed, England generally discriminated against all the
Portuguese products in favor of her own colonial production,
the friendship treaties with Portugal notwithstanding.

In

1661, the same year she signed a treaty with Portugal, she al
so instituted a high preferential tariff in favor of sugar im
ports from her own colonies in the West Indies.

Not only did

England close her market to Brazilian sugar but proceeded to
undersell the Brazilian product in third markets all over Eu
rope.

This weakened the sugar industry in Brazil, forcing it

to reduce production substantially in subsequent years (Furtado,
1963:67-69)-

Similarly, Brazilian tobacco was forced from Brit

ish markets in favor of Virginia tobacco.

Thus, Portugal saw

the European markets for her two most important colonial pro
ducts preempted before the end of the 17th century through Eng
lish mercantile tactics despite the commercial treaties with
England.

Obviously, the special relationship did not protect

Portuguese economic interests.

The sharp reduction of Portu

guese exports without a simultaneous reduction in her imports
of English manufactures produced, not surprisingly, severe prob
lems in the balance of payments.
This period saw the rapid expansion of wine production
and wine exports to England.

At the time, England searched for

alternative wine suppliers because, the traditional French sup-
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plies were severly curtailed as a consequence of the hostil
ities between England and France in the last decades of the
17th century.

Therefore, Portuguese wine imports were given

preferential duty treatment.^-76

The expansion of wine pro

duction improved of course the economic situation of the
landed aristocracy and the church.

These groups would have a

strong interest in maintaining a guaranteed access for their
products to the English market and their political dominance
would assure appropriate policies.
Partly spurred by a worsened economic situation in the
later decades of the 17th century (as pointed up by the nega
tive Portuguese balance of payments), but also by recognizing
the harmful effects of the treaties with England which created
a privileged and prominent expatriate English class, the Por
tuguese government made an effort from 1670 on to modernize
and industrialize Portugal by introducing protectionist legis
lation.

Since the treaties with England prevented Portugal

from imposing import duties or quotas, the import of English
cloth had to be reduced indirectly by prohibiting the wearing
of foreign cloth.

Portuguese cloth manufacturing increased

dramatically (helped in part by new laws of incorporation).

-L76f|owever, English tastes preferred French to Portuguese
wines and, for a long time, Portuguese wines were marketable in
England only because the consumption of French wines was pro
hibited or because exhorbitant tariffs priced them out of the
market. Nonetheless, the actual or potential French competition
and the heavy English duties kept wine prices in Portugal very
low. The commercial side of the wine trade in Portugal was con
trolled by English merchants and the Portuguese economy did
therefore profit only insubstantially from this expansion of
export opportunities (Sideri, 1970:24-26).
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It managed to be competitive even with English cloth at re
duced prices.

Initially the balance of payments Improved,

although subsequently, increased export proceeds were closely
matched by increased imports.

English cloth imports fell sub

stantially, particularly because the Portuguese-Spanish sub
stitutes succeeded in those categories in which England seemed
to be heavily specialized (Sideri, 1970:26-28).
In spite of these initial gains, the necessary rapid
transformation of the Portuguese economy and class structure
was prevented by (i) the political opposition of the landed
gentry and the Church who wanted to protect their extensive
agricultural interests; (ii) the lack of administrative skills
to follow through on initially successfull new policies; and
(iii) the lack of a strong indigenous merchant class, thus deny
ing the government a substantial base of political support for
the new policies.

This last condition was itself the conse

quence of earlier Anglo-Portuguese treaties with their privi
leges for English competitors.

The feudal interests were able

to reassert themselves quickly under these circumstances once
the main proponent of the reforms committed suicide.
The desire of the reactionary interests to expand the
wine trade and to keep the volume of manufactured imports up
(to provide customs revenue) coincided with the English deter
mination to reestablish her dominant economic, political, and
military position.^-77

The discovery of gold in Brazil could

Portuguese treaty in 1701 with France and Spain
threatened English military interest. At this moment Portugal
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finance any future trade deficit of Portugal, and at the same
time alleviate the English shortage of bullion. -^8

This con

sideration only Intensified the English determination to con
clude a new treaty (Sideri, 1970:40-41).
The Methuen Treaty of 1703 was the result of this con
vergence of internal and external Interests.

On the one hand,

It helped to preserve the existing social and economic struc
tures of Portugal, assuring non-development, and on the other
hand, it reinforced Portugal's dependence on England; these
structural conditions reinforced each other in such a way as
to stabilize and maintain both the internal and external struc
tural arrangements.^ 9
Although seen by many as the beginning of Portuguese de
pendence on England, Sideri (1970:42) views the Treaty, as

tried to broaden its options along the lines suggested in note
167. But her dependency on England had already become too
great to let her persist in the face of English resistance.
*1 7

ft

The inflow of Brazilian gold via Portugal was crucial
for English industrialization (Blaug, 1968:17; Supple, 1964:1314). This is not to say that Portuguese industrialization
would have been forthcoming in case the gold had increased the
Portuguese money stock. The analysis of internal structuring
in response to an external economic event in Chapter 4 indicated
that a given development depends very much on the structure of
the country itself.

179stein and Stein (1970:86) argue that the Methuen treaty
solved the Portuguese crisis in the wake of the breakdown of its
economic and administrative controls over Brazil. Portugal
acknowledged her dependence on England in exchange for the se
curity of her political control over the empire.
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suggested above, as its conclusive reaffirmation:
its significance has been over-estimated by
making it the source of English economic and po
litical predominance in Portugal. Considered in
a wider perspective, the Methuen Treaty proves to
be no less the result of the situation created by
1642-61 treaties than it was the ’origin’ of Por
tuguese dependence on England. In line with the
policy outlined in the previous treaties, England
exchanged political support and promises of ter
ritorial increases (the Alliance Treaties) for
economic concessions and benefits (the commercial
treaty).
'The unequal advantages of the alliance
....were sadly paid for with the economic and po
litical subjection’ (Cortesao).
The commercial treaty reopened the markets in Portugal and her
colonies to English products, especially woolens.

Portugal

gained the concession that her wine exports would be charged
a tariff two-thirds of the rate on French wine.
sentially a codification of previous practice.

This was es
It was a pseu

do-benefit as it did not specify an absolute limit, nor did it
prevent the giving of equal preference to non-French wine im
ported into England.

(In fact, as soon as England reestab

lished its control over Portuguese and Brazilian markets, she
increased the absolute level of the tariff on wine substan
tially and admitted competing Spanish wine under the same terms
as the Portuguese ones (Sideri, 1970:43))For such minimal and uncertain advantages more or less
enjoyed previously Portugal sacrificed her infant cloth indus
try.

That is, she permitted the destruction of her manufactur

ing sector which in many countries later on developed into a
leading sector of industrialization (Rostow, i960).

This

stopped short a technological learning process which perpetuated
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a technological gap still existing today.

The agricultural

specialization in wine necessitated the import of large quan
tities of foodstuffs (Fisher, 1971:127-128).

The resultant

payments deficit led to the outflow of Brazilian gold to Eng
land preventing Portuguese capital accumulation.

This in turn

was partly the reason for Portugal's inability to develop the
colonies for her own benefit.

At the same time, the expansion

of the English textile industry was reinforced, contributing
to cost reductions, further technological advance, and greater
ability to penetrate old markets and to create new ones.

This

set the stage for further expansion, in a spiral of develop
ment, leaving a stagnant Portugal further and further behind.
The treaty and its outcome locked a weak Portugal into
a bilateral relationship with a strong England which had multi
lateral contracts with the entire world.

Portugal specialized

in wine, England in the production of "hardware and other goods",
fitting neatly the model of comparative advantage of interna
tional trade theory.

Portugal's actual situation corresponded

to a trade structure that maximizes the power of the trading
partner (Hirschman, 19^5)*

The outcome resulted from a long

process in which England used an initial power advantage to
structure her exchange relations with Portugal in such a way
that the resultant unequal exchange system continued to in
crease her power advantage and ultimate economic gains.

Sideri's

analysis shows that the sixty year period of Anglo-Portuguese
history reviewed here was to repeat itself again and again for
the next 250 years.
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2.

World Power and External Restructuring:
The Bretton Woods Agreements
In 19^0 and 19^1, before the U.S. entry into the war,

Britain reached the limit of her ability to pay for the large
quantities of imported armaments, raw materials, foodstuffs,
and consumption goods necessary to sustain the war effort.

In

the spring of 19^1, her foreign exchange reserves reached a
low of $12 million (Gardner, 1969=55; Brian Johnson, 1970:105106).

The U.S. Congress had passed legislation prohibiting

credit sales of military armaments and supplies to any bellig
erent nation.

The answer to the problem this created was lend-

lease, providing help without violating the letter of the law.
A post-war reconstitution of these deliveries was unthinkable,
and a conversion into normal debt was similarly undesirable
(due to the experience with war debts after 1918).

Therefore,

the idea emerged that Britain should discharge her obligation
from lend-lease "by cooperating with the Americans in certain
lines of policies favored by them" (Harrod, 1972:10).
Leading officials in the U.S. were concerned at the
time about the shape of the post-war international order.

In

their view, the emergence of trading blocs and bilateral regu
lation of international economic exchange in the wake of World
War I and the Depression had been leading causes of World War
II.

They aimed, therefore, for economic, financial, and mone

tary post-war institutions that would outlaw discrimination
and would prevent the emergence of narrow nationalistic inter
ests through the neutral regulation of exchange in 'multilat
eral' free markets (Brian Johnson, 1970:108-110).

The
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preferential tariff system of the Commonwealth and the tight
British control over the foreign exchange reserves of the
Sterling bloc were, in this view, major obstacles to the re
alization of such institutional plans.

The U.S. suggested,

therefore, that the promise of a future elimination of the
British Imperial Preferences would be compensation enough for
the lend-lease program.

The British government refused to en

ter into such a clear obligation, partly because of internal
political reasons, partly because of the realization that re
construction demanded special safeguards to protect her balance
of payments and internal full employment.

However, in view of

the desperate situation in which Britain found herself at the
time, she finally agreed to a watered down 'consideration',
Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement of February 1942 (Harrod,
1972:11; see also Gardner, 1969:54-68):
In the final determination of the benefits to be pro
vided to the United States of America by the Govern
ment of the United Kingdom in return for Lend-Lease
aid, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such
as not to burden commerce between the two countries,
but to promote mutually advantageous economic rela
tions between them and the betterment of world-wide
economic relations. To that end, they shall include
provision for agreed action by the United States of
America and the United Kingdom, open to participation
by all other countries of like mind, directed to the
expansion by appropriate international and domestic
measures of production, employment, and the exchange
and consumption of goods, which are the material foun
dations of the liberty and welfare of all the peoples;
to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce, and to the re
duction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in
general, to the attainment of all the economic ob
jectives set forth in the Atlantic Charter.
The lend-lease agreement illustrates a point made in
Chapter 3 and illustrated by the development of the relationship
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between Portugal and England in the preceding section.
Structuring processes on the basis of differences in meta
power involve normally higher level multiplex exchanges
where the country in a relatively weak position gives away
concessions and valuables with long-term potential, especially
with long-term power implications, in return for the satisfac
tion of short-term n e e d s . T h e Mutual Aid Agreement is ex
actly of this type.

For the receipt of badly needed war sup

plies of an initially undetermined quantity, price and value,
Britain essentially accepted to concur with the U.S. concep
tion of the future world order.

This agreement entailed the

exchange of economic valuables (goods and services) against
economic concessions of an institutional and structural nature,
i.e., a promise to eliminate future barriers to international

1 0 A

Leading figures in the U.S. State Department and the
Treasury were reluctant to agree to a final settlement of the
lend-lease issue later on because they wanted to use their
bargaining power on this open question to force Britain into
embracing a policy of multilateral trade (Gardner, 1969:172).
Promptly, at the end of the war, it was argued, in a report to
the House of Representatives that the "advantages afforded by
U.S. loans and'other settlements are our best bargaining assets
securing political and economic concessions in the interest of
world stability". Again the Administration was urged to ex
tract commitments on multilateral policies before writing off
lend-lease debts (Gardner, 1969:198).
In the initial discussion in the U.S. on the ratifica
tion of the Mutual Aid Agreement in 19^2 and later on again in
19^5, many voices demanded that Britain should give guaranteed
access to the U.S. to British raw materials in the form of a
U.S. lien on the rubber and tin resources of the British Empire
or that the U.S. should claim tangible and intangible assets
like rights to control raw materials, bases, aviation rights,
sites and buildings for embassies, etc. (Gardner, 1969:172).
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trade.-1-®-1- Moreover, the meta-level economic concessions
(determining future interaction possibilities in world mar
kets) had profound political, social, and cultural implica
tions (Gardner, 1969:1, quoting from The Economist of 1942):
Let there be no mistake about it. The policy put
forward by the American Administration is revolutionary.
It is a genuinely new conception of world order. It is
an inspiring attempt to restate democracy in terms of
the twentieth century situation, and to extend its mean
ing in the economic and social sphere.182
The lend-lease agreement had immediate results that were
more than just economic.

Besides the increase in military

1 P> "1

xThe agreement included the exchange of political
valuables. The large U.S. commitment expressed the political
agreement of the U.S. with the British war aims and it also
strengthened the determination of the British people to sus
tain the war effort and the resultant deprivations.
l82iphe whole American concept of a peaceful post-war
world order was based on the recognition of the multi-dimen
sionality of economic valuables exchanged internationally
(Gardner, 1969:14-15):
The case for multilateralism (i.e., restrictions on trade
and capital flows only of moderate degree and applied nondiscriminatorily) also has its non-economic aspects. The
economic benefits of multilateralism can be said to pro
mote, in a general way, the cause of peace. Human beings
whose economic circumstances are improving will be less
likely, everything else being equal, to challenge the
internal or external order. It can be argued also that
multilateralism, by insuring equal access to markets and
raw materials, avoids the grievances felt by the victims
of discrimination. Finally, as a very rough rule of thumb,
it is probably true that the cause of peace is assisted by
the reduction of government interference in international
economic life.
The Roosevelt Administration, and especially the policy-makers
in the State Department before, during, and after World War II
believed essentially that economic magnanimity in international
relations would bring about a peaceful world order (Gardner,
1969:7-11). Gardner calls this view ’economism' and thinks it
was utopian because it neglected the existence of nationalistic
political interests (Gardner, 1969:11).
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fighting capability, the deal facilitated the purchase of
consumer goods with foreign exchange that did not have to be
spent on the purchase of weapons and other military articles.
This permitted the maintenance of an acceptable standard of
living in Great Britain and thus clearly helped maintain sup
port for the government's policy of total resistance.

The

ability to sustain the war in turn can be seen as having con
tributed to Britain's preservation of her cultural, social and
political values and beliefs.

Again, this points up the non

economic aspects of purely economic goods.
Thus, although Article 7 might not have made sense from
a 'rational' economic viewpoint, the total threat to British
national survival shifted her value ordering of the various
options to a predominantly non-economic basis.
The elimination of discriminatory tariffs and other
trading restrictions would, if realized, change the relative
access opportunities to world markets of the corporate units
of the contracting parties as compared to the situation during
the interwar period.

In fact, in light of the extensive war

damage and the deterioration of civilian productive capacity
(and the problem of reconversion) in most countries, the end
of tariff discrimination and other trade barriers implied the
creation of favorable business opportunities for American cor
porations ."^3

strong American desire to end preferential trad
ing areas, and the additional desire to do away with exchange
controls and quantitative trading restrictions had very strong
ideological motives. U.S. demands were not motivated so much
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Furthermore, it must have been clear from the begin
ning to both the U.S. and Britain that the British agreement
to consider the U.S. plans for the future international trade
order would have significant implications for the institutional
organization of the monetary and financial aspects of interna
tional exchange and relations.

In fact, both governments began

to draft plans for institutions in this area which would be
able to support the envisaged open, non-discriminatory worldtrading system. ^84

The British government signed the Mutual

by a desire to see free trade enacted, than to preserve the
role of the market and price mechanism in international econom
ic exchange (Gardner, 1972:22):
Thus tariffs were permissible, but not direct controls.
The concept was practical as well as ideological. The
U.S. wanted an environment in which American trade could
expand — in which the comparative advantage of the U.S.
in key sectors could make its impact, free from unreason
able burdens and restrictions.
The planned organization of the institutions governing future
international economic transactions implied certain specific
political and social institutions in the participating coun
tries themselves. It seems impossible that a country partici
pating in such a scheme could conceivably choose a socialist
framework. Gardner, (1969:lxxxviii) describes the planning
for these multilateral international institutions as not mak
ing "very many concessions to the special problems of commun
ist participation." The subsequent withdrawal of the Soviet
Union and other Eastern European countries in the years immed
iately after the war bears this out (although other arguments
for their withdrawal are also valid).
The entire planning leading up to and including the ne
gotiations at Bretton Woods in 1944 were clearly dominated by
the U.S., Great Britain, and Canada. The eventual solutions
may have been facilitated by their common ideological and in
stitutional background. Not surprisingly, the special problems
of the developing countries were not recognized at the time and
no special provisions were made for them (Rasminsky et_. al. ,
1972:44-45; 47).
l84The British tried to solve three problems which would
necessarily arise if such a liberal trading regime was super
imposed on a world coming out of the war. For one, the monetary
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Aid Agreement containing Article 7 only after it had reached
an understanding with the American Administration about a
trade-off between commercial and financial considerations:
Britain would essentially accept the ideas of the U.S. about
the features of a common commercial policy as outlined in Ar
ticle 7 if the U.S. would accept the establishment of an in
ternational monetary institution that would be able to issue
gold notes (i.e., international credit facilities) on a gen
erous scale with the intent of helping countries with a de
ficit in their balance of payments due to their reconstruction
effort.185
The preparation for, and the actual negotiations at
Bretton Woods in 19M4 —

out of which emerged the statutes of

the major international institutions: the IMF, the World Bank
(IBRD), the unsuccessful ITO (International Trade Organization)
and its substitute, GATT (the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs) —

proceeded with the U.S. believing that Britain had

entered into a contract to abolish restrictive policies. -^6

arrangements had to cope with expected large balance of payments
deficits. Secondly, large amounts of finance capital would be
needed to rehabilitate and reconstruct civilian productive ca
pacities. And thirdly, raw material buffer stocks would have
to be financed to stabilize payments deficits and surpluses and
thus minimize the need for reserves. Only the U.S. had the nec
essary resources to accomplish these goals and it is no surprise
that the final solution reflected the restrictive U.S. and not
the generous British viewpoint.
l85narrod (1972:12) mentions that only Keynes' persua
sive powers and the overwhelming power position of the U.S. con
vinced Britain to accept this trade-off.
1ftf\
In fact some in the U.S. wanted to use their tactical
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Of course, the U.S. had its way.

She was in a dominant po

sition partly because the important economic powers on the
enemy's side were absent from the negotiations.
Prance was represented only by a government-in-exile
and the Soviet Union participated only reluctantly and remain
ed a passive participant.

The allies had just landed in the

Normandy when the actual conference began and it was still
unclear how and when the war would be won.

Only the U.S. had

the resources to ensure a rapid end of the war and then to make
the planned post-war institutions work.

The U.S. was therefore

in a position of military, political, and economic dominance
and so her role at the conference was decisive.

Gardner (1969:

21) notes that the U.S. will most probably never find herself
again participating in a world conference where her power is
as preponderant as at that moment.

The British recognized

their complete dependence on the U.S. and their lack of any
equivalent leverage they could exert. Britain cooperated there
fore with the U.S. in the construction of the post-war institu
tions in order to ensure the pursuit by the U.S. of a success
ful end of the war and her help in the reconstruction effort
(Gardner, 1969:24-25)•187

advantage created by the lend-lease obligations to defeat once
and for all British imperialism (Gardner, 1969:xcix).

^■^Gardner (1969:xxxix) argues that only the war situa
tion enforced Anglo-American cooperation. The common war effort
provided a framework of mutual orientation which was translated
into economic and political cooperation. This mutual under
standing dissipated rapidly with the end of the war.
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In this situation, the compromise bringing about the
formal results of the Bretton Woods Conference and the fol
lowing negotiations seemed to be overshadowed by the reality
of continuous U.S. dominance.

Both the Anglo-American Loan

Agreement of December 1945 settling the lend-lease issue and
the inaugural meeting of the IMP and IBRD at the Savannah
Conference in March 1946 bear the stamp of American power
(Gardner, 1969 :267):188
The Savannah Conference revealed a serious division
between the United States and Britain on the character
of the financial institutions they had constructed in
the war. The British, led by Keynes, inclined towards
the view that the Fund and Bank should be purely finan
cial institutions, directed mainly by a staff of inter
national civil servants. The Americans, led by Vinson,
sought to subject the institutions to close control by
national governments. The political and economic cir
cumstances of the transition period made it virtually
inevitable that the American view point should finally
prevail.
The Bretton Woods compromise itself appeared as a trade
off between U.S. and British aims.

The U.S. managed to scuttle

l88The U.S. made increasingly sure that the IMP and
World Bank lending policies did not contradict U.S. foreign
policy once the tensions with the Soviet Union began to in
crease (Gardner, 1969:196):
In the case of the Bretton Woods institutions....American
resources had already been put under international control.
But it was not too late to ensure that the resources of
the Fund and Bank were employed in conformity with American
political interests. The powerful voice which the U.S. had
in the operation of these institutions soon began to make
itself felt. The political question came up most directly
in the case of the Bank. Although the Articles required
it to be non-political in its lending policy, the Bank made
it clear almost from the very beginning of its operations
that it would take account of political factors in consid
ering requests from members of the Soviet bloc.
See Hayter (1971) and Payer (1974) on the use of these institu
tions to pursue U.S. objectives in UDC.
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the far-reaching institutional proposals of the British gov
ernment.

In turn Britain gained recognition for many excep

tions and safeguards which were deemed necessary, as a second
best solution, under the general American framework.

The U.S.

succeeded in obtaining a general commitment to liberal trade
rules.

Preferential tariffs were to be reduced in the course

of a general tariff reduction.

Non-tariff barriers (e.g. quo

tas) were ruled out in principle.

They would be tolerated .or

a unspecified transition period in order to support similarly
transitional capital controls under IMP rules.

After the nec

essary adjustment to peace time, such barriers would be allowed
only in support of protective agricultural policies (of the
American type) and in case of certain persistent payments de
ficits (Gardner, 1969:148-153).189
Britain gained a general commitment from the U.S. to
full employment policies, although the guarantees were far
from iron-clad.

Britain had hoped for a rule that would pre

vent deflationary internal policies spreading unemployment to
the world at large as was the case in the Depression.

Britain

herself was determined to insure full employment at home in
order to protect her internal order even if in the course of
such policies the balance of payments would go into a deep def
icit.

However, the general rule adopted stated that such pol

icies were only in conformity with the principles of Bretton
Woods if they were compatible with the "international under-

IB9But

even then quotas would have to be applied in a
non-discriminatory way.
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takings designed to promote an expanding volume of inter
national trade and investment in accordance with compara
tive efficiencies of production" (Gardner, 1969:147)In the financial sphere, the U.S. succeeded in incor
porating most of its restrictive views into the articles of
the IMP and IBRD.

Both the Fund and the Bank would have only

limited means available.
mental deficits.

The Fund was not to finance funda

Britain did not realize her goal of estab

lishing an institution that could grant the large and unre
stricted credits necessary to finance the payments deficits
that would surely arise in the course of British reconstruction
and full employment policies.

Gardner (1969:110-144) shows

convincingly how in the course of the negotiations the burden
of adjustment was shifted from the creditor to the debtor coun
try.
er.

Britain was expected to be the latter, the U.S. the form
The second-best solution to the adjustment problem in the

form of exchange rate changes gave the IMF the right to criti
cize the national policies producing the need for a devaluation
This gave the U.S., which dominated the Fund, substantial moral
and political influence over other countries’ internal policies
Capital controls were to be abolished after a transition period
however, the problem of the Sterling balances was left unde
cided.

Britain had accumulated extensive Sterling obligations

during the war and had no way to redeem them with foreign cur
rencies.

For one, Britain did not want to give up the reserve

currency status of Sterling as this was viewed as an important
mainstay of the British imperial and commonwealth policy.

On
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the other hand, the U.S. was quite aware that the proposed
solution prevented the holders of Sterling balances to ful
fill their needs on the American market (Gardner, 1969:112121; 213-221).

The financial compromise seemed without any real bene
fit for Britain.

Brian Johnson (1970:120) sees the outcome as

a victory of U.S. conservatism over Keynesian liberalism:
The achievement of getting 44 nations embracing the
opposite poles of political ideology together to hammer
out a new world monetary order was certainly impressive.
The spirit of Bretton Woods seemed to give real grounds
for hope; but the Fund had a pathetically small 'kitty'
in relation to the adjustment task at hand, while the
Bank idea had also been hobbled by inadequate capital.
Indeed, the yawning gap between these institutions' ob
jectives and their substance was so curtailed by the forces
of conservatism as to invite dangerous delusion.
Both the governments of the U.S. and Britain presented
diametrically opposed interpretations of the agreements to
their respective parliaments during the ratification process.
But since the U.S. had emerged from the war as the dominant
political, military, and economic power and controlled the
world currency, its views and demands prevailed.

The history

of the Bretton Woods agreements and the years after the war
showed clearly that the U.S. was quite willing to use her dom
inance to push her ideas on the appropriate economic institu
tions, and, indirectly, on decolonialization, free market in
stitutions, and other ideological viewpoints (Gardner, 1969:
224-253)•
The legal framework of the Bretton Woods institutions
reflected the power situation among the Allies at the time of
1944.

Or rather, it reflected the conception of relative power
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relations that the major powers, essentially Britain and the
U.S., possessed.

The two were not exactly the same.

Britain

was one of the two countries carrying the major burden of the
war.

She still headed a far-flung empire and Commonwealth.

She perceived herself as victor and therefore as rightful pos
sessor of a role in world leadership.

She did not accept an

inferior position in the post-war world and was willing to en
ter into sizable obligations to underscore this leadership
role.

The U.S. was well aware of the historic shift in rela

tive power that had taken place over the last decades and es
pecially during the few years of World War II. As the domi
nant country, she took a leading role in planning a post-war
world order reflecting her interests.

She succeeded in pushing

through the major features of her grand design not without ac
cepting certain British claims that were granted in view of
Britain’s historical position.
However, both governments underestimated the serious con
sequences the war effort had wrought on the British economy,
and especially the time required to overcome the basic imbal
ances created in British productive capacity due to the total
war mobilization.

Keynes and others were probably aware of the

exhaustion of British productive capacity and the seriousness
of the shift in British indebtedness.

Keynes suggestion for

a Clearing Union, which would have granted unlimited credits
for British reconstruction and maintenance of full employment
at home was, in British eyes, the vehicle to reconcile these
needs and the actual impoverished situation of Britain.

How

ever, the unwillingness of the U.S. to accept such a generous
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scheme, as well as her Inability to see the problem In such
stark terms, led to the scuttling of this Idea.

On the other

hand, the British, unwilling to openly recognize the decline
in their power, opted for the incorporation of numerous safe
guards and escape clauses that would essentially guarantee an
independent British policy in the face of the adoped market
institutions unfavorable to British interests.

The resultant

compromise was interpreted in the two countries in divergent
ways.
The U.S., as the dominant power, could enforce her view
of what Bretton Woods was all about.

The British were forced

to embrace the American plans. The result was the collapse of
Sterling, British default on the American loan, and the rapid
introduction of bilateral control mechanisms by all the Euro
pean nations bringing about a world Bretton Woods was supposed
to prevent.

And in the end, the U.S. had to pour $30 billion

of Marshall Aid grants into Europe, doing essentially what
Keynes' Clearing Union was supposed to do (with the difference
that Marshall Aid would not have to be repaid, which had major
implications 25 years later).

In order to make the aid more

effective, the U.S. accepted to support the creation of a Euro
pean multilateral regionalism that discriminated against Ameri
can commercial interests, something U.S. policy was determined
to prevent when she made the end of imperial preferences one
of the central demands during and immediately after World War
II.

Bretton Woods was essentially suspended; it had been cre

ated for a world of greater equality than existed at the end of
the war.

147
In 1958, the reconstruction of Europe ended.

The pre

war power relationships (at least on the economic level) were
more or less reestablished.

The formation of the European

Economic Community created a market comparable in size to the
American one.

The dismantling of the controls on currency as

well as on capital transactions created for the first time the
climate in which the International Monetary Fund and its rules
could play the role planned at Bretton Woods.

World power re

lations and the institutional framework were basically compati
ble, at least temporarily (but see Boyer, 1974:3)-

However,

the continuous rapid growth in Europe and Japan, and the world
wide military and political involvement of the U.S. altered the
relative power relationships in the economic and political
spheres in favor of Europe and Japan.

Bretton Woods, in con

trast, was basically a system compatible with a world where
one country, in this case the U.S., was dominant although not
completely so (as in the years immediately after the war).

As

the relative power of the U.S. relative to Europe and Japan
declined even more, the system of Bretton Woods and the struc
ture of international relationships it assumed were once more
out of step with the real world (Rolfe and Burtle, 1973:60).
The early warning signals of the Sterling devaluation of 1967
and the establishment of the two-tier gold market in 1968 did
not produce a fundamental alteration of the Bretton Woods in
stitutional framework: above all, the pivotal role of the dol
lar and the U.S. was not reduced.

The collapse of the inter

national monetary system in 1971 and the continuous instability
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since then exposed this underlying contradiction between
changing power relationships and an institutional framework
predicated on the assumption of a particular, fixed power
structure.
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CHAPTER VI
STRUCTURING AND RESTRUCTURING: DILEMMAS AND TURNING POINTS
The preceding chapter looked at two structuring pro
cesses with respect to the IES.

In both cases, the dominant

power succeeded to a substantial degree in creating interna
tional structural and institutional conditions favorable to
its interests and those of its actors.

The unequal exchange

system between England and Portugal was characterized by a
compatibility between the power relationships with Portugal
and those characterizing the IES.

The output of the system

itself maintained and strengthened this structure of inequal
ity for several centuries.

The post World War II system, in

contrast, underwent considerable change over the relatively
short period of thirty years as exemplified by the modifica
tions of the institutions decided upon at the Bretton Woods
Conference in 1944.

These modifications and transformations

were the result, as argued at the end of the preceding chap
ter, of contradictions between the actual power relationships
among the participating countries, those power relationships
implied by the created institutions, and the unequal exchange
outcome of the structured IES which favored the countries of
Western Europe and Japan.
In Chapter 3 it had already been pointed out in ab
stract terms that dominant actors may be unable to assure
their continued power dominance over a system for two reasons.
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For one, the systemic ramifications of economic exchange and
relational control activities may have contradictory charac
teristics to the extent that they affect positively (nega
tively) the growth and development of the system but have
negative (positive) consequences for the power position of
the dominant actors.

In this case, the dominant actors face

the dilemma of having to choose between continued domination
and retarded growth and development of the system.

This di

lemma is illustrated in Section 1 on hand of the development
of the Comecon —
(CMEA) —

the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance

and the related policies of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, power reversals are possible in an unequal
exchange system because hitherto powerless actors may ex
perience an improvement in their power position in the course
of the operation of the system itself or due to interventions
in their favor by external actors.

The relatively powerless

actors can then use their improved power position to engage
in a struggle to restructure the system into one more favor
able to their interests and power positions.

The events con

nected with the oil crisis, the struggle between the countries
joined in OPEC and OECD, and the current negotiations for a
NIEPO provide an excellent illustration of the origins, and
possibly early phases, of such a process of power reversal.
Section 2 will therefore deal with the recent history of the
relationship between OPEC and OECD and try to discern a scenar
io for the future.
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1.

A.

The Dilemma between Domination and Development:
The Case of Comecon
Divide and Rule as a Strategy of Relational Control
Divide and rule strategies are a subset of relational

control strategies used by dominant actors to ensure their
continued dominance.^90

Burns and Buckley (1974) have in

vestigated a number of instances where higher-level actors
exercise relational control, i.e., control over social re
lationships and structures, by manipulating and managing in
teraction conditions and processes with the goal of producing
non-cooperative, competitive and conflictive, or cooperative
and harmonious socio-economic relationships and structures.-*-91
Any ongoing social system, like e.g. the IES, entails
a

system of exchange and interaction within a structure of

power differences based on the unequal control over economic,
political, social, cultural and other bases of power.

Such an

interaction system, involving actors A, B, C,....can be con
ceptualized as consisting of at least three systems components

1^(^The study by Galtung (1973) of the EEC is an exception
to the relative neglect of the study of divide and rule strate
gies in social systems. However, Galtung is not specifically
concerned with the socio-economic consequences of the use of
such strategies and the dilemmas dominant actors may face when
using them. Nonetheless, his treatment of divide and rule
strategies is much broader and more analytical than that of
other contemporary students of the subject like Gluckman (1967) 3
Caplow (1968) and Gamson (1968).
■^lBraun (1975) used recently the term "institutional
engineering" in connection with her discussion of mechanisms
for modern incomes policies.
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whose states determine the behavioral outcomes of the inter
action system made up of the lower-level actors B, C,...;(i)
the interaction situation, i.e., the action possibilities of
the actors; (ii) the interaction payoffs, i.e., the outcome
structure associated with all possible combinations of actions;
and (iii)the attitudes and orientations of the actors towards
one another.
In divide and rule strategies, a dominant actor A, e.g.,
an

elite, power group, or institutionalized authority system,

manipulates one or more of these components so as to ensure
conflictive and competitive social relationships and actions
among the lower-level actors B, C,
A uses his power to structure

192

ip^g dominant actor

such non-cooperative relation

ships in order to strengthen his dominance over actors B, C,....
and to increase the likelihood of his remaining in a position
of dominance and power compared to the case of cooperative re
lationships among B, C,....

This means that A uses his power

to socially segment ("divide") the lower-level actors B, C,....
from one another in order to achieve and maintain dominance
("rule") over them.
In many instances, A's main interest is to weaken B and
C, not to organize them for any particularly useful purpose.
For example, the rulers of China (as well as rulers of other
ancient empires) played barbarians on her borders off against

^ Baumgartner et_. al. (1975a) examine the structuring
of cooperative relationships in the case of management-labor
interaction.
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one another with no other purpose than weakening them.

On

the other hand, A may seek to promote a certain degree or
type of cooperation between B and C for his own purposes.^93
Thus, in order to exploit their subordinates more effectively
for productive or defense purposes, rulers bring about or
maintain a social and political organization among the sub
ordinates; but this organization, potentially, can be used by
them to oppose their rulers.

Therefore, A typically tries to

form or structure associations between B and C that are under

IQ?
•7JWhile it might be possible for rulers to foster con
flict, it is likely to impede the performance of intricate
administrative or productive operations. The dilemma is point
ed up nicely by an example from Russian history (Hill, 1947).
During the 1st World War, when the President of the Duma wished
to hold a meeting with various mayors and industrialists to
accelerate the supply of boots to the army, the Minister of
the Interior forbade it, suspecting that they were only meeting
to formulate plans to agitate for a broader constitution.
Yet, because of the potentiality of cooperative link
ages and structures being used for political purposes, rulers
develop strategies such as cooptation, offering mobility op
portunities in productive enterprises or in national bureau
cracies (including the educational system) and creating status
and reward differentiation. Certainly, the ideology of a
'classless society', equal opportunity, and upward mobility
for hard working, 'meritorious' individuals gives persons a
sense of being on their own, and hence maximal social frag
mentation. At the same time, they must, for purposes of ad
vancement, realize some minimal degree of cooperation with
others, especially at their work place. Other ideologies which
contribute to social fragmentation are those asserting that
social rewards should be — need to be — distributed on the
basis of individual achievement thus emphasizing individual
career orientations and status competition.
Such diffuse fragmentation may be more efficient, when
combined with the ideological and motivational beliefs and
institutions mentioned above, in insuring power-reducing di
visions than if the fragmentation entails simply a few large
aggregates, even if the latter are clearly separated on grounds
of ideology, distribution of income, status, or power.

154
his control.194

That is, he attempts to establish a super

vised association or limited cooperation between B and C, in
which they relate to one another cooperatively either under
A's direct supervision or according to rules or conditions A
sets down.

He encourages association for productive purposes

at the same time that he works to prevent the association (its
’cooperative power’) from being used to challenge his dominant
position.
B.

Domination and Development in the Case of Comecon
This dilemma facing a dominant power is well illustrated

by the policy problems within Comecon.

For control purposes,

194l OU;lS XIV’s policy of assembling all the important
nobels at Versailles under his close surveillance, making them
dependent on him(for life style, consumption, settlement of
debts, etc.), and controlling their visits to their palaces
was a strategy of reducing their unsupervised association,
particularly of those who could be potential leaders of a re
bellion or whose estates could serve as meeting places to or
ganize challenges to the king's power (Elias, 1969:272).
Obviously the court of Versailles provided considerable
opportunity for interactions among the nobles. However, court
life was a succession of public events (demanding the presence
of the nobles) where conspiratorial conversations and the mak
ing of plans were difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore,
Louis XIV had a number of Swiss in his direct employ whose only
task was to patrol all the hallways and passages of the palace
day and night in order to observe, follow, and listen to the
people of the court and to report back to him (Elias, 1969:273).
Similarly, interaction between conspiratorial lords and
the masses or their bourgeois leaders in Paris was made diffi
cult because of the isolation of Versailles.
In any event, increased density and interaction oppor
tunities in and of themselves are not sufficient conditions for
group formation among subordinates in opposition to superiors.
As suggested here, the rulers may control the interactions by
obtaining information and regulating them in a variety of ways.
Indeed, association under conditions controlled by rulers may
serve as a reliable prophylactic against associations outside
of their control.
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the Soviet Union wants to keep the socialist countries of
Eastern Europe divided and dependent on herself.

At the

same time, the need to compete economically with a rapidly
developing Western Europe forces the Soviet Union and Comecon
to encourage intra-Comecon trade and cooperation in order to
reap the benefits of an international (socialist) division of
labor.195
Comecon was established in 19^8 to allow for a system
atic economic cooperation among European socialist countries.
Originally, cooperation was limited to coordination of trade.
But since the mid 1950's, economic integration was systemati
cally furthered through coordination of investment plans,
product specialization, joint undertakings, and financial,
scientific and technical cooperation (Wilczinsky, 1970:195)The implementation of such cooperation has followed a seesaw
pattern, partly due to the inherent difficulties in coordinat
ing planned economies, but mostly due to the conflicting goals
of the member countries which were at different stages of de
velopment and the inherent dilemma between fostering coopera
tion and maintaining dominance (Kaser, 1967).

In the beginning,

the Soviet Union was able to exert close control over the eco
nomic development of the whole area through the yearly coordin
ation of plans and the conclusion of bilaterally balanced trade
contracts.

The Soviet Union possessed both the raw materials,

^This example raises questions about the general argu
ment of Galtung (1973) which strongly emphasizes the interest
of the dominant power in simply maintaining its power through
divide and rule strategies to the neglect of other interests.
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technology and Investment goods needed by the other countries.
The Comecon headquarters was located In Moscow; the head
quarters served essentially as a clearing-house.

The domi

nance of the Soviet Union as the center was reinforced by the
development of rubel imbalances in the bilateral trade rela
tionships and the rule that positive balances from trade with
one country were not allowed to be used to pay for a negative
balance with another country.

Therefore, planned clearing

through Comecon action was essential if such imbalances were
to be resolved.

Moreover, to strengthen Comecon and there

fore the leading role of the Soviet Union, stress had been
placed on mutual trade relations rather than on relations with
the outside which might lead to linkages and access to power
resources to challenge the center or to counterbalance its
power.
Economic development, while reinforcing peripheral de
pendency on the Soviet Union based on growing raw-material
needs, generated at the same time increasing dependence of the
Soviet Union on the productive output of the peripheral coun
tries.

The diminishing benefits of early forced industriali

zation increased pressures for an international division of
labor as a device to accelerate growth.

In order to keep the

bilateral dependency structure intact at the same time that
the overall level of multilateral coordination increased, the
Goncept of horizontal specialization was proposed.

Each coun

try was supposed to specialize in a number of industries and
serve as the chief supplier of these products to the entire
Comecon area.

The Soviet Union, due to its size, would have
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been the least specialized at the same time that it would
have been host to the largest number of bureaucratic agencies
performing integrative functions.

On the basis of this struc

ture of interaction, the Soviet Union seemed willing to push
for a supra-national identity of Comecon in the early sixties.
Rumania, the least developed Eastern European country,
was anxious about becoming locked into the position of raw
material producer.

At the same time, it was the country least

dependent upon the Soviet Union due to its own oil supplies
and significant trade relations with Western countries.

The

other Socialist countries seemed willing enough to forego po
litical and ideological independence in order to gain economi
cally, but Rumania refused to participate in this economic
scheme, fearing that economic supra-nationality would be a
tool to ensure political and ideological dominance by the Sovi
et Union (Schaefer, 1972:22; Kaser, 1967:92-129).
Following the failure of the Soviet Union’s plans in
1962, further economic development, combined with the attrac
tiveness of trade with Common Market countries and the reduc
tion of cold war hostilities, led to a rapid increase of trade
between the countries of East and West Europe (Kaser, 1967:
142-143; Schaefer, 1972:6).

This shift from the dependency

mechanism of intra-Comecon trade to an increased involvement
with the capitalist economies began to threaten the Comecon
system of center and periphery.

The Soviet Union was squarely

faced with the dilemma of 'divide and rule’, especially in the
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years 1968 and 1969 (Schaefer, 1972:6-7):^^
It apparently didn't want economic relations among
Eastern European members to become significantly closer
unless the Soviet Union was also included. It didn't
want Comecon members to become too economically involved
with the Western Countries or to develop relations to
the EEC. Perhaps most significantly, it did not want
Comecon reform to lead to domestic reform movements or
to help provide its members with the means to slip out
from under the Comecon yoke.
At the same time, despite its growing complaints
about the economic burden of Eastern Europe, the USSR
had no clear idea of the sort of institutional forms
really needed to solve Comecon’s problems and thereby
bolster the East European economies and reduce the
economic burden on itself.
In the aftermath of the Czechoslovakian crisis of Aug
ust 1968, the problems of continuing the balancing act between
maintaining control and increasing productive cooperation

^ The delicate balancing act of the Soviet Union to
satisfy the competing objectives of dominance — political and
ideological leadership — and rapid economic expansion becomes
quite clear in this description of the Soviet position before
the Comecon anniversary meeting in January 1969 (Schaefer,
1972:35) :
However, whatever its supposed rationale, Soviet com
mitment to the sort of integrated regional grouping that
would include some sacrifice of Soviet sovereignty and
increasing dependence of the East European countries on
each other — particularly in new industrial fields and
for advanced technology -- had to be ambiguous at most.
What was frequently interpreted as an almost self-evident
Soviet interest in a strenghtened, centralist Comecon was
often simply the much more■self-evident Soviet interest
in bilaterally binding these states to itself. Moreover,
the supranational threat to Western Europe posed by the
EEC was a very popular theme at this time, as was the
plan for an international Communist conference, and a
drive for a supranational Comecon would hardly have
served Soviet interests either in developing an alter
native design for Europe or within the Communist move
ment. Although Eastern Europe might be an increasingly
costly burden to the USSR and although it was clear that,
for the long-run economic viability of the Comecon area,
a more sophisticated approach had to be found than in the
past, the way out had not yet been determined.

159
increased drastically.

In particular, the Soviet Union was

faced more and more with the dilemma between maintaining
existing socio-economic arrangements and social control
mechanisms on the one hand and introducing risky reforms in
the institutional and ideological basis of Eastern Europe in
order to increase cooperation among periphery countries, on
the other.

Political and military tightening up combined with

the scrapping of risky economic reforms continued to fetter
the possibilities for economic development at the same time
that it entailed considerable political costs, internally and
internationally, as well as an increased level of military
expenditures.
Of course, the dilemma for the Soviet Union arises be
cause she is not solely concerned with her continued dominance
but has to ensure a certain level of economic growth both for
herself and the other member countries of the Comecon.

This

need to perform arises for one because of the ideological
claim that socialist economies perform better than capitalist
ones.

Secondly, the Soviet Union finds herself in a general

competition and conflict with the Western countries for world
leadership and dominance.

Continuation of the conflict and

maintenance of the already achieved position of world leader
ship demand continued economic development, at least as long
as the industrialized countries of the West avoid long-run
stagnation and recessions.
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2.

A Turning Point for the International Economic
System: The Oil Crisis
A.

Origins of the Power Reversal

It has been pointed out in Chapter 3 that a struc
tured system of inequality is generally reproduced and main
tained because it generates unequal exchange.

However, in

ternal and external events and processes can reverse such a
process of systems reproduction and set in motion a process
of restructuring of the system which brings about greater
equality.^-97

The redistribution of meta-power in favor of

hitherto relatively powerless actors, the starting point for
such processes of systems transformation, can come about for
three reasons: (i) The multi-dimensionality of valuables and
action outcomes generates positive and negative ramifications
for the maintenance of the structured system of inequality.
In part, these ramifications are unanticipated and unintended
by the dominant actors.

(ii) The operation of the system

changes resource availabilities and distributions as well as
their strategic importance for structuring activities.

(iii)

Actors external to the system may intervene and provide sub
ordinate and dependent actors with additional power resources,
new relationships, and different conceptions of acceptable

197
^'0f course, such a process of systems transformation

may end with the elite being replaced by formerly subordinate,
relatively powerless actors, without a change in the degree
of inequality and dependency patterns.
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Institutions and structured action possibilities. 198
Restructuring activities and systems transformations
can be based on or generated by a combination of these factors. 199 The reasons why such initial meta-power shifts go
unchallenged by the dominant actors in the system while there
might still be time to intervene successfully and stop the
emergent process of restructuring lie in the fact that often
the long-term significance of such meta-power redistributions
may be unknown, misjudged, and disregarded (especially by
those in relatively powerful positions).

Several of the spe

cific reasons for this are: (i) Those in dominant positions
are distracted by wars, internal crisis, and problems, so
that others not affected adversely by these events gain op
portunities to develop themselves.

(ii) As a result of pre

vious commitments, and the institutionalized system with which
their position is identified, those in a dominant position
allocate fewer resources to newer, developing areas than com
petitors.

(iii) Cultural and social constraints, e.g., con

cern with matters of 'status’, may inhibit or constrain those
in a dominant position from getting into areas having develop
ment potential, even though they have the possibility to do so.
(iv) Those in a dominant position may be more conservative in

1 9 8

* The external actors may not necessarily act self
lessly but hope to establish a dependent relationship with
those actors of the system which were helped by their actions.

•^^See Baumgartner et. al. (1976a) for a wide range of
illustrations of power shifts and systems transformations.
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outlook, subject to commitments and constraints associated
with their position and way of doing things, and less dis
posed than those in more marginal positions to take advantage
of new power resources or action opportunities that avail
themselves as a result of technological innovations, differ
ential diffusion of education and skills, rise in the level
of consciousness and self-organization of previously less
organized, subordinate groups, emergence of new political
coalitions, and other socio-structural changes.
The history of the oil crisis, which now has resulted
in renewed demands for a NIEPO, a transformation of the IES
for the benefit of UDC, illustrates well some of the points
made with respect to power reversals.

The formation of OPEC,

one source of the recent power shift, is one of the unintended
outcomes of the operation of the IES and of the multi-dimen
sional nature of oil production in UDC.

Since the beginning

of international oil exploration and production, UDC with
proven and potential oil reserves had been pawns in the power
plays of DC and their integrated major oil corporations
(Tanzer, 1967)*

Until recently, it was the UDC which tried

to attract oil corporations to explore for oil and hopefully
produce it when found.

Although the major oil corporations

and their governments often intrigued against each other and

The preceding section has suggested that such a power
reversal may be accepted by dominant actors if their commitment
to systems development is greater than their desire to maintain
their own position of dominance in case they are faced with the
dilemma between choosing to rule and letting the system develop
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competed for the same concessions, the countries granting
them did not benefit.

The formation of OPEC was a direct

response to the unilateral reduction of posted prices, and
thus of the royalty and tax revenues of the producer coun
tries, decreed by the major oil corporations in 1959 and I960
in response to the glut of oil in world markets (Tugendhat,
1968:159-160):201
This was not a large (price) fall, but to the gov
ernments basing their entire budgets on their revenues
from oil it was an extremely serious matter. Moreover,
to add insult to injury, the companies did not consult
them beforehand. The cuts were thus a blow to their
pride as well as their profits. All their latent re
sentments against 'foreign exploitation’ came rushing
to the surface in a storm of emotion, and for once
they were able to sink their political differences to
the point where they could act together.
OPEC was the tool "to make unilateral action impossible
in (the) future, and to ensure that the companies always kept
the producer governments' interests rather than those of any
body else in the forefront of their minds" (Tugendhat,
160).

1968:

The most effective way to prevent the divide and rule

tactics, used by the oil companies and their governments to
play the producer countries off against one another during the
Abadan crisis in 1952, was the formation of a united front
like OPEC.
The creation of OPEC did not immediately produce success.
Efforts on the part of the Arab oil-producing countries to or
ganize an embargo immediately following the Israeli victory in

P01 This reassertion of self determination has to be seen
in the context of decolonialization and the beginnings of the
organization of non-aligned nations.
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1967 failed, and confirmed the viewpoint of many, that the
producing countries were essentially in a weak position. How
ever, OPEC and its Arab sister organization OAPEC provided an
organizational focus for discussion, the exercise of coopera
tion, exchange and evaluation of information, and the learning
of trust, factors which in itself affect relative power.

The

military defeat in 1967 spurred the desire for Arab cohesive
ness (Safran, 1974).

The formation of OPEC and the increased

cohesiveness of the producer countries were important factors
in shifting relative power in their favor.

More important,

however, were the shifts in the demand and supply conditions
for oil, a result of the successful operation of the capital
ist IES of the post World War II period.
In the late fifties and early sixties, most countries
in Western Europe drastically reduced their reliance on coal
as a major source of energy.

All of the DC experienced rapid

economic growth based on energy intensive modes of production
(Commoner, 1976). POP

Oil satisfied a high proportion of these

additional energy needs.

Demand projections assumed continued

rapid motorization, increased use of synthetic materials, and
a dramatic rise in the use of fertilizers in conjunction with
the Green Revolution.

These demand projections, especially if

they assumed rapid economic growth and development in UDC based
on the same economic structure as in DC, suggested a rapidly

POP

Cipolla (1970) contains several papers showing how
shifts in demand changed the power positions of countries.
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worsening supply situation.^03

pn addition, significant im

balances between loci of demand and supply started to emerge
in the late sixties.

Oil and gas production in the U.S. and

Western Europe stagnated or even declined beginning in the
late sixties, suggesting that any additional oil supplies
would have to come predominantly from the oil fields of the
Middle East (Helbling, 1975).
This long-run shift in power in favor of the Middle
East oil producing countries was reenforced by several factors
which affected the short-run supply situation in the years af
ter 1967.

The closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 and the si

multaneous interruption of the TAP pipeline connecting the
rich Saudi fields with ports in the Mediterranean sea increased
market uneasiness as long as tanker tonnage remained scarce.
Also, the market structure of the world oil industry had
changed over the years.

Smaller, independent companies suc

ceeded in gaining concessions.

However, their supplies origi

nated mostly in just one country, making them vulnerable to
threats against their right to continue producing oil.^^
This shift in relative power was first utilized by in
dividual countries and then OPEC collectively to improve the

^M. Adelman (1972b) contends that there was never any
basis for this view about a worsening supply situation. He
maintains that official and corporate statements were propagat
ing this view until the public ultimately believed it, maybe
helped by the beginning discussion on the limits to growth.

It was Libya which perfected this technique at the
beginning of 1970 and realized the first significant improve
ments in the terms of its concessions.
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terms of their concessions.
price by up to 25%-

1970 saw increases of the posted

This together with a rise in the tax rate

on profits to 55% increased the projected oil revenues of the
OPEC countries by $10 billion.

The Teheran meeting at the

beginning of 1971 produced another major setback for the oil
companies and set OPEC firmly on its way of escalating demands
and ultimately unilateral decisions culminating in the oil em
bargo at the end of 1973 and the quadrupling of oil prices
within a period of about 16 months in 1973 and 1974.^05,206
B.

The Transformation of the International
Economic System

The immediate result of the power shift in favor of
the countries organized in OPEC and their actions in 1973 and
197^ was a dramatic increase in present and predicted future

5> T h e shah Qf Iran apparently felt up to the time of
the Teheran meeting that the slightest failure of OPEC to real
ize its maximal demands would shatter OPEC unity and coopera
tion (M. Adelman, 1972b:8l). M. Adelman (1972b:90-92) mentions
that U.S. obstruction, or at least inaction, prevented OECD
from developing a common strategy of the consumer countries
in the crucial years 1970 to 1972. Also, the constant talk
by U.S. officials about the danger of higher oil prices and
limited production levels for the well-being of DC, as well as
the admission of OECD that contingency plans were non-existent,
actually encouraged OPEC to up its demands and escalate the
threats in case of their non-acceptance.
206^jhiie the successes strengthened the cohesion, and
therefore the power of OPEC, the differential impact of in
creased oil prices on the OECD countries as well as their
different political, military and cultural interests in the
Middle East led to increased divisions and distrust among
them (M. Adelman, 1972a).
These divisions were very cleverly encouraged by the
various producer countries in a reverse divide and rule strategy.
The administration of the embargo and production cutbacks were
a prime example of the use of this tactic (Field, 1975).
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state revenues, and for some countries, In foreign exchange
reserves.

A World Bank Study in June 1974 predicted accumu

lated foreign exchange reserves by all the OPEC countries to
gether of $650 billion by 1980 with yearly additions there
after of $100 billion until 1990.

Later studies were more

optimistic assuming a total accumulation of reserves of $300
billion (in 1974 dollars) by 1980 with net reductions begin
ning in 1990 (Chenery, 1975).^07
Some voices called for a serious consideration of a
U.S. military intervention in the Middle East to destroy OPEC
and save the DC from economic strangulation and political
2n O
blackmail (Kissinger, 1975a; Tucker, 1975a).
Others plead
ed for a collective search for a compromise between the con
flicting interests of OPEC and OECD countries instead of the
dangerous and destabilizing scramble to conclude bilateral
deals or to seek individual solutions (Farmanfarmaian et. al.,
1975)-

In this situation, Chenery (1975) took the position

that the oil-price and recycling problem was likely to remain
a short-run one.

Substantial financial net flows to the OPEC

countries would exist only up to 1985-

The only required re

sponse was therefore the creation of institutions capable of

2°7a H these forecasts are based on highly conjectural
assumptions about economic growth rates, future rates of energy
growth, the development of alternative energy resources, OPEC
pricing policies and the absorptive capacity of the OPEC coun
tries. The latter is very much subject to political decisions
on foreign aid and the stockpiling of weapons (Tucker, 1975b:
49-51).
208prj_ecj an(i Schultze (1975) conclude that the economic
policies chosen in response to the oil price increases worsened
their recessionary effect in the OECD countries.
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recycling the funds accruing In the treasuries of the OPEC
countries and a step-up in foreign aid to finance the in
creased payments deficits of the non oil-exporting UDC.
Chenery arrived at this optimistic view by comparing the mag
nitudes of the financial flows of the Marshall aid program
and the OPEC-OECD case.
For Chenery, the major difference between the two
cases is that Marshall aid was largely grant aid while a sub
stantial portion of OPEC revenues will be invested in stocks,
bonds and real estate in DC.

Consequently, Chenery corrects

the Marshall aid example for hypothetical

debt servicesin the

form of interest and dividend payments at

5$ as well asa re

payment of the principal over six years.

Chenery's calcula

tions show that the present problem is in fact no problem as
long as the DC keep their growth rate at their historical lev
el (Chenery, 1975:256-287):
When put in these terms, the adjustment to higher oil
prices that is now required is shown to be of somewhat
lesser magnitude than the postwar adjustment process.
The proportion of imports to be financed by external
capital in the first five years is only half as great,
and it will not be necessary to limit the growth of
non-oil imports in order to close the trade gap with
OPEC. Although there was little repayment of the actual
postwar debt, the growth of exports and GNP after 1950
was rapid enough to have permitted such repayment with
little effect on continued growth. The important les
son of the postwar period is that such a large restruc
turing was accomplished with relative ease because eco
nomic growth was sustained at a high rate.
This reassuring analysis is misleading because of its
purely economic focus and reasoning.

The oil price problem

is merely one facet of a multi-dimensional problem which in
cludes the Arab-Israeli conflict and has at its root a struggle
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over the distribution of control and power within the world
system.

The OPEC countries are now in a position to demand

a greater influence in the determination of the form and con
tent of this system.

They seek to utilize their increased

power to increase their power and control in other spheres,
for purposes of structuring a world system which would allow
them to realize more effectively their own aspirations for
self-determination, economic development, and political im
portance (Hoveida, 1975).
Seen in this light, the difference between the flow of
Marshall aid and petro-dollar recycling is not just a formal
one.

The former took the form of grants, the latter will be

based mostly on commercial financial transactions according to
capitalist rules applicable to consumers who produce less than
they want to consume, and who then have either to sign future
claims on their productive capacity or to transfer property
rights.

It is therefore inappropriate to proceed in the anal

ysis, as Chenery does, simply by adjusting for debt amortiza
tion in order to make the Marshall aid case comparable to the
present one.

Rather, the various power and control aspects of

international relations in the Marshall aid situation and the
current oil crisis, must be taken into account in a systems
analysis.

Prom such a perspective, several comments can be

made about specific limitations of Chenery's analysis as well
as about the likely scenario for the restructuring of the
world system.
In arguing that the problem of recycling may not be as
acute as first appearances would have suggested, Chenery shows
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that the debt service on the funds accruing to OPEC will re
quire only half as much of GNP or exports of the OECD coun
tries in 1985 as the Marshall aid countries would have had to
pay in 1955 had their grants in fact been loans,

In this hy

pothetical case, the industrialized countries of Western Eu
rope would have had to use maximal 3.1$ of their GNP or 13$
of their export revenues, to service their debts.
these countries did not have to do this.

However,

To argue, therefore,

that the OECD countries could easily manage the predicted endebtedness to OPEC because it would require, in 1985, at most
half as large a debt service charge as one never paid in the
first place for Marshall aid is a non sequitur.

Since Europe

did not undergo the type of experience which she will now go
through, Chenery's calculations cannot provide us with a re
liable yardstick against which to assess the future.
The reparation payments and massive capital flows in
the wake of wars in recent history give clear evidence of the
problems related to such financial flows and the attendant
transfer of real resources.

The disaster in connection with

the German reparation question after World War I illustrates
dramatically enough the serious socio-political consequences
such a transfer can entail if the appropriate conditions are
not met (Kindleberger, 1968b).

One has instead to ask oneself

what the consequences for the growth rate in per capita con
sumption would have been if the Western European countries
would have had to repay the aid received under the Marshall
Plan.

The outcome of such an inquiry depends on the assump

tions made about what would have been the maximum feasible
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growth rate of investment in these countries where the debt
service charges would have reduced the GDP by approximately
3% below their GNP (in countries that were major aid recipi

ents, this percentage would have been substantially higher).
It is obvious that the living standard of the European coun
tries would have recovered much more slowly and would have
been substantially lower in 1958 than was actually the case.
At a time when internal political conflicts and social dis
ruptions were frequent, even a marginal decrease in standards
of living might have negatively affected the political and
social stability in many European countries, with likely
adverse effects on economic performance.209

in particular,

it would have certainly undermined the claim, so crucial at
that time, of superior performance of capitalist economies as
compared to socialist ones.
One can wonder how such reduced economic recovery in
the years 1948-1960 would have affected France's reaction to
the trauma of the military defeat in Indochina, the loss of
Algeria, and the dramatic ascent to power by de Gaulle which
brought France close to a civil war, even under more favorable
conditions.

Similarly in Germany, the adoption of the Bad

Godesberg program by the Social Democratic Party and thus its
ultimate transformation into an acceptable governmental party
might never have occurred, with altogether different con-'
sequences for political development in Europe.

And Great Britain

% . D. Wallace (1974) shows that continuous economic
expansion and growth in real wages contribute to the mainte
nance of political stability.
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would have been forced Into even more disruptive 'stop and
go' policies in an attempt to reconcile an even larger defi
cit in her balance of payments with the need to dampen class
antagonism through a satisfactory level of consumption growth.
The international implications of such developments in Europe
might have been an earlier decolonization and withdrawal from
East of the Suez with all the ramifications that would have
had in the Third World.
One cannot be as sanguine as Chenery about the socio-eco
nomic and political stability of some of the European countries.
To subscribe to an a priori assumption that these countries
could give up part of their GNP growth increment to service
their debts to OPEC in the years to come without substantial
non-economic consequences is a questionable basis for prognosis.
The dubious nature of Chenery's assumption is reinforced by the
likelihood that most European countries will not be able to achieve the growth rates experienced during the fifties and six
ties, for reasons unrelated to the oil crisis but related to
the deep structural misallocations of resources in most advanced
capitalist countries (Tucker, 1975a:50-51; Barraclough, 197^0 •
A global and systematic analysis of world restructuring
has to be based upon a careful and extensive examination of
international economics and politics and their interrelation
ships.

One should not forget that at any one moment, a coun

try's position as either an international net-lender or netborrower can determine its options in international politics.
Great Britain used her foreign assets (held by government and
citizens) to acquire the foreign exchange necessary to finance
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her military efforts both in World War I and in the begin
ning of World War II.

When she began to run out of foreign

exchange reserves shortly before the U.S. entrance into
World War II, her need for U.S. financing of her continued
war effort (which ultimately occurred through the lend-lease
program) led throughout the war to attempts by the U.S. to
use the leverage thus gained.

The U.S. used her position to

pressure Britain into acceptance of her grand design for a
post-war world order as illustrated in Section 2 of Chapter 5*
The U.S. found herself similarly restricted in her freedom to
pursue her interests in the sixties when the unwanted dollar
accumulation in European hands forced the U.S. government to
restrict capital exports as well as revise the Vietnam strat
egy.

If the Marshall Plan had been based on loans instead of

grants, this dollar overhang would never have occurred, since
the European countries would have had to use their dollar
earnings to repay their debts to the U.S.
Mot only does Chenery disregard these economic and non
economic differences between grant aid and straight forward
lending and borrowing as in the OPEC - OECD relationship, but
he fails to consider the essential nature of debt financing.
Financial flows are always balanced by a flow of property rights
in the opposite direction.

Either the property rights take the

form of direct ownership of productive assets as in the case of
the purchase of corporate stock and real estate, or they rep
resent indirect claims on productive assets or future produc
tion through the acquisition of government and private securi
ties, and monetary claims in the form of foreign exchange
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reserves.

In any case, such property rights are multidimen

sional in a capitalist system.

Their holders are, explicitly

or implicitly empowered to ensure the safety and profitability
of their investments.

They have the right to use the property

thus controlled commensurate with their overall objectives,
not just their economic goals (Friedman, 1962).

The property

owner in the capitalist system has the right to influence, or
to try to influence, social, cultural and political processes
by using the economic resources under his control.

This in

cludes the right to try to secure a political regime amenable
to his own ideological and political views.

Many historical

examples show that foreign investors used their own and their
government's resources to put pressures on the governments of
the country in which their property interests lay if they felt
these interests threatened.210
The members of OPEC as well as LDC's in general have a
vision of a world order where there is less material inequity
and where countries can participate on a more equal basis in
international affairs.

This vision is fundamentally incompat

ible with the present system in which the industrialized coun
tries consume most of the world's resources

and, until re

cently, imposed their views and interests on international
organizations and the world community as a whole.

PI 0

The member

Chenery argues that even at the height of OECD endebtment to OPEC, at most 2% of total OECD assets would be
owned by OPEC members and that this amount would not be suf
ficient to exercise any influence on government policies of
OECD countries. Such an aggregate assessment neglects the
fact that certain countries will find themselves in debt to
OPEC to a much larger extent than 2%.
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countries of OPEC are utilizing their newly gained power to
try to restructure the present world system into one more
compatible with their desires and aspirations. Pi 1
Therefore, we would expect that official and private
investors from OPEC countries will sooner or later exercise
all their property rights, acquired in the process of in
vesting their surplus revenues, to the fullest extent possible. PIP One can already see how those OPEC members with sur
plus funds use them to begin restructuring international rela
tionships and institutional forms along lines of their
vision. This includes attempts to bring about conditions and
policies in other countries as well as in international agen
cies which are more supportive to their interests or at least

PI 1

Reference has already been made to the statement by
the Iranian premier Hoveida (1975) in the New York Times. The
resolutions and action programs passed by the two special ses
sions of the UN General Assembly in May 197^ and September
1975 (reprinted in the UN Monthly Chronicle of May 197^ and
the UN Chronicle of October 1975) leave no doubt about this.

This is widely realized and feared in the DC. Hence,
the entreaties to OPEC investors to behave 'rationally' and
limit the use of their investments to simply receiving an ap
propriate rate of return without in any way influencing corpo
rate policies; and hence, also the increasingly obvious at
tempts to scrutinize OPEC investments and to refuse their di
rect investments, if not indirect acquisition of control over
assets, in areas, sectors, and corporations deemed to be of
strategic importance or to be related in some way to national
security interests. However, one important implication of the
present analysis is that it would be naive to believe that the
OPEC countries will remain satisfied with the suggested role
of emasculated capitalists. Their reluctance so far to actively
participate in the management of their investments is much more
the result of their inexperience than their unwillingness to
do so (Field, 1975).
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not detrimental to them.

Already before the 1973 war in the

Mid-east, oil revenues were the basis of foreign aid to sev
eral African states in exchange for their break of diplomatic
and economic relations with Israel.

The first important po

litical results of this new alliance have emerged during the
197^ General Assembly of the United Nations with the suspen
sion of South Africa, the invitation to the Palestinian Liber
ation Organization to present their viewpoint, and the exclu
sion of Israel from UNESCO regional activities.

The U.S. de

nounced the recent majority votes in the 197^ General Assembly,
which went against its own interests, as a dangerous dictate
by countries possessing only nominal voting power.

However,

these majorities are significantly different from those that
used past UNCTAD conferences to demand new international trade
and finance relationships, demands which were simply ignored
by the industrial countries when they went against their own
interests.^13
Of course, there remain questions as to the extent that
OPEC members can transform oil wealth into military and indus
trial power.

There is also a question as to how solid money

power can be if it is based largely on foreign currency re
serves which have ultimately to be kept in the banks of the in
dustrialized countries (Mikdashi, 197^:29-30; Bergsten, 197^a).

^The present majority obviously possesses more than
purely nominal votes. The Middle East countries have demon
strated their ability to realize a transfer of wealth of ex
traordinary proportions — enabling them to buy industries and
arms — as well as to threaten the stability of the world fi
nancial system, which is still of greater importance to the
well-being of the industrialized nations than to their own.
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However, the reserves provide the tool to exercise power now
and to protect those reserves In the future.

The OPEC coun

tries, together with other UDC, have already used their newly
won leverage to demand and obtain an increase In their IMF
quotas (McDonald, 1975)*

They have also carefully limited

the role of the IMF and the World Bank in the oil revenue re
cycling.

The IMF oil facility has not been renewed for 1976,

and most countries in the Middle East seem to prefer to allo
cate their surplus funds to their own development funds and
regional development banks under their control (Field, 1975)*
However, an increase in OPEC lending to the World Bank and the
IMF will provide these countries generally with the subtle
policy influences in borrowing countries which the U.S. and
other DC have enjoyed in the past.^l^

And while the OPEC coun

tries do not yet possess the military power necessary to protect
their interests in case some major industrial countries default
on their loans, the threat of a selective boycott, which will
be easier to enforce once oil supplies are arranged directly
between state-controlled oil corporations in the producing and

g-p
The discussion by the OECD countries about the es
tablishment of a recycling and credit facility was a repeti
tion of the negotiations in Bretton Woods (see Chapter 5)The European countries tried to establish a credit facility
under IMF control where they possess a collective veto. The
U.S., however, proposed and succeeded in gaining approval of
a relatively large emergency credit facility under the auspices
of OECD. This would have ensured U.S. control. Kissinger
(1975a) indicated that European countries in need of credits
would have to adopt policies in line with American views on en
ergy conservation, a common front of oil-consuming countries,
and- appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. France’s oppo
sition to this plan was essentially based on its reluctance to
accept reestablishment of U.S. hegemony.

178
consuming countries, will suffice to extract appropriate
compensation.
Although some assurances have been given by Mid-East
Investors that they do not Intend to exert management control
over the corporations In which they have Invested, they none
theless acquire a base from which to isolate Israel commer
cially and, in general, to lobby in other countries for proArab policies.

In early 1975, we already witnessed the first

attempts to boycott Western investment banks doing substantial
business with Israel.

It also seems that most manufacturing

corporations and large trading firms participate in the Arab
League's economic boycott against Israel.
The Middle East oil countries and OPEC clearly intend
to use their newly acquired power to the fullest in order to
remodel the world system, particularly its institutional
structure, in a way that would guarantee their long-run eco
nomic development and their leverage in world politics.
present conditions, they

Under

have a unique opportunity to reverse

the long trend of uneven development that was imposed on them
by the DC.

Of course, it is too early to tell if they will

succeed in this endeavor, even if they participate in a close
alliance with other UDC.

However,

it is clear that the DC

have already

lost their freedom to act unilaterally and that

they have to

at least discuss with some seriousness together

with all the

UDC the shape of the future NIEPO.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The five case studies in the preceding chapters illus
trated and elaborated on the concept of the structuring and
restructuring of various aspects of the past and the present
IES.

They have illustrated in a preliminary way the useful

ness and fruitfulness of the systems approach to the political
economy of the IES advocated in the beginning chapters.
This particular approach is clearly applicable to the
type of problems which involves changes in the institutional
and structural conditions of a system.

This is the case, of

course, with the development of new economic institutions it
self.

We are not lacking examples in the IES of today: New

international monetary rules, rules governing foreign direct
investments, the issues discussed at the UN conferences on the
Law-of-the-Sea, or the discussions at a wide range of forums
concerned with the realization of a NIEPO itself.
Another area of economics where the systems approach
is fully justified is in the analysis and modelling of devel
opment and the economic activities related to it.

Economic

development is not possible without development in other spheres
of a system.

It is a multi-spheric process and therefore in

volves the multi-dimensional qualities of valuables in an es
sential way.

Development also means changes in traditional

forms of behavior, the adaptation of institutions to changing
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economic forces, and the structural transformation of rela
tionships among actors and of actors to forms of property.
Development, therefore, involves necessarily the redistribu
tion of relative, if not absolute, shares of income and wealth.
It also changes the strategic importance for further develop
ment of resources, skills, knowledge and capabilities, of
status and positions in networks of relationships.

Consequently,

development affects the positions of power and meta-power of
the actors in the developing system.

It is therefore by neces

sity a process full of conflicts and struggle and will involve
structuring and restructuring processes.

That is, development

is a social process which builds on the basic elements and
concepts of the systems approach advocated here.

To the extent

that one wants to derive policy implications, for example for
international trade, finance and investment, in the context of
development, the systems approach developed and illustrated
here is necessarily the correct one.
In general, one can say that the study of any economic
problem or topic should be based on the systems approach the
longer the time period is over which the problem is to be
modelled, studied, and analyzed.

Increasing lengths of time

imply greater probabilities that institutional and structural
changes and transformations may occur and introduce changes
in the values of the structural parameters of an economic
model.

This means that the investigator has to be open to the

possible occurrence of such systems transformations and break
points in the behavioral patterns to be modelled.

The choice

between the traditional ceteris paribus short-run approach where
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systems stability is assumed, and a long-run systems approach
where systems transformation is possible, cannot, however, be
based on an a priori and rather arbitrary judgement by the
researcher himself.

Rather, the decision has to be made after

the situation has already been assessed in a preliminary way
with the help of such a multi-level systems approach itself
(Baumgartner et_. al., 1976b).
Such a procedure and the actual formal modelling of
systems transformations demand the availability of a multi
level methodology which can determine the presence of and eval
uate the nature of such transformations.

Unfortunately, this

methodology is not yet available and we are still stuck with
the ad hoc techniques used in econometrics to deal with break
points and transformations: A judicious choice of the time
period for which the data is analyzed, the introduction of
dummy variables, and the re-estimation of the structural vari
ables of a model whenever its predictive power diminishes
(Baumgartner et_. al., 1976b

The lack of such a method

ology as well as the early stage at which the systems analysis
of economic problems finds itself have limited the present in
quiry to the use of historical case studies in support of the
arguments and propositions advanced.

It is clear that further

systematic research and a formalization of the, often implicit,
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These econometric techniques indicate that economists
frequently encounter economic systems which exhibit feedback
patterns linking the operation of the systems and their struc
tural and institutional constraints. Economists, however, seem
to be reluctant to accept the consequences and struggle openly
with the theoretical and methodological problems involved in
the modelling of the complete systems.
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propositions contained in this inquiry are necessary in order
to fully exploit the richness of the systems approach.
Of course, the particular systems approach to the po
litical economy of the IES presented here is only the begin
ning of a longer-term research effort.

It is therefore some

what premature to develop specific policy implications with
respect to international economic exchange problems and future
forms of the IES.

The research reported here is primarily de

signed to propagate the systems approach to problems of the
IES and to alert researchers to the possibility of break-points
and the importance of modelling economic problems in the way
it has been attempted here for problems of the IES.
Future research should give some priority to the fur
ther investigation and development of three concepts introduced
here.

For one, it is essential to clarify the concept of sys

temic ramifications.

This includes the concrete specification

of (i) the decision models used by the different actors in the
hierarchy of actors, (ii) the multiple dimensions of the valu
ables used by actors in a system, and (iii) the spin-off and
spill-over effects that occur because of economic actions in
specific socio-economic contexts.

Secondly and related to the

first topic, it is important to fully develop a theory of power.
This includes the determination of the valuables which give
actors power and meta-power, and under which circumstances and
to what degree.

It also involves the development of a complete

model of the processes through which power is translated into
actual systems states.

And thirdly, the multi-dimensionality

of valuables, the concept of systemic ramifications, and their
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power implications imply a theory of value different than the
ones commonly implied by neo-classical and marxist economic
theories.

But this problem raises a whole series of philo

sophical and scientific questions which it is difficult to
treat so early in this research effort.
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